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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
“How dreadful!” cried Lord Henry.  “I can stand brute force, but brute reason is 
quite unbearable.  There is something unfair about its use.  It is hitting below the 
intellect (Oscar Wilde, 1891).” 
1.1: The Assumption of Predictability and its Relevance 
The Assumption of Predictability in Investing 
Predictions pervade economics and investing in its theory and practice.  
Specifically in investment theory and its practice, stochastical predictions 
dominate.  A stochastical prediction is a prediction of an average outcome with a 
probability distribution attached.  But do statistics predict in investing?  Is it, to 
paraphrase Oscar Wilde (1891), un-fair to use the brute reason of statistics for 
investing if statistics cannot stand the test of the intellect?   
Besides its mere intellectual relevance, the assumption of predictability is relevant 
for academia in economics and investing because the opposite case of 
unpredictability and its consequences are outside the mainstream conversation and 
therefore need attention.  From a societal point of view, the assumption of 
prediction in economics and investing has consequences for the economy, the 
financial wealth and well-being of people, witness the consequences of the credit 
crisis of 2008.  Practice based on investment theory means that if the theory fails, 
the risk management fails as well, and, that the investment portfolios do not deliver 
a sufficient return, meaning that the clients will suffer from lower than expected 
wealth in investments and pensions.  The general public also suffers from failing 
financial risk management indirectly: in the United States, the credit crisis of 2008 
and its consequences caused an conservatively estimated loss of foregone 
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economic growth of 40 to 90 percent of a one year’s GDP, or $6 to 14 trillion, 
which equals $50,000 to $120,000 for every household in the United States 
(Atkinson, Luttrell & Rosenblum, 2013). 
 
The discussion of the received view of predictability and its related idea of rational 
markets, is also relevant for the financial services industry, their supervisors such 
as central banks, and the policy makers.  The financial services industry can 
improve their risk management and their long term added value for clients, which 
both help the continuity of their businesses in the long run.  Central banks and 
policy makers should include unpredictability and irrationality in their policies of 
supporting trust, stability, and healthy growth, by distrusting low volatility, booms 
in the stock and housing markets, and, so-called optimistic new era thinking about 
the future of the economy (Shiller, 2000), as a reason for loosening restrictions on 
lending of banks, borrowing of households, and regulations and capital 
requirements for the financial sector. 
 
The Queen and Economic Prediction 
After the credit crisis in 2008 Queen Elizabeth asked an economist “Why did no 
one see the crisis coming (Skidelsky, 2009b)?”.  The Post Keynesian Robert 
Skidelsky argues that the question makes sense, because economics presents itself 
as a predictive discipline like a natural science.  To elaborate on the Queen’s point, 
economics, besides its theoretical purpose, indeed serves the practical purpose of 
decision making: therefore individuals and the society should understand whether 
economics predicts, or which parts of it predict, and to what extent the prediction is 
merely general, or meant to be specific.  To make sure, our society perceives 
economics as a predictive discipline.  Philip Mirowski (2013, p. 246 and further) 
distinguishes three reasons for the perception that economists should predict:  
 
1. Milton Friedman’s methodological paper (1953) proposed the goal of 
prediction for economics,  
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2. a lot of economists have made a living out of predicting, and,  
3. finance and economics made prediction since the 1980s central to the 
theory, among other things founded on the rational expectations 
theory. 
 
But economics resembles other social sciences, and does not predict either: “It is 
only by imagining a mechanical world of interacting robots that economics has 
gained its status as a hard, predictive science (Skidelsky, 2009b).”  Skidelsky 
believes that the credit crisis has been aggravated as a consequence of the 
intellectual failure of the dominant neoclassical school of economics, which 
assumes a stable world with rational agents and efficient use of information 
(Skidelsky, 2009a).  In the credit crisis, the ideology of the rational market as 
advocated by Alan Greenspan and others was put to a reality check (Fox, 2009).  
The ideology of rational markets, which implies that the market comes up with the 
true price, makes one forget that the financial market is “a devilish thing” as well 
(Fox, 2009, p. xv).   
 
How statistics interprets data of the financial markets can also offer an explanation 
for the credit crisis of 2008.  The assumptions behind the models in finance seem to 
imply that risk is manageable, but turbulence is normal, not abnormal, in financial 
markets (Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2004).  If turbulence in financial markets is 
normal, modern finance is problematic indeed, in Mandelbrot’s & Hudson’s words: 
 
Financial economics, as a discipline, is where chemistry was in the sixteenth 
century: a messy compendium of proven know-how, misty folk wisdom, 
unexamined assumptions and grandiose speculation (Mandelbrot & Hudson, 
2008/2004, p. xv). 
In line with the ideas of Mandelbrot, Taleb (2010) explains how investment theory 
is a cause of the credit crisis of 2008 because it neglects the consequences of low 
probability events, aka (also known as) black swans.   
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 The Problem with Prediction in Investment Theory 
Modern investment theory assumes that future expected returns and standard 
deviations are predictive.  Markowitz (1952, 1959), generally perceived as the 
father of modern investment theory, leaves no doubt that he believes in the 
predictability of investment returns in the long run.  Investment theory after 
Markowitz’s contribution (1952, 1959) evolves on mathematical statistics: though 
the investment theory of equilibrium on financial markets (Sharpe, 1964) and its 
empirically based successors differ from Markowitz’s approach, the investment 
decision still takes the statistical form of an expected return and a risk in the form 
of a standard deviation.  The practices of financial risk management and the 
composition of investment portfolios in the financial sector have evolved out of 
modern investment theory (MacKenzie, 2006).   
 
Because academic investment theory also constitutes practice, the validity of 
predictability by statistics determines the sense making of decision-making by 
investment theory.  If we assume predictability by statistics as valid, then statistics 
rules investment theory and its practice.  Yet, if the arguments in the dissertation 
persuade that investment theory based on statistics does not predict, the theory is 
meant to support decision making.  Once more, the credit crisis of 2008 may clarify 
the sense making of investment theory in investment practice.  In the aftermath of 
2008, an investor typically could have asked his investment manager: 
 
In the crash on the financial markets in 2008, the MSCI World, the global 
stock market index, dropped 38%.  If you compare the expected maximal 
loss as indicated by the investment model before 2008, with the realized 
loss in 2008, a gap emerges.  So, our model before 2008, based on 
investment theory, was wide of the mark.  Is the investment model still 
correct? 
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The investment manager could have answered in two ways: 
 
1. Yes and no.  No, because the investment model failed in the crisis of 2008.  
Yes, because in the meantime we improved the model: the improved model 
approximates the future reality of financial markets. 
 
2. The question assumes that the investment model delivers real predictions 
of risk and return.  Yet, we use the investment model merely to support 
decisions on investment policy, but not to predict. 
Translated into the language of philosophy, the investment manager has answered: 
 
1. The models of investment theory are based on scientific laws, and 
therefore predict.  Thus investment models result in truth, in the sense of 
the correspondence theory of truth.  The correspondence theory says that a 
proposition is true, if it corresponds to facts (Audi, 1995).  The proposed 
risk and return parameters of the investment model correspond to the 
‘factual’, objective future reality. 
 
2. The outcome of the investment model interprets the future.  The model 
produces fiction, not truth, unless by coincidence.  The investment model 
enables the investment manager to get to grips with the future, and 
enriches judgment with historical and theoretical insights. 
 
I believe that answer 1 is wrong.  Answer 2 is possibly correct, and originates from 
rational behaviour, instead of predictability.  What rationality means will be an 
important theme in the dissertation. 
 
The Relevance for Academia, Witness the Textbooks 
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The case for unpredictability in investment theory is usually no topic in the field’s 
textbooks, in its literature, or in its university courses.  The broader literature on 
investment theory does not debate the possibility of unpredictability, because 
unpredictability is the opposite of the ideas of neoclassical economics.  Indeed, the 
field of modern investment theory seems to ignore the history of economics and 
finance, and current non-mainstream schools of economics and finance, a reason 
why the dissertation will discuss both items.  We will now have a look at what the 
textbooks of investment theory tell us about predictability. 
 
A textbook expresses the normal science of a field (Kuhn, 1996/1962, p. 137 and 
further).  A scientific community founds its practise on normal science.  To 
illustrate the ideas about the predictability of investment returns by statistics, I will 
examine a number of textbooks about investment theory.  A simple test is whether 
the textbooks refer to Knight (1921), because Knight distinguishes risk and 
uncertainty: risk is stochastically predictable, uncertainty does not provide 
predictability.  The textbooks that I examined were a part of my education as a 
MSc in finance and a financial analyst in the post-doctoral VBA-education.  The 
VBA-education is the Dutch equivalent of the CFA-education.  None of the five 
textbooks in my sample refer to Knight (Bernstein & Damodaran, 1998, Bodie, 
Kane & Markus, 1989, Maginn & Tuttle, 1983, Reilly, 1994, Solnik, 1996).  The 
textbooks neither refer to other writers on uncertainty in economics such as Keynes 
(1936, 1937) and Von Mises (1949).  The five textbooks seem to suggest that the 
probability distribution of returns can be estimated in a reasonable way.  The result, 
that the textbooks in my sample do not mention uncertainty, was to be expected 
because the idea of being able to estimate probability distributions underlies 
economics and investment theory.  I do not intend to disqualify the high level of 
the textbooks mentioned as the books elaborate in depth on the paradigm of 
modern investment theory ─ though I wish to see the paradigm evaluated because, 
again, it has proven to be harmful in practice if not fully understood because the 
risks of financial markets can be underestimated.  Though in my opinion the 
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textbooks should incorporate uncertainty, one cannot blame the textbooks for their 
one-sidedness, because learning necessarily ‘indoctrinates’ since in order to learn 
one has to take basic assumptions for granted (Feyerabend, 2010/1975, p. 8).   
 
The Relevance for Society, Witness Political Economics and Political Finance 
Predictability in economics and financial markets relates to the domain of political 
economics as well.  In the socialist calculation debate, Ludwig Von Mises and 
Friedrich Hayek disputed with proponents of the socialist economic model whether 
economics is able to calculate optimal outcomes for a socialist economy (Rothbard, 
1991).  The proponents of a socialist economy won the theoretical part of the 
debate, because the techniques for neoclassical economics can be used for a 
socialist economy as well: if predictability in economics is a proper assumption, 
both the market and the socialist economy function optimally in theory.  The 
conclusion of the theoretical part of the socialist calculation debate confronts one 
with the absurd consequences of the assumption of predictability: both a market 
and a socialist economy are optimal in theory despite their incompatible ideas 
about the role of markets and the state in the economy.   
 
Thomas Piketty (2014) combines predictability of financial markets with the 
political economic topic of income and wealth inequality.  Though he warns that 
the causes of future inequality cannot be reduced to economic mechanisms 
(Piketty, 2014, p. 20), he nevertheless proposes that inequality will grow, because 
the return on financial assets of the richest 1%, outpace economic growth (ibid., pp. 
25-26).  He founds his pre-diction on historical data, and thus supposes that the 
historical return is representative of the future return.  My criticism on Piketty’s 
view on future inequality is that if the return on the financial markets would be 
specifiable above some rate above the risk-free rate, all we would have to do to 
diminish inequality is to lend the other 99% of the people money to the buy stocks 
and other financial assets.  If the assumption of Piketty that the future return equals 
the historic return is true, the result should be a sure gain for the 99%, if in practice 
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there would be enough financial assets available to be bought.  The assumption that 
financial assets yield a specifiable return above the risk-free rate sounds too good 
to be true, and cannot be true, which I will try to underpin in the dissertation.  
Furthermore, common-sense tells us that financial assets risk more than risk-free 
assets, so Piketty’s prediction is too simple, because it does not take risk into 
account. 
 
Another actual account within political finance is David Graeber’s (2011) history 
about the nature of debt and its ethical side.  To him, debt expresses a social 
relation in which debt is a promise of which the repayment depends on power 
relations: to the powerless, debt is presented as a moral obligation, the powerful on 
the other hand are not held to the moral obligation to redeem.  The credit crisis in 
2008 illustrates Graeber’s point: the losses of the financial sector were socialized as 
the government, i.e. the tax payer, paid the bill, seemingly leaving the people 
responsible people in the financial sector relatively undamaged.  Graeber 
(2012/2011, p. 46) regards money as a form of debt as well.  If money is debt, then 
money does not need to possess intrinsic value, unlike in the form of a silver or 
golden coin.  Graeber’s historical account of the term ‘stock’ is interesting for 
investing.  The term ‘stock’ comes from the 12th century custom in England to 
notch the level of debt onto tally sticks, which represented the ‘stock’ for the 
debtor.  The term ‘stock holder’ originates from the custom.  Analogue to his 
political account of debt and money, it seems to me that one could perceive stocks 
as postulated in modern investment theory, as a power relation in the form of a 
promise of a specified return above the risk-free rate and a specified risk. 
1.2: The Purpose of the Investigation 
The idea of stochastical prediction seems to be taken for granted in mainstream 
investment theory.  But stochastical prediction is a problematic assumption of 
investment theory.  As I will underpin in the dissertation, stochastical prediction is 
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a subtle notion which must be based on solid arguments, which cannot be found in 
the textbooks.  Because of the reflective nature of the dissertation, rhetoric, history, 
philosophy, and culture form the major reference to discuss the foundations of 
stochastical predictability in investment theory.   
 
The central question of the dissertation is: What grounds the use of stochastical 
predictability in investment theory?  
 
The central question of the dissertation is investigated by a number of sub 
questions: 
 
1. What is the rhetoric of investment theory?   
The rhetoric of investment theory translates into questions as: what are the 
rational arguments (logos), constitutional ideas (metaphors), and the 
discourse of investment theory?  The analysis of the rhetoric of investment 
theory is grounded on the approach of the rhetoric of economics by 
McCloskey.  The rhetoric of investment theory is under-researched. The 
investigation of the rhetoric of investment theory is enriched by the 
economic theories of uncertainty, the history of finance, alternative 
investment theories, the philosophy of probability, the culture of investing, 
and innovative practices. 
 
2. What philosophy of statistics is applied in investment theory?   
The arguments for assuming stochastical predictability are founded on 
statistics, which is a theory of how to interpret randomness.  The various 
theories of statistics have implicit assumptions about the structure of 
reality, in other words, the theories of statistics have different philosophies 
of probability. 
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3. What are the arguments for uncertainty as the opposite of predictability?  
Non-mainstream economics assumes unpredictability instead of 
predictability and has heavily debated predictability and statistics.  Their 
arguments against predictability and statistics are an important source for 
making the case against predictability. 
 
4. Do alternative investment theories offer a better explanation, modelling, 
prediction or handling method?   
The history of investment theory and current alternative investment 
theories offer various paradigms for investment theory which do not claim 
to predict but focus on explanation or alternative modelling.  It is important 
to show the alternative non-mainstream investment theories because they 
contrast and compete with the received view of investment theory. 
 
5. Can virtue and value ethics compensate the assumed epistemological 
deficiencies of investment theory in decision making?   
If the epistemology of mainstream and alternative investment theories is 
not suited for predicting, practical reason in the form of virtue or value 
ethics can become relevant, also because the ethics in economics and 
investment theory is reduced to merely the rationality of prudence.   
 
6. What explanations offers an investigation of the culture of investing for the 
use of investment theory?   
As an extension of rhetoric, the perspective of culture offers a fertile 
ground for explaining and exploring the behaviour of investors.  I will 
follow Klamer’s approach of the culture of economics because is relevant 
and applicable to investing. Also innovative practices within the culture of 
investing will be considered. 
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The purpose of the dissertation is to investigate  stochastical predictability in 
investment theory by an extensive reflection from rhetorical analysis, uncertainty 
economics, philosophy of statistics, history, culture, innovative practices, and 
literature on alternative investment theory.   
1.3: The Forms of Predictability and their Denial 
In the introductory Chapter, a clarification of the notion of predictability and its 
counterarguments are now essential for understanding the discussion forthcoming: 
what forms of predictability exist, which notions of prediction are applied in 
investment theory, and, what are the main arguments of unpredictability in 
economics and investment theory?  In Markowitz’s investment theory, 
predictability is to be understood as stochastical predictability.  Stochastical 
predictability differs from forecasting: a stochastical prediction explicates 
probabilities, a forecast does not.  Forecasting delivers a number, or a range 
between two numbers, for example of some future price or economic indicator.  A 
stochastical prediction yields a probability distribution, meaning a range of 
outcomes with probabilities attached.  The dissertation is about the case for using 
statistics in investing, not merely about forecasting, though we will see in Knight’s 
thinking (1921) in Chapter 3 that if probabilities and outcomes are uncertain, 
meaning non-measurable, stochastical probability and forecasting resemble. 
 
The Forms of Predictability 
Let us analyse what kind of predictions exist.  The first form of prediction is by a 
deterministic law in which a causal law extrapolates the present conditions to its 
future conditions (Audi, 2006/1995, p. 124).  A deterministic law also shows the 
specific path to a future state.  An example of a deterministic law from classical 
mechanics is the calculation of the place of landing of a cannon ball.  The 
deterministic law relates to an underlying stable structure which enables the 
prediction.  In economics, price theory provides a good example of the appliance of 
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deterministic laws, for example, how demand for goods decrease after its price 
increases. 
 
The second form of predicting is by a teleological law in which predictability is 
possible because an end state is known (Audi, 2006/1995, p. 124).  Now, the 
starting point matters less and the path towards to the end state can vary as well.  In 
physics, the teleological law is illustrated by the experiment in which a ball reaches 
a state of equilibrium at the lowest point of a bowl.  In investment theory, the 
equilibrium theories of valuation (Graham et al, 1934) (Williams, 1938) and the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964) are such teleological theories.  
The theory of valuation assumes that the price of a security will tend to its intrinsic, 
equilibrium, value.  In the CAPM, the continuation of Markowitz’s portfolio 
theory, informational efficiency ensures an equilibrium.  The equilibrium relates to 
an underlying stable structure. 
 
Regularity is the third form of prediction.  Regularity assumes that the future 
resembles the past.  The analogy that future cases equal past ones assumes stability.  
A prediction of regularity is that the sun will rise tomorrow, because it did so in the 
past.  Of course, a prediction of regularity, like the daily sun rise, is upgraded to a 
causal prediction if a more specific scientific theory is available.  Yet, in more 
complex cases, like in economic phenomena, multi-causality denies simple causal 
predictions. 
  
The three forms of prediction, causal, teleological and by regularity, can have the 
form of a deterministic prediction, meaning ‘having one outcome’, or a stochastical 
prediction, meaning ‘having more than one outcome’.  To repeat, a stochastical 
prediction results in a number of outcomes with probabilities attached.  An 
example of a stochastical prediction is the outcome of the rolling of a dice.  The 
structure of the dice causes the outcomes 1 to 6 to appear in equal quantities at a 
large number of throws.  The certainty of stochastical predictions restricts to 
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artefacts such as dices, or in economics to actuarial affairs, in which stability for 
some period can be assumed (Knight, 1921).  To fully profit from stochastical 
predictability, one has to have access to the results of the whole group of outcomes.  
The teleological theories of investing, valuation theory as used in Markowitz’s 
portfolio theory and the CAPM, have an evident stochastical nature: risk 
accompanies the equilibrium value of the CAPM, in valuation theory it is uncertain 
when the price of a security will equal its fundamental value.  Predicting 
regularities by past data is done in empirical investment theory.  The frequency 
theory of statistics provides the apparatus for predicting regularities by past data.  
The frequency theory of statistics also uses the term predictability to indicate 
whether a sample can predict some outcome representative for a population: the 
use of the term prediction stems from the acceptance of the assumptions of the 
frequency theory of statistics and the particular probability distribution applied, the 
stability of the distribution in the future, and its method of testing.  In the 
dissertation will be argumented that, whereas artificial probabilities yield certainty 
over the outcomes of a group of cases, past observations of financial markets in 
general do not possess the apodictic quality needed for stochastical prediction. 
 
Profitable versus Unprofitable Predictability 
Mainstream economics believes in profitable predictability, which is disputed from 
within economics:  
 
The best economic scientists, of whatever school, have never believed in profitable 
casting of the fores (McCloskey, 1990, p. 109). 
 
In the dissertation profitable predictability is relevant; of course, economics 
delivers all kinds of non-profitable predictions, as well as general economic 
principles.  An example of a non-profitable prediction is the certainty of the result 
of the mechanism of interest rate parity by risk-free arbitrage.  General economic 
principles like in price theory predict on a more general, non-specific, level.  The 
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same kind of non-profitable predictability exists for investing: for example that a 
period of rising stock prices will be followed by a period of falling prices, that high 
levels of valuation will be followed by lower levels of valuation, that more risk is 
rewarded by a higher return. 
 
The Case for Deterministic Unpredictability in Economics 
After having discussed the forms of predictability, I will now discuss the denial of 
predictability in economics and investment theory.  Concerning the denial of 
predictability in economics, my introduction focusses on the ideas of Frank Knight 
(1921), who is one the most important thinkers about uncertainty in economics. 
Knight clarifies the assumptions of neoclassical economics, and concludes the 
unpredictability of most economic phenomena.  Knight reflects in the classic Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profits (1921) on the price theory of perfect competition, a 
cornerstone of neoclassical economics.  The mechanics part of physics has been the 
model for economics in the price theory of perfect competition; both are small but 
founding parts of physics and economics: 
 
An abstract deductive system is only one small division of the great domain of 
economic science, but there is opportunity and the greatest necessity for 
cultivating that field. Indeed, in our analogy, theoretical mechanics is a very small 
section of the science of physical nature; but it is a very fundamental section […] 
(Knight, 2009/1921, p. 2). 
 
Yet, the analytical method of physics is effective because few and important 
common elements dominate: 
 
The laws of these few elements, therefore, enable us to reach an approximation to 
the law of the situation as a whole.  They give us statements of what ‘tends’ to 
hold true or ‘would’ hold true under ‘ideal’ conditions, meaning merely in a 
situation where the numerous and variable but less important ‘other things’ which 
our laws do not take into account were entirely absent (ibid, p. 1). 
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The analytical method in physics works in practice because its models are 
approximately true: the laws of physics allow us to build a bridge and to put people 
on the moon.  But the analogy with physics does not hold for economics:  Knight 
argues that price theory, and most of economics, has complicated causes, unlike 
mechanics in which a few common elements dominate.  An extended account of 
the analogy of physics and economics would be out of the scope here, and can be 
found in for example Mirowski (1989).  Knight claims that economics along the 
lines of the method of physics is speculative and dangerous, because theorists and 
practitioners tend to forget that the assumptions are necessarily too simple: 
 
[…] the allowances and corrections necessary in the case of theoretical economics 
are vastly greater than in the case of mechanics, and the importance of not losing 
sight of them is correspondingly accentuated.  The general principles do not bring 
us so close to reality; there is a larger proportion of factors in an economic 
situation which are of the variable and fluctuating sort (ibid, p. 5). 
 
To clarify the difference between the outcomes of mechanics and price theory in 
practice, Knight investigates the postulates of price theory.  His investigation 
addresses uncertainty as the reason why the outcomes of the price theory of perfect 
competition do not match the outcomes in practice: in theory, profit should not 
arise in a perfect competition, but it does in practice because of uncertainty.  
Though Knight’s ideas about uncertainty in economics remain influential, 
uncertainty never became leading in economics as Wubben (1993) shows in an 
investigation of the history of uncertainty in economics: 
 
In tracing trends in the treatment of uncertainty in neo-classical economics, 
following its introduction into economics by Knight, we have found two major 
trends.  First, during the interwar period the Knightian concept of uncertainty was 
first of all restricted to the domain of profit theory; later, it became a side issue; 
and finally it was shunted into a scientific railway siding (Wubben, 1993, p. 53). 
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Knight’s ideas about uncertainty in economics and his investigation of price theory 
contribute to the critical investigation of investment theory and will be explained in 
detail in Chapter 3 of the dissertation. 
 
Knight’s criticism of economics does not necessarily imply a criticism of idealized 
theory as such.  Economics in the form of pure theory has a purpose as well: a 
utopian theory informs us about the difference between the theory and the world, 
and thereby enhances our understanding of the world.  For example, the price 
theory of perfect competition gave Knight the contrast to express his ideas about 
uncertainty in economic phenomena.  In neoclassical economics and investment 
theory, the theory takes the form of a model.  The nature of models is an important 
subject in the philosophy of science.  A model is a simplification and, usually, an 
idealization of a phenomenon (Reiss, 2013, p. 119).  The purpose of a model can 
be to explain the causal mechanism behind a phenomenon, or to predict.  It makes 
sense to model economic phenomena:  the mathematics used in the models 
naturally invites us to be a more precise about the economic mechanisms involved.  
The models of economics and investment theory differ in character: some models, 
like the interest rate parity, do explain and predict like physical mechanics, yet, to 
repeat, Knight’s criticism stresses that models in economics usually lack dominant 
explaining features and therefore have to cope with multi-causality.   
 
The Case for Stochastical Unpredictability in Investment Theory 
Let us now contrast the case for stochastical predictability in investment theory, 
whether teleological or by regularity, with that for unpredictability.  The argument 
for unpredictability is grounded in the instability of the probability distribution of 
investment returns.  The cause of instability is the unpredictable nature of the 
changes in the substrate which ‘produces’ investment returns.  Unpredictable 
changes happen in, for example, the structure of the economy, society, 
environment, investor attitudes, or in expectations about them.  Of course, the 
historical investment returns technically add up to some probability distribution: 
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but the distribution should be qualitatively judged as representative or non-
representative for the future.  Future stability or instability of a probability 
distribution is a matter of belief, which is to be justified by arguments.  The 
argument about future instability or stability of investment returns cannot be settled 
by the statistical method, because the argument lies outside the scope of statistics.  
Prediction in statistics, and in science in general, is grounded on stability, not on 
instability.  A nuance needs to be made regarding the stability assumption, because 
some economic phenomena are more stable than others: say, the sales of foodstuffs 
is more stable than the sales of chemicals or steel which tend to depend on the 
economic cycle: the key is that one needs arguments for stability, its determinants, 
and its expected duration.  
1.4: The History of Modern Investment Theory, Chapter 2 
Investment theory is nowadays regarded as a part of economics, though in Chapter 
2 about the history of investment theory will be demonstrated that investment 
theory as a part of finance has a separate history, and is only since the 1960s 
regarded as economics, that is financial economics.  As is customary in academic 
finance, finance is used in the dissertation to denote investment theory as well.  The 
sociology of science explains the promotion of the new scientific movement of 
finance since the 1960s.  Modern finance had to be ‘new’ because of its new 
paradigms.  Yet, the history of finance as described in the Chapter 2 starts from the 
beginning of the 13th century, when Fibonacci published his Liber Abaci.  The 
roots of finance since the 13th century probably emerged from actuarial science and 
probability theory.  The importance of actuarial science for finance is that it relates 
to the valuation of options, which was needed to solve the practical problem of the 
value of a life annuity.  In France of the 1860s the theory of behavior of financial 
markets takes the step from manipulation and bubbles to the efficient market 
theory.  The first half of the 20th century is full of interesting research on finance.   
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Current mainstream investment theory is founded on Markowitz’s portfolio theory 
(1952, 1959).   Portfolio theory aims to enable an investor to compose a 
statistically legitimate portfolio of individual stocks, bonds, and other assets.  After 
Markowitz determined how a rational investor would act, the next logical step in 
financial economics was a formulation of the market equilibrium of expected risk 
and return.  So, for example, William Sharpe (1964) builds a theory of equilibrium 
in investment markets, aka the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  Another 
continuation of the CAPM is an empirical branch in investment theory, which tries 
to identify anomalies in the efficient market hypotheses (Robert Haugen, 1995).  
Option theory is also a part of modern investment theory (Black & Scholes, 1973).   
 
Besides the history of modern investment theory, Chapter 2 critically reviews 
modern investment theory and shows the alternative investment theories.  The 
ideological criticism of modern finance, political finance, uses elements of 
behavioural and bubble criticisms, and combines them with the criticism on free 
markets in general.  Mandelbrot provides within the rational mathematical tradition 
an alternative statistical theory, which explains seemingly predictive patterns in 
financial markets, wild volatility, and bubbles.  Bubble theory explains bubbles on 
financial markets and their bursting.  Behavioural finance is also insightful and 
helps to reflect on decision making, and explains behaviour of market participants.  
The bottom-up approach of evolutionary finance yields an interesting alternative to 
the top-down approach of modern investment theory. 
1.5: The Theories of Probability and Uncertainty, Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 explains the foundations of probability theory as applied in investment 
theory, and discusses the arguments against predictability and statistics of Knight 
(1921), Keynes (1936, 1937), Von Mises (1949),  McCloskey (1990) en (Taleb, 
2007).  The arguments for unpredictability in economics and investing all stem 
from a lack of future information and the denial of the mainstream statistical 
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theory.  Chapter 3 also presents a thought experiment about stochastical 
predictability in investment theory.  The possible new argument discusses the idea 
of predictability by the rational mechanism of risk-free arbitrage: there cannot 
actually be stocks of the kind that investment theory postulates.   
 
Let us now introduce the two theories of probability used in mainstream economics 
and investment theory with a citation of the Post Keynesian Paul Davidson: 
 
1. The objective probability environment 
Decision makers believe that the past is a statistically reliable, and hence unbiased, 
guide to the future.  This is the rational expectations hypothesis, where knowledge 
regarding future consequences of today’s decisions involves a confluence of 
subjective and objective probabilities. 
2. The subjective probability environment 
In the individual’s mind, subjective (or what Savage calls personal) probabilities 
regarding future prospects at the moment of choice govern future outcomes.  
These subjective probabilities need not coincide with objective distributions, even 
if well-defined objective distributions happen to exist […] (Davidson, 1991, pp. 
130-131, his insertion). 
The objective, frequentist approach regards the probability of an event, as the 
relative frequency in past observations: the approach is the statistics often used in 
empirical science.  The subjective, or personal approach, uses the machinery of 
probability to explicit beliefs, but mixes with the probabilities of the objective 
approaches as well (Savage, 1954).  Leonard Savage (1954) claims that the use of 
personal probabilities is consistent with rational behaviour, which has been heavily 
debated in the economic literature.  The notion of rationality needs careful attention 
in investment theory, and will be treated at length in dissertation. 
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1.6: The Rhetoric of Economics, Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4 of the dissertation, I will present a rhetorical analysis of predictability 
in investment theory along the lines of McCloskey’s project of the rhetoric of 
economics.  Rhetoric is a way of reflecting on science, like sociology and 
philosophy of science.  McCloskey pioneered the analysis of the rhetoric of 
economics (1983, 1985a, 1990, 1994, 1996, and 1998).  Her analysis of rhetoric 
combines the techniques of classical rhetoric with those of literary criticism, the 
latter being a 20th century theory of rhetoric.  With literary criticism she bridges the 
gap between literature and science (1990, p. 30, my insertion):  “The scientific 
report is itself a [literary] genre, whose conventions have changed from time to 
time.” 
 
To gain an understanding of McCloskey’s rhetorical approach, I will first explicate 
her ideas about economics as a science in general.  Despite being a critic of 
economics, she considers economics as the queen of social sciences (1996).  
Economics is about prudence, which is an important virtue in human action.  
Economics is successful as a historical science, but not as a predictive one in the 
sense that it delivers easy profits (1998).  In her words:   
 
Economics is a sort of social history.  For all the brave talk about being the 
physicists of the social sciences, economists do their best work when looking 
backwards, the way a paleobiologist or geologist or historian does (McCloskey, 
1990, p. 31). 
 
Besides being a historical science, economics is a theoretical one as well.  The 
value of pure economic theory is that it gains insights into the crucial assumptions 
in economic phenomena.  The mathematics used in the models merely explicates 
relationships between economic variables and clarifies the working of the 
economic mechanism.  When working at the University of Chicago, McCloskey 
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wrote The Applied Theory of Price (1985b), about applying the mechanisms of 
price theory:  she has arguably believes in the usefulness of applied mathematical 
models, which matter for the purpose of explanation and non-profitable general 
prediction. 
 
To clarify what ‘rhetoric’ means in McCloskey’s project of the rhetoric of 
economics, it is necessary to distinguish between the phenomenon of rhetoric (its 
practice), and the discipline of rhetoric (its theory).  One can distinguish two 
meanings of the phenomenon, and two of the discipline: 
 
1. the phenomenon of rhetoric with a negative connotation 
2. the phenomenon of rhetoric in a neutral sense 
3. the discipline of rhetoric for the creation of rhetoric 
4. the discipline of rhetoric for the analysis of rhetoric 
 
‘Rhetoric’ as the phenomenon in the negative sense means hollow speech, i.e. 
speech which merely aims at persuasion by arousing the emotions of the audience.  
The popular use of the term ‘rhetoric’ as hollow speech is often associated with 
politicians.  Rhetoric in the negative sense can also mean flowery speech.  In a 
neutral sense, the phenomenon of rhetoric signifies that every argument, good or 
bad, consists of rhetorical elements which aim to persuade.  The discipline of 
rhetoric applies to both its creation and its analysis.  McCloskey investigates the 
rhetoric of economics as a neutral phenomenon.  With the discipline of rhetoric she 
analyses the phenomenon of the rhetoric of economics.  I will do the same for 
stochastical predictability in investment theory.  Rhetorical criticism sensitizes us 
to the possibility that a writer, possibly unconsciously, tries to make us look in a 
particular way.  Her project is to analyse the phenomenon of rhetoric by means of 
rhetoric as a discipline.   
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To get an introductory impression of the discipline of rhetoric, I will briefly present 
the ideas of Aristotle (2006).  Aristotle is regarded as having developed the first 
full theory of rhetoric and defined rhetoric as (2006, § I.i.12.2):  “[…] the faculty 
of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject 
whatever.”  Yet, the brief description of Aristotle cannot arguably represent the full 
scope of rhetoric.  In contemporary usage the possible range of meanings of 
rhetoric is even wider than in the classical use and incorporates for example 
discourse, literary criticism, and theories of discourse or language.  In A 
Companion to Greek Rhetoric its editor lists the meanings of rhetoric as employed 
by its contributors:  
 
[…] one can discern the word ‘rhetoric’ or ‘rhetorical’ being used to denote a wide 
range of phenomena, including oratory, parts of speech, prose genres, figurative 
language, performance, pedagogical practices, discourse, the strategic use of 
language, persuasion, and various theories of discourse, language or persuasion.  
[….].  Notably, there are a goodly number of other disciplinary terms that are just 
as broad in scope, including anthropology, sociology, psychology, and politics 
(Worthington, 2010/2007, p. 4, his italics). 
 
McCloskey’s rhetorical investigations have a wide reach as well.  The 
investigations are about style and the implicit or explicit reasons for the particular 
style employed.  They also cover the analysis of the metaphors, the arguments, the 
narratives, the methodology, the philosophy, the science and the discourse of 
economics.  Chapters 2 and 3 will focus on the logos, the rational arguments, of 
stochastical predictability in investing by close reading.  To gain a deeper 
understanding, I will focus in Chapter 4 at the metaphors, the models, of 
investment theory, as well as the discourse of investment theory, and what needs to 
be changed in the discourse, among other things by the inclusion of virtue ethics.  
To my knowledge, no specific literature exists on the rhetorical analysis of the use 
of statistics in investment theory. 
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1.7: The Culture of Investing, Chapter 5 
In Chapter 5, I work along the lines of Klamer’s (2001, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2014) 
approach of the investigation of the culture of economics, which also suits with 
investment theory as a part of economics, that is financial economics.  The analysis 
of culture helps to explain the behaviour of investors.  The central claim of the 
dissertation that predictability does not apply to investing, raises the questions why 
investors hold on to their practices of prediction, and what constitutes the practices 
of investors, seen through the perspective of culture.   
Klamer’s cultural approach fits in with the rhetorical approach applied in the 
dissertation, which has been Klamer’s point of departure as well (1988 & 1992 & 
1995 with McCloskey, 1994 with Leonard, 2001).  Although a conversation 
resembles rhetoric, Klamer (2007) prefers conversation because it relates to a 
community and its cooperative character.  Within the cultural approach Klamer 
concentrates on conversations and values.  By relating culture to economics, 
Klamer (2014) poses a question in the Weberian tradition of distinguishing 
between procedural and substantive rationality.  Economics is about procedural 
rationality, culture is about substantive rationality.  Both substantive rationality and 
culture centre at values, or, the answer to ‘What is important?’. 
The field of culture also relates to uncertainty.  Hofstede (1997) has investigated 
cultural differences between countries in the research project for IBM.  The way a 
culture handles uncertainty is a part in Hofstede’s explanatory model.  To him, 
uncertainty is a feeling of anxiety and as a matter of culture, uncertainty avoidance 
begs for predictive ability by some method.  Using a predictive method such as 
stochastical prediction handles uncertainty by replacing the feeling of uncertainty 
with a rational, technical method.  Thus, risk per se is not the problem of 
uncertainty: the ambiguity of uncertainty is the reason of anxiety.  Ambiguity 
aversion is also a subject of behavioural finance.   
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Chapter 5 also investigates three innovative practices in the Dutch institutional 
investment world by interviews with their proponents and their literature.  The 
alternative approaches are about ‘the management of investment risk’, ‘the Shell 
scenarios approach’, and ‘investment beliefs’. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of the dissertation. 
  
24 
 
Chapter 2 
The History of Investment Theory  
 
“History […] could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by 
which we are now possessed (Kuhn, 1996/1962, p. 1).” 
2.1: An Introduction to the History of Investment Theory 
History Enriches 
The study of the history of investment theory enhances the insight into the rhetoric 
of modern investment theory, its underlying philosophy, and its culture, and 
thereby enriches the dissertation.  At the same time, the Chapter serves to explain 
modern investment theory by studying its seminal texts and treating its rivals.  
Thomas Kuhn (1962), a historian, philosopher, and sociologist of science, 
advocates the study of the history of a scientific field.  An analysis of the history of 
a field clarifies its current paradigms and contrasts them with the previous and the 
competing paradigms (Kuhn, 1962).  His approach implies that science can have 
incompatible theories, and does not label earlier theories as unscientific (Kuhn, 
1996/1962, p. 2).  Yet, the textbooks of a field present the image of science that 
Kuhn opposes: “Inevitably […] the aim of such books is persuasive and pedagogic 
[…] (ibid., p. 1).”  Textbooks are merely meant to explain the leading paradigms of 
a field, are unhistorical by nature and suggest that science is accumulated: 
“Textbooks thus begin by truncating the scientists’s sense of his discipline’s 
history and then proceed to supply a substitute for what they have eliminated (ibid., 
p. 137).”  In their purpose, textbooks merely refer to the work and persons that 
easily can be seen as a part of the leading paradigm; the unhistorical practice of 
textbooks is not constrained to the scientific community “The temptation to write 
history backward is both omnipresent and perennial (ibid., p. 138).”  
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 Kuhn’s historical approach highlights that a dogmatic scientific methodology is a 
constraint on answering scientific questions (ibid., p. 3).  In his perspective, science 
is a way of seeing, which is arbitrarily mixed by personal and historical elements, 
and grounds on a set of received beliefs (ibid., p. 4).  The study of the history of 
science as proposed by Kuhn does not yield the correct theory, but it helps 
understanding the sociology of scientists, how they operate, and provides a broader 
view on the historically competing currents within a field.  The discussion in the 
Chapter stems from three sources: the available research into the history of 
investment theory, the philosophical, critical, reading of a number of seminal texts, 
and the evaluation of the competing investment theories.  The philosophical 
reading of seminal texts and the evaluation of competing theories is, of course, 
targeted beyond the purpose of a textbook.   
 
Because investment theory is a part of finance, the term ‘finance’ is now clarified.  
The broad term ‘finance’ can mean: 
 
1. The practice of manipulating and managing money. 
2. The capital involved in a project, especially the capital that has to be raised to 
start a new business. 
3. A loan of money for a particular purpose, especially by a finance house. 
4. An academic discipline within the general field of economics dealing with 
funding, financial markets, and the funding implications for managing businesses 
(Law, 2014, keyword ‘finance’). 
 
The fourth meaning of ‘an academic discipline’ is relevant here.  Finance as an 
academic discipline can be divided into two subdisciplines.  The “economics 
dealing with funding […] and the funding implications for managing businesses 
(ibid., 2014)” belong to the subdiscipline of corporate finance.  The remaining part 
of the fourth meaning of finance that deals with financial markets is the 
subdiscipline of investment theory.  Corporate finance and investment theory differ 
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from perspective.  Corporate finance takes the perspective of the organisation 
central, while investment theory focusses on the investor in financial markets.  The 
theories of corporate finance and investment theory overlap.  As is customary in 
academic finance, finance is used here to denote investment theory as well.  
Financial economics is another name for finance because modern finance has been 
applying price theory, a cornerstone of neoclassical economics. 
 
Finance and economics have had separate histories.  In the fifties, Milton Friedman 
has denied investment theory as a part of economics during Markowitz’s defence 
of his dissertation on investment theory (Markowitz, 1990, p. 286).  Though 
Friedman could not remember the remark later on, he nevertheless could agree to 
it, because Markowitz’s theory was indeed about applied mathematics, and not 
about economics (MacKenzie, 2008/2006, p. 50).  Finance and economics as 
separate fields, was no strange idea in the 1950s, because the fields have different 
roots.  Finance and economics have usually been taught at different institutions: 
finance has been a subject at the business schools, and economics has been thought 
at the universities (MacKenzie, 2008/2006, p. 5).  The business schools were “[…] 
use-oriented and populated by a faculty of practitioners, operating at the margins of 
university academia (Poitras, 2007, p. 7).”  Yet, institutional developments have 
been of importance to the evolution of finance (Poitras, 2007).  Since the 1960s, 
business schools have often become a part of universities and their intellectual 
norms.  Since then, the evolution of finance has resembled that of mainstream 
economics; like economics, finance has changed its institutional account for a 
modernistic one.  In the twentieth century, economics as a mathematical, statistical, 
and theoretical science has succeeded to economics of an institutional sort, which 
was of a historical, qualitative and measurement driven nature.  Financial 
economics is an offspring of modernistic economics (ibid.). 
 
Since the 1960s, finance has become incorporated in economics and few would 
probably argue now against the inclusion of finance in economics.  Modern finance 
27 
 
is grounded on the theory of full competition, the cornerstone of price theory.  
Because of arbitrage under full competition, the price of a good tends to its cost 
price.  Full competition in finance means for the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), the equilibrium model of financial markets, that the risk and return of 
securities will be balanced.  Yet, a financial market differs from a goods market 
because expectations can be priced instantaneously in a financial market.  
Immediate processing of information is usually not a feature in a goods market, 
because the competitors need time to adapt their production levels, which after a 
time lag feed back into the price of a good.  Therefore, financial markets stand as a 
perfect model for other markets.   
 
In its canonical history, modern investment theory is founded on Markowitz’s 
portfolio theory (1952, 1959).  Markowitz constructed his portfolio theory on 
statistics.  Portfolio theory intends to compose a statistically legitimate portfolio.  
The CAPM, invented by Sharpe (1964) and others, generalizes the individual 
behaviour of the ‘Markowitz’-investor to an equilibrium in financial markets.  The 
equilibrium model is founded on the efficient market hypothesis, which means that 
investors cannot beat the market because all available information has been 
incorporated in the market prices.  The efficient market hypothesis in its elaborated 
form is invented by Samuelson (1965b) and Fama (1965a, 1965b).  Markowitz’s 
mean-variance approach, the efficient market hypothesis, and the CAPM constitute 
the core of modern portfolio theory (Poitras, 2007, p. 5).  Efficient market theory 
also results in the option theory of Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973b), 
another core of modern investment theory.  Option theory treats the valuation of a 
contingent claim, a claim of which the outcome depends on an uncertain 
phenomenon, such as the future price of a stock. 
The Pitfalls of History 
We have to be careful, however, to perceive finance as a new science.  The 
sociology of science (Kuhn, 1962) explains the reason for the promotion of the new 
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scientific movement of finance since the 1960s.  Modern finance had to be ‘new’ 
because of its new paradigms: 
 
Because modern financial economics provides a textbook case of these processes 
[i.e. the processes dominated by sociological factors], it is necessary to disentangle 
the essential intellectual contributions from those that have gained attention due to 
the ‘techniques of the huckster’ involving ‘repetition, inflated claims and 
disproportionate emphases’ (Poitras, 2007, pp. 1-2, my insertion). 
 
Because of education, the promotion of modern finance as a new science has been 
successful.  Usually, the authority argument of academic education persuades the 
student of a simplified history of a field: 
 
One can speculate about how an academic field could so distort its own origins.  
Its history is largely rewritten, as it were, by the victors.  New students too often 
rely on the version of scholarly history conveyed to them by their mentors, who 
themselves are too dependent on their mentors, and so forth (Rubinstein, 2006a, p. 
xii).  
 
Illustrated by the literature, it is easy to find leading theorists who emphasize the 
scientific movement of finance since the 1960s, for example Robert Merton who 
claims: 
 
The Modigliani-Miller work stands as the watershed between ‘old finance’, an 
essentially loose connection of beliefs based on accounting practices, rules of 
thumb and anecdotes, and modern financial economics, with its rigorous 
mathematical theories and carefully documented empirical studies (Merton, R.C., 
1987, “In Honor of Nobel Laureate, Franco Modigliani”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 145-155, in Poitras, 2007, p. 2). 
 
Yet, ‘old’ finance, finance before the 1960s seems mathematically rigorous as well, 
and has carefully documented empirical studies.  For example, Bachelier’s random 
walk theory (1900) or Williams’s valuation models (1938) are mathematically 
rigorous, and many of its empirical studies are documented, such as for example 
Cowles (1933, 1944) and Working (1934) about the unpredictability of the stock 
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market.  The ‘watershed’ mentioned by Merton in the previous citation, has made 
the old finance appear less valuable, and therefore less cited by the new finance 
(Poitras, 2007, p. 3). 
 
It might not be surprising that the history of finance has been ignored as a 
consequence of the construction by the scientific movement of modern finance.  
So, the notion that finance was not scientific before the 1960s, seemed to be taken 
for granted until the 1990s, when the history of finance started to be investigated: 
 
[...] the academic community of modern financial economics only arose during the 
1960s.  One of its major preoccupations was the creation of a canonical history, 
which glorified its past (Jovanovic, 2006b, p. 211). 
Until the 1990s, the canonical history of modern financial economics provided 
what was known about the construction of this discipline.  As with any canonical 
history, it was a means to structure and to legitimize a scientific discipline (ibid., 
p. 191). 
 
Contrary to the canonical version of modern finance, finance has deep historical 
roots, and had been thoroughly developed before the 1960s (Poitras, 1996, 2006, 
2007).  Finance in the 20th century before the 1960s, was concerned with 
accounting (financial statements), legal issues (securities law), and institutional 
issues, topics which are still relevant today (Poitras, 2006, p. 1).  From the ‘old’ 
finance also stem the theories of security analysis and technical analysis, which are 
still being practiced today.  Another topic which was highly developed before the 
1960s is the analysis of bonds as illustrated by the work of Frederick Macaulay 
(1938) (Poitras, 2007).  Macaulay’s work will not be treated here, because the 
analysis of bonds is outside the scope of the dissertation. 
 
A documented start of finance as the technique of providing loans and calculating 
interest, can be traced back to around 2000 BC in Babylonia, but arguably finance 
existed before that time as well (Goetzmann & Rouwenhorst, 2005, pp. 3-4).  
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Because the scope of the Chapter is mostly confined to the history of stochastical 
predictability for finance, the history of finance begins at the start of the 13th 
century, when Fibonacci published his Liber Abaci (translated as ‘The book of 
calculations’) in 1202.  In the work of Fibonacci is for example described how to 
calculate a net present value, a cornerstone of finance (Goetzmann, 2005, p. 123).  
Finance since the 13th century is grounded on actuarial science and probability 
theory: the confluence of finance and economics in the 20th century is more recent 
in historical terms (Poitras, 1997).   
 
A question relevant to the history of science is which authors should get the credit 
for its main ideas.  Inevitably, investigations into history often result in incomplete 
findings, our knowledge of history is necessarily incomplete.  Even if all the 
required historical sources would be available, it would take a long time before the 
sources would be scrutinized and well understood.  Research into the history of 
science has showed that authors often anticipate, or independently formulate, the 
same scientific ideas: 
 
In most of these cases, the individuals commonly given bibliographical credit in 
academic papers were actually anticipated many years, occasionally decades or 
centuries, earlier.  In some cases, there were others with independent and near-
simultaneous discoveries who are seldom, if ever, mentioned, offering one of 
many proofs of Stephen Stigler’s law of eponymy that scientific ideas are never 
named after their original discoverer!  This includes Stigler’s law itself […] 
(Rubinstein, 2006a, p. xii). 
The scope of the current Chapter is, of course, not aimed at performing research 
into old and new primary sources.  But I will consult different sources of historical 
research into finance, in order to compose a history of finance for the purpose of 
the dissertation.  The authors of historical research consulted here are, among 
others, Peter Bernstein (1992, 1996, 2007), Geoffrey Poitras (1996, 2006, 2007), 
Colin Read (2013), and Mark Rubinstein (2006a).  The investigations into the 
history of finance reveal a number of authors, for example Louis Bachelier (1900) 
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and Benoit Mandelbrot (1963a, 1963b, 2004 with Hudson), who are absent in the 
picture sketched by the textbooks of finance: 
 
Intellectual history is replete with examples of individuals making contributions 
that were seminal in content but, by and large, did not receive the corresponding 
recognition and attention (Poitras, 2006, p. 5). 
The Assumption of (un-)Predictability 
Of importance to the dissertation is what the history of finance and economics tells 
about the predictability of markets.  Besides the theoretical importance, the 
predictability of risk and return of investments matters for practice.  As Bernstein 
says, all investors agree that it is hard to get rich by investing:  
 
Yet, in the face of admittedly high odds, enough people do try to predict stock 
prices to keep an entire industry humming (Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 17). 
 
The history of finance and economics tells two tales about predicting: one tale tells 
that we cannot predict, and the other tale tells we can predict.  The efficient market 
theory claims that predicting, in the sense of beating the market, is not possible.  
Though, the CAPM grounded on the efficient market theory, claims that a 
stochastical prediction of risk and return is possible.  Yet, a number of theories in 
finance and economics explicitly says that predicting beyond beating the market is 
impossible as well, see for example Knight (1921), Keynes (1936, 1937), Von 
Mises (1948) or Mandelbrot (1963a, 1963b, 2004 with Hudson).   
The tale in finance in which predicting, in the sense of beating the market is 
possible, has many expressions, such as the theories of valuation, the Dow-theory, 
and theories about exploitable anomalies of the efficient markets.  The theories of 
the valuation of securities imply that if the price of a security on the market 
deviates from its intrinsic value, arbitrage opportunities arise (Graham et al, 1934, 
Williams, 1938).  The Dow-theory, a chartist theory, is an alternative theory of 
prediction on the basis of historical patterns of prices on the financial markets.  To 
32 
 
summarize, the views on predictability in financial markets have, by closer 
inspection, three variations:  
 
1. the theories that believe in beating the market index 
2. the CAPM, which includes the efficient market theory, does not believe in 
beating the market, but believes in stochastical predictability of risk and 
return.   
3. the theories of Knight, Keynes, Von Mises, and Mandelbrot which deny 
any stochastical and other forms of predictability in financial markets.  
 
I like to establish that my dissertation which denies stochastical predictability of 
investments, is a logical extension of modern finance, with its denial that 
predictions can outperform the market.  I do, however, not believe that market 
efficiency implies stochastical predictability of risk and return of investments; the 
impossibility of stochastical predictability I will discuss at length in Chapter 3.  
Then, I will also discuss the notion of uncertainty which is the epistemological 
transitional phase between stochastical predictability and total uncertainty, in 
which judgment, instead of predictability, is central (Knight, 1921).  Judgment 
under uncertainty takes many forms, such as subjective probability, econometric 
analysis, qualitative opinion, ordinal probability, or a general prediction. 
 
In the current Chapter, modern portfolio theory receives a large part of the attention 
besides the historical investigations.  Other relevant underpinning investment 
theories are treated, such as the valuation of securities and option theory.  A 
number of alternative investment theories will be treated as well:  
 
• Keynes’s theories of the beauty contest, ‘efficient market’, and animal 
spirits 
• the quantitative empirical based theories of non-efficiency in markets 
• investing as gambling 
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• the alternative theory of Mandelbrot based on a non-normal probability 
distribution  
• bubble theory 
• behavioural finance 
• evolutionary finance. 
2.2: Finance in Europe in the 13th to 18th Century 
Finance as the technique of supplying loans is as old as antiquity (Poitras, 2006, p. 
2).  The oldest evidence of financial contracts stems from 2400 BC from the 
southern part of Mesopotamia, Babylonia, in the form of short-term loans (Van de 
Mieroop, 2005, p. 20).  For reasons of scope, our historical discussion of finance 
begins in Europe at the beginning of the thirteenth century.  Finance since the 
thirteenth century, concentrates on the analytical problems of discounting future 
cash flows and the valuation of contingent claims.   
 
An important condition for the development of finance is the numerical notation.  
Fibonacci, or Leonardo da Piso (1170-1250) introduces the numerical notation 
from the Middle East to Europe by his Liber Abaci, meaning ‘The book of 
calculations’, published in 1202 (Rubinstein, 2006a, p. 3).  Fibonacci elaborates the 
numerical notation to the finance problems of that time, such as the distribution of 
profit in partnerships, and the discounting and accruing of interest:  
 
Fibonacci illustrates his methods of calculation through several numerical 
examples.  Among these are four types of applications to investments: (1) the fair 
allocation of profits to members of a partnership (‘On Companies,’ […]; (2) the 
calculation of profits from a sequence of investments, with intermediate 
withdrawals (‘Problems of Travelers,’ […]; (3) the calculation of future value (‘A 
Noteworthy Problem on a Man Exchanging One Hundred Pounds at Some 
Banking House for Interest,’ […]; and (4) the calculation of present value (‘On a 
Soldier Receiving Three Hundred Bezants for His Fief,’ […]) (Rubinstein, 2006a, 
p. 4). 
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Finance before the Enlightenment must be considered from its ethical and 
theological context, in which usury and gambling were prohibited (Poitras, 2006, 
pp. 2-3).  Usury means that it is forbidden to charge interest on loans.  To illustrate 
its importance, the forbidding of usury is a theme in the work of the scholastic 
philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) (Sylla, 2006, p. 18).  A common 
division in the stages of the forbidding and reassessment of usury, is the period of 
1150-1450, in which the scholastic theory of usury applies, and the period of 1450-
1750, in which the scholastic theory of usury is reassessed; yet, the common 
division underplays that ideas about the loosening of usury were expressed in the 
first period of 1150-1450 as well (ibid., pp. 18-19).   
In business practice, usury had to be avoided because it was prohibited in canon 
law.  But the interpretations of canon law allowed interest to be paid in concealed 
forms (Poitras, 1996, p. 4).  Eventually, the insight grew that usury and payment of 
interest were two separate things: usury overcharges borrowers who are in need of 
money, but payment of interest compensates the lender for the opportunity cost of 
providing money.  That lending money bears the opportunity cost of missed profits, 
was witnessed by the daily commercial practice (Sylla, 2006, p. 19).   
 
In the 15th century the loosening on usury and gambling, enabled the development 
of pricing securities.  The reckoning masters, or algorists, who had adopted the 
Indian-Arabic calculation methods such as presented in the Liber Abaci, were 
specialized in the theory pricing of securities.  An example of a master algorist is 
Nicholas Chuquet (1445-1500), who illustrates in Triparty en la science des 
nombres (1484) the arithmetic available at that time (Poitras, 1996, p. 5).  
Eventually, the theory about the pricing of financial assets further expands, among 
other things because of the growth and acceptance of commercial activity and the 
reformation (ibid., p. 5).  The development in finance was directed at the valuation 
of the then existing securities.  Valuation fulfilled a practical need because it serves 
as a calculation of the correct, fair price of a financial asset.  At that time, questions 
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of valuation arose for bonds, annuities, life contingent claims, and partnerships in 
business.   
 
An example of such an obligation is a census, paying annually and backed by land 
or future taxes, which evolved into an annuity (Poitras, 1996, p. 5).  As early as in 
the thirteenth century, the city of Venice issues a census, which becomes 
securitized in the 14th century.  In the 16th century, the market for loans develops 
and the need emerges to compare the loans with the help of valuation theories 
(ibid., p. 6).  The calculation of compound interest is also needed, which was at that 
time allowed by canon law because religious tolerance of commercial activity 
arose.  In the second part of the 17th century more complex fixed income securities 
with redeemability, sinking funds, and lottery elements, are followed by elaborated 
valuation techniques (ibid., p. 8).   
 
Though usury prohibits loans with interest in the Middle Ages, partnerships of 
business in which profits and losses are shared, are customary (Sylla, 2006, p. 14).  
Relevant questions of finance are at that time how to divide profits between 
partners with different roles and within different timeframes.  Thus, finance 
answers the question what is a fair probability behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, 
when dividing profits in the partnership of a business (ibid., p. 12).  So, pre-modern 
probability theory is grounded on contractual or institutional grounds, and not on 
the later adopted physical grounds of frequency theory (ibid., p. 13).  When 
dividing profit among a fixed group of partners, such an ethical perspective of 
fairness on probability is appropriate.   
 
The history of actuarial science is also relevant for finance because it encompasses 
the valuation of options.  Both actuarial science and finance involve in the pricing 
of contingent claims with risk neutral valuation.  Probability theory is needed to 
solve the relevant practical problem of the valuation of a life annuity: 
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Not only were these securities important in state and municipal finance in France, 
England and Holland; in an era pre-dating actuarially sound pension plans and life 
insurance the life annuity performed an essential social function (Poitras, 2006, p. 
79). 
Because solving the problem of the valuation of a life annuity was hard, scholars 
from outside the commercial arithmetic practice were attracted.  Without the 
intention of being complete, I will illustrate a number of important contributors to 
solving the problem of the valuation of a life annuity.  Among the first to support is 
the mathematician Simon Stevin (1548-1620), who contributed to, for example, the 
tables of the present value of annuities (Poitras, 1996, p. 16).  The Dutch statesman 
Johan de Witt (1625-1672) thinks up an analytical solution to the price of a life 
annuity by involving the probability of dying, which is a novelty (Poitras, 2006, p. 
84).  After De Witt, Edmond Halley (1656-1742), famous for his work on comets, 
provides an improved solution to the valuation of a life annuity (ibid., pp. 87-88).  
Abraham de Moivre (1667-1754) completes the theory of life annuities by solving 
the theoretical gaps in the valuation of life annuities (Poitras, 1996, p. 20).  
 
Since Abraham de Moivre’s approach of frequency theory in 1730, the medieval 
approach of ethical probabilities becomes out of sight.  Blaise Pascal and Pierre de 
Fermat discover modern probability theory in the second half of the 17th century, 
followed in the first half of the eighteenth century by De Moivre, who proposes the 
normal or bell-shaped curve and the dispersion measure of the standard deviation, 
and by Daniel Bernoulli who invents decision theory (Bernstein, 1996, pp. 4-5).  
The probability theory of Pascal, De Fermat, De Moivre, and Bernoulli still 
grounds finance today:  
 
[…] the tools we use today in risk management and in the analysis of decisions 
and choice […] stem from the developments that took place between 1654 and 
1760 […] (Bernstein, 1996, pp. 5-6).   
Stocks such as we are now familiar with, emerge in the beginning of the 16th 
century.  In the 16th century, the economic focus shifts from Southern to Northern 
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Europa.  At that time, Antwerp, Amsterdam and London develop exchanges for 
commodities and securities, which include derivatives such as forwards and 
options (Poitras, 1996, p. 6).  After 1620, the publicly traded securities of the joint-
stock companies emerge.  A joint-stock company has two distinct features in 
comparison to a private stock: a joint-stock is transferable and has a limited 
liability (ibid., p. 22).  Because the volume of joint-stocks and government debt 
expands, in 1695 some 100 joint-stocks are traded in London, security markets 
become necessary (ibid., p. 9).   
 
Amsterdam precedes London in having a major modern security market.  The first 
stock traded on the Amsterdam Exchange in 1602 is the Dutch East India 
Company.  The share trading practices in the beginning of the 17th century in 
Amsterdam are marked by the manipulation of the stock market (Van Dillen, 
Poitras and Majithia, 2006, p. 45).  Joseph de la Vega (1650-1692) writes an 
eyewitness report of the stock market of Amsterdam.  The title of De la Vega’s 
book, Confusion de Confusiones (1688), to be translated as ‘The confusion of 
confusions’, refers to the darkness of the workings of the stock market.  
Amsterdam is then the prime financial centre of the world (Cardoso, 2006, p. 64).  
The tulip mania from 1634 to 1637 in Amsterdam accentuates that speculation is a 
part of the era (ibid., p. 65).  De la Vega’s book is set up as a dialogue between a 
philosopher, a merchant and a stockholder.  De la Vega claims that, despite that 
speculators and gamblers play a big part in the stock market, the valuation of a 
stocks is based on fundamentals as well (Poitras, 1996, p. 23).  Cardoso concludes 
about De la Vega’s book that it was meant to show that investing in the stock 
market was worthwhile: 
 
[…] there should be no dispute about the main purpose of Joseph de la Vega when 
writing his book: to demonstrate that, though the inner or potential risks and 
dangers of financial operations, the dealings at the stock exchange market were 
worth pursuing (Cardoso, 2006, p. 73). 
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Nevertheless, the book demonstrates at the same time that the stock market is 
dangerous, because one can be captured by optimism and end up hit financially.  
Contrary to Cardoso (2006), Petram (2011, p. 211) concludes that De la Vega’s 
book was meant to warn and to entertain.   
 
A difference between stocks and other financial instruments in the seventeenth 
century, is that the valuation of stocks is not as developed as the valuation of life 
annuities (Poitras, 1996, p. 22).  Instead, the attention around stocks is directed to 
manipulation and bubbles, as illustrated by Van Dillen (1935), De la Vega (1688), 
and Kindleberger (1978). 
2.3: Efficient Market Theorists in the 19th and Early 20th 
Century 
Jules Regnault and Henri Lefèvre 
In France of the 1860s, the theory of behavior of financial markets takes the leap 
from manipulation and bubbles to the efficient market theory.  The development of 
the theory occurs against the background of the emerging stock market of Paris in 
the 19th century: the stock market expands from 3 listed stocks in 1800 to more 
than 1000 stocks in 1900 (Jovanovic, 2006, p. 170).  Arguably, there was a need 
for analysis in the form of graphical presentations, statistics, probability theory, and 
financial-economic theory (ibid., p. 170).  At that time, popular investment 
literature was widely available: 
 
The ‘science of financial investments’ [popular investment literature in the second 
half of the eighteenth century in Europe and the United States] was meant, among 
other things, to disentangle investment from gambling. [….] The most important 
instruments were financial charts, price tables and balance sheet analyses (Preda, 
2006, p. 152, my insertion). 
 
In the 19th century, investing in stocks is associated with gambling, but how could 
investing in stocks be legitimized (Preda, 2006, p. 151)?  The legitimization of 
39 
 
investing in stocks is done by vernacular science.  The vernacular science of 
financial investments attempts to dispose of the unethical connotation of investing 
by turning investing into a scientific object: 
 
‘Vernacular economics’ is understood to comprise heterogeneous sets of practices, 
know-how techniques and rationalization procedures with the help of which social 
actors make sense of their economic environment and of the economic 
consequences of their own actions. […] vernacular economics mixes tacit, 
commonly shared assumptions and knowledge about economic processes with 
non-systematic rationalizations (Preda, 2006, p. 150). 
 
So how does vernacular finance relate to the then emerging efficient market 
theory?  Vernacular science draws the analogy of financial markets with physics 
and engineering, and adopts the idea of rational behaviour as the guideline for 
stock holders.  Rational behaviour in the form of self-control and the study of 
information, is promoted as the key to successful investing: 
 
They [The how-to brochures of vernacular finance] aimed to convince their 
readers that investments were not only lucrative, relatively sure, but also legitimate 
sources of income, given that a few rules were respected.  These rules, incessantly 
repeated, concerned individual behaviour, on which financial success was made 
dependent.  Lack of emotions, capacity of self-control, continuous study of the 
markets, and monitoring of the joint-stock companies were made into fundamental 
conditions of successful investments (Preda, 2006, p. 153, my insertion). 
A part of vernacular finance results in the efficient market theory, because 
vernacular science includes probabilistic and abstract reasoning.  Within the history 
of finance, Louis Bachelier (1870-1946) is generally considered to be the first 
efficient markets theorist.  Efficient market theory is, in short, the theory that prices 
at the financial markets behave randomly.  Yet, his fellow Frenchmen Jules 
Regnault (1834-1894) and Henri Lefèvre (1827-1885) precede Bachelier in 
inventing similar theories about the financial markets.   
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Regnault (1863) writes about the random walk hypothesis of stocks in Calcul des 
chances et philosophie de la Bourse (Preda, 2006, p. 149).  He invents a 
stochastical theory of financial markets.  Bachelier’s work (1900) s based on 
Regnault, especially the random walk hypothesis (Jovanovic, 2006, p. 191).  
Jovanovic considers Calcul des chances et philosophie de la Bourse a seminal 
contribution to finance.  Regnault’s work is unique in a period in which even 
economics is merely becoming a part of the university institutions (ibid., p. 211).  
To illustrate the claim of Regnault’s importance: he invents the square root formula 
of risk and time, analogous to the diffusion theory of heat and gases: 
 
Regnault also produced the earliest financial theory of the dispersion of securities 
prices over time.  He argued that while the mean value of a financial instrument 
may converge to some expected value, it was seemingly buffeted up or down by 
myriad external and subtle forces (Read, 2013, p. 19). 
In 1870, Lefèvre invents the graphical presentation of the pay-off of an option, 
which Bachelier uses and which is still used today, and thinks up an economic 
theory about the place of financial markets in the circulation of goods (Jovanovic, 
2006, pp. 169-171).  For Lefèvre, the stock market can contribute to a better 
society (Preda, 2006, p. 152). 
Louis Bachelier 
Bachelier (1900) could be acknowledged as the father of modern finance and 
should replace Markowitz, who is usually given the credit (Read, 2013, p. 1).  
Bachelier anticipates the Black & Scholes option formula and formulates the 
random walk of stock prices.  He proposes to view the financial market as a 
phenomenon which can be expressed by scientific statistical laws, and presents an 
alternative for the financial markets as mere gambling on price changes (ibid., p. 
28).  At the same time, his claims about the predictive capability of statistics are 
modest and nuanced.  Interesting to note is that his PhD-supervisor Henri Poincaré 
(1854-1912), a mathematician and philosopher of science among other things, did 
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not favour probabilistic modelling of dynamic systems, but nevertheless lets 
Bachelier succeed (Zimmerman & Hafner, 2006, p. 254). 
 
Bachelier’s work is not recognized in his time.  It took 60 years before his seminal 
work starts to get noticed (Bernstein, 1992).  The ideas of Bachelier (1900) will be 
presented here by a number of citations.  Bachelier discerns two sorts of causes, the 
first being ‘events’ which influence the price of securities, and the second that the 
stock market is reflexive: 
 
The influences which determine the movements of the Stock Exchange are 
innumerable.  Events past, present or even anticipated, often showing no apparent 
connection with its fluctuations, yet have repercussions on its course. 
Beside fluctuations from, as it were, natural causes, artificial causes are also 
involved.  The Stock Exchange acts upon itself and its current movement is a 
function not only of earlier fluctuations, but also of the present market position 
(Bachelier, 2011/1900, p. 1).  
So many causes exist, that a forecast, a point estimate, is not possible.  Moreover, 
probability theory is not applicable, meaning that the fluctuations of the stock 
market do not resemble the outcomes of the tossing of a coin: 
The determination of these fluctuations is subject to an infinite number of factors: 
it is therefore impossible to expect a mathematically exact forecast.  Contradictory 
opinions in regard to these fluctuations are so divided that at the same instant 
buyers believe the market is rising and sellers that it is falling. 
Undoubtedly, the Theory of Probability will never be applicable to the movements 
of quoted prices and the dynamics of the Stock Exchange will never be an exact 
science (ibid., p. 1). 
Bachelier is evidently aware that probability theory for investing does not 
stochastically predict.  His use of probabilities falls in the category of Knightian 
uncertainty, not Knigthian risk (Read, 2013, pp. 30-31).  Probability theory has a 
different purpose in Bachelier’s theory: probability theory can be an instrument to 
capture momentary insight or opinion about the level of fluctuations on the stock 
market: 
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However, it is possible to study mathematically the static state of the market at a 
given instant, that is to say, to establish the probability law for the price 
fluctuations that the market admits at this instant.  Indeed, while the market does 
not foresee fluctuations, it considers which of them are more or less probable, and 
this probability can be evaluated mathematically (Bachelier, 2011/1900, p. 1). 
Though Bachelier was ahead of his times, he continues on the ideas of Regnault 
and Lefèvre (Poitras, 2006, p. 5).  He does not mention Regnault of Lefèvre when 
he presents his formula: 
 
Up to the present day, no investigation into a formula for such an expression 
appears to have been published: that will be the object of this work (Bachelier, 
2011/1900, p. 1). 
 
Bachelier does not mention information as the driver of changes in the prices on 
the stock market, but refers to ‘innumerable factors’ or causes.  He seems to 
include more causes then Fama (1965a, 1965b, 1970), who reduces all causes to 
information associated with news about the external world, which should shed a 
light on the fundamental value of the securities traded on the market.  Bachelier 
explicates his doubt about the transfer mechanism of influences or ‘information’ 
into the valuation of stocks.  Yet, Read (2013) seems to view ‘reflection of 
information’ and ‘all sort of causes’ as similar: 
 
Yet, Bachelier was asserting that prices should be modelled as without memory, 
reflected all available information, and buffeted by random forces of various 
strength, which he would go on and describe as characterized by a Gaussian 
distribution (Read, 2013, pp. 27-28). 
Read (2013, p. 29) argues that a random walk presupposes informational 
efficiency.  If information would only be available to some, the stock market would 
not be a random walk anymore, because the market would be predictable for some 
of the market participants.  Read explains the efficient market hypothesis as a lack 
of foresight about the future, and assumes that without future changes the value of 
a security can be estimated correctly, though maybe merely as a convention:  
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All market participants have equal knowledge of past events, and the current 
prices each presumably exhibit an identical lack of foresight of future events, 
hence the observed price is assumed to be correct, if only perhaps as a matter of 
financial philosophy or faith (Read, 2013, p. 29). 
Bachelier believes that buyers and sellers on average do not know more about the 
future, and claims that the information would already have been included in the 
price if it would have been available (Bernstein, 1992, p. 20).  For Bachelier it 
means that the expected return of the speculator is zero.  Otherwise stated: 
investing is a fair game because the chances of winning and losing are equal.   
 
Bachelier’s work is characterised by originality, both in the theory of financial 
economics and the modelling of the theory in which he discovered the formula for 
the random walk of stocks comparable to the so-called Brownian motion:  
 
Beyond its pioneering treatment of option pricing, efficient financial markets and 
rational expectations, Bachelier’s dissertation provided a mathematical 
formalization of the stochastic process later identified with the Brownian motion 
of molecules […] (Dimand & Ben-El-Mechaieckh, 2006, p. 225). 
Though actuaries have used the notion of probability to perform calculations in life 
insurance, the techniques were not related to financial markets, or options.  He is 
the first to develop a sophisticated option formula which resembles like the Black-
Scholes options formula (Read, 2013, p. 26). Volatility as a measure of risk is a 
part of Bachelier’s approach to option pricing and is not invented by Markowitz 
(ibid., p. 32).  Bachelier’s work is even compared to Einstein’s work:  
 
Five years later, Albert Einstein (1879–1955) used the same reasoning in physics 
and went a step further by calibrating the model and the resulting diffusion rate to 
determine the size of atoms (Read, 2013, p. 25). 
Bachelier’s dissertation of 1900 attracts attention after some fifty years by Savage 
(Dimand & Ben-El-Mechaieckh, 2006, p. 233).  Savage informs others such as 
Paul Samuelson of his discovery.  But Savage’s discovery of Bachelier is not a 
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total coincidence, because Savage was aware that possibly interesting probability 
theorists had existed in France:  
 
Savage was then browsing in the writings of early twentieth-century French 
probability theorists and was receptive to lost treasures […] (Dimand & Ben-El-
Mechaieckh, 2006, p. 233).   
Read proposes two explanations why Bachelier’s work, and that of Bruno de 
Finetti, remained unnoticed for such a long time: because of the ‘balkanization’ of 
science and the advanced level of their work:  
 
Caught squarely in this unfortunate tendency toward the nationalization of 
scholarship was the work of Louis Bachelier in the early twentieth century, and, 
for that matter, the great mind Bruno de Finetti (1906–1985) a little later.  The 
work of both of these brilliant scholars remained abstruse both for reasons of 
language and for the advanced nature of their mathematical and philosophical 
discoveries in the field of probability (Read, 2013, p. 16). 
2.4: Finance in the First Half of the 20th Century 
Irving Fisher 
After treating Bachelier and his French predecessors, who introduced the notion of 
the random walk and option pricing, we continue with a number of theorists on 
other issues in investment theory in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
such as Irving Fisher, John Maynard Keynes, and John Burr Williams.  The 
American economist Irving Fisher (1867-1947) is well known for his unfortunate 
prediction in October 1929 before the crash that “stock prices have reached what 
looks like a permanent high plateau (Dimand, 2007, p. 45).” Nevertheless, Fisher is 
highly regarded as an economist because of his lasting contributions in for example 
monetary economics, illustrated by his famous equation of exchange of  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 =
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 , his distinction between real and nominal interest rates, and his theory of debt 
deflation, in which the burst of the bubble is followed by a debt-fuelled depression 
and deflation (Tobin, 2008). 
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With regard to financial economics, Fisher acknowledges a serious role for stocks 
as an investment, invents a portfolio approach, and systematizes the net present 
value method for investments.  He stresses that the perception that bonds are a safe 
investment when the default risk is absent, is wrong, because bonds have 
purchasing power risk because of inflation (Dimand, 2007, p. 46).  Yet, stocks have 
the inherent capacity to rise with inflation because companies can adjust their 
selling prices; stocks and bonds are subject to different risks, but on the whole 
stocks can be expected to have a better return in an inflationary environment (ibid., 
p. 46).   
 
Fisher is ahead of his time by advocating the diversification of a stock portfolio and 
constructs for the purpose an investment theory with an expected return (the 
dividend yield), risk (the standard deviation), and risk attitude (the coefficient of 
caution) (ibid., p. 48).  Preceding Markowitz (1952), he advocates the use of 
probability distributions for making investment decisions.  
 
Though the method of net present value has existed for a long time, it is Fisher who 
seems to have proposed that it is appropriate for any investment decision, both for 
a firm and an investor on the financial market (Rubinstein, 2006a, p. 7).  His idea is 
continued by the dividend discount model of Williams (1938) for the valuation of 
stocks (Dimand, 2007, p. 49). 
John Maynard Keynes 
Keynes (1883-1946) formulates a theory of investing under uncertainty which 
combines the psychology, reasoning, and consequences of human interacting.  
First, he illustrates the functioning of a financial market by the metaphor of a 
beauty contest.  The beauty contest held in a certain newspaper at that time 
compares with a financial market under uncertainty in which its participants 
behave reflexively on each other (Keynes, 1997/1936, p. 156).  To win the beauty 
contest, the participants have to choose the six most popular faces out of a hundred 
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pictures.  To win, a participant has to predict which face the other contesters will 
choose.  So, if the stock market resembles the beauty contest, stock prices are not 
about some fundamental value, but about the perceived ideas of other market 
participants and their interaction. 
 
The lack of knowledge about the future implies for Keynes that the current market 
valuation is not correct in the sense that the valuation of, say, a stock properly 
discounts the future.  The current price of a stock cannot be correct, unless by 
coincidence, because we lack the knowledge to calculate the correct price.  Keynes 
summarizes with three principles (the present is the best guide for the future, the 
current prices reflect the available information, the ‘market’ knows more than the 
individual) how to act under uncertainty and then formulates an efficient market 
theory avant la lettre, in which the consequence of uncertainty is that financial 
markets are instable.  Keynes’s three principles and his efficient market theory will 
be quoted at length because it is a predecessor and competitor of the modern 
efficient market theory, with the fundamental difference that his theory does not 
assume predictability like the CAPM does:: 
 
(1) We assume that the present is a much more serviceable guide to the future than 
a candid examination of past experience would show it to have been hitherto.  
[….]. 
(2) We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and the 
character of existing output is based on a correct summing up of future prospects, 
so that we can accept it as such unless and until something new and relevant 
comes into the picture. 
(3) Knowing that our individual judgment is worthless, we endeavour to fall back 
on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed.  [….]. 
Now a practical theory of the future based on these three principles has certain 
marked characteristics.  In particular, being based on so flimsy a foundation, it is 
subject to sudden and violent changes.  The practice of calmness and immobility, 
of certainty and security, suddenly breaks down.  New fears and hopes will, 
without warning, take charge of human conduct.  The forces of disillusion may 
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suddenly impose a new conventional basis of valuation.  [….].  At all times the 
vague panic fears and equally vague and unreasoned hopes are not really lulled, 
and lie but a little way below the surface (Keynes, 1978/1937, pp. 114-115, his 
italics). 
Moreover, besides reflexivity, irrational optimism of investors, that is their animal 
spirits, overshadows the importance of probability calculations: 
 
Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences 
of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result 
of animal spirits—of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as 
the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by 
quantitative probabilities (Keynes, 1997/1936, p. 161). 
For Keynes, decision making is about animal spirits, which in combination with 
uncertainty and interaction of market participants, characterize financial markets.  
Interestingly enough, Keynes anticipates three arguments against neoclassical 
economics: decision makers are irrational, information about the future is to a great 
extent uncertain, meaning unknowable, and markets behave reflexive as witnessed 
by the beauty contest and his version of the ‘efficient market theory’. 
Benjamin Graham and John Burr Williams 
Another perspective on the theme of predictability is the idea that the value of a 
security is not same as its price, and that the value of a security can be discovered.  
The notion of predictability stems from the conviction that price and value 
converge in the end (Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 117).  If the current value of a 
security is lower than its market price, valuation theory indicates a buying 
opportunity, a prediction that the price of the stock will rise in the future.  
Valuation is a cornerstone of old and modern finance, and at the same time 
ambiguous: is the value of a stock its book value (which can theoretically be sold 
on other markets), the net present value of its future cash flows or dividends (or the 
lowest of the two), or a product of supply and demand on the financial market 
(Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 118)? 
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 Benjamin Graham (1894-1976) uses security analysis to gain insight in the value of 
a stock.  His theory proposes a defensive way of investing and is based on rules of 
thumb.  Graham et al (1934) use past data to estimate the value of a company, for 
example its book value.  The investment theory of John Burr Williams (1900-1989) 
values an individual security by looking at its future dividend.  The valuation 
theory of Williams (1938) assumes that the value of a security equals the net 
present value of the future dividends of the security.  In Williams’s model, the 
interest rate is an appropriate part of the calculation.  His approach combines 
theoretical and common sense: the value of a stock is the same as its future returns 
discounted, which makes his valuation theory theoretically superior to Graham’s 
method.  But Graham’s method is more practical.  Later portfolio theory assumes 
the theory of valuation as valid; the seminal work of Markowitz (1952, 1959) and 
Fama (1965a, 1965b) refers to the valuation method as the way to discover the 
intrinsic value of a stock. 
 
Yet, the theories of valuation are problematic: “Even modern financial economics 
lacks a theoretical model of stock pricing with any practical accuracy […] 
(Poitras, 1996, p. 22, his emphasis).”  To start with Graham’s method, his practical 
backward looking method of valuation has the problem of the interpretation of 
accounting data: what does the book value tell about the value of the stock?  
Concerning risk, Graham’s approach incorporates risk in a practical way by 
investing in value stocks with a safety margin between the stock price and its 
supposed value.  But his approach does not work if all stocks are expensive in a 
historical perspective, because all stocks will then have a high value.  Anyway, the 
appropriate level of valuation, such as the ratio of book value to price, or price to 
earnings, is the key problem, for Keynes (1936) a reason to consider valuation as 
an instable convention.  Graham’s method merely analyses whether a valuation is 
high or low relative to its past, but what if other factors determine the level of 
valuation, say the central bank policy or a positive economic outlook?  I do not 
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mean to suggest that historical valuation measures such as the price-earnings ratio 
are useless, but valuations such as the historical price to earnings ratio can stretch 
enormously and can stay that way for a long time.  So, the expectation that 
valuation predicts teleologically cannot be met: valuation merely predicts in a 
general fashion, but renders no specific prediction.  If valuation would predict, than 
the return of stocks would become stochastically predictable, which is not possible 
as I will try to underpin by arguments of economists, and a thought experiment 
invented by myself in the next Chapter. 
 
Considering Williams’s forward looking valuation method, it has, of course, the 
difficulty of forecasting the future earnings or dividends of a stock.  A special 
difficulty arises in the valuation of growth stocks if the growth factor is higher than 
the discount factor: in William’s model the value will become infinite at a large 
horizon (Durant, 1957).  But valuation has to incorporate risk as well, so it is not 
merely about the expected value, but also about the probability distribution of the 
value.  Yet, how should the investor, who is likely to be risk averse, weigh the 
probability distribution of the future earnings?  First, we would have to investigate 
whether the value of a security is subjective, meaning depending on the preferences 
of the investors, or objective, meaning that risk is neutrally valued.  Utility theory 
informs us that preferences matter and that because of risk averseness, the 
subjective element should be in the valuation of a stock.  Thus, if investors find 
themselves in a financial crisis they become more cautious and might weigh 
negative outcomes of the probability distribution of earnings higher than before, 
which means that the value of stocks should go down in a financial crisis, 
irrespective whether future earnings will be lower.  Of course, the obvious solution 
to the problem of subjectivity would be to use the risk neutral valuation method 
like in option theory.  Yet, risk neutral pricing of options is grounded in the 
possibility that an option can be hedged by a position in stocks or by the put-call 
parity, a possibility which is absent for stocks.  And, the pricing of an option has 
only one dimension, because the buyer and the seller of an option only have to 
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agree about the future volatility of a stock, since an option price does not 
incorporate an expected value above the risk-free return.  But stocks are assumed to 
have a return that differs from the risk-free return, which has to be distilled from its 
future earnings or dividends.  To conclude, for the valuation of a stock three 
estimates have to be made: its expected value, the probability distribution of the 
value, and the level of risk averseness to weigh the probability distribution.  
Though modern investment theory, as will be shown later on in the Chapter, 
proposes a solution for determining the risk and return of stock in a portfolio 
context, modern investment theory nor valuation theory predicts stochastically, for 
which I will give a number of arguments in the next Chapter of the dissertation. 
Empirical Work on Predictability and the Random Walk 
Predicting financial markets is hard, which both theory and empirical evidence 
illustrate (Bernstein, 1992).  In the first half of the 20th century, Alfred Cowles, 
Holbrook Working, and Frederick Macaulay, investigate the ability to predict 
financial markets.  Alfred Cowles (1891-1984) founded the ‘Cowles Commission 
for Research in Economics’ in January 1932 to promote research into financial 
markets (Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 33).  Cowles (1933) investigates the results of 
the advice of investment analysts for beating the market average and predicting the 
stock market.  The outcome of his investigation denies that the advice of 
investment analysts outperforms the market index or predicts the market as a 
whole.  Cowles wonders about the economic logic of offering advice about the 
outcome on financial markets for a fee, because exploiting the predictions, if 
correct, would result in a higher income than the fee provides:  
 
Market advice for a fee is a paradox.  Anybody who really knew just wouldn’t 
share his knowledge (Bloom, M.T. (1974), Rogues to Riches, Warner Books, New 
York, in Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 35). 
Another study of Cowles (1944) about the prediction of the stock market again 
concludes that investment advice for predicting the stock market makes no sense 
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(Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 36).  But it turns out that investors and practitioners are 
deaf to investigations such as performed by Cowles, and stick to their habits of 
continuing to believe in forecasting (ibid., p. 37).  Cowles suggests that investors 
are in psychological need of believing that experts possess knowledge about the 
future course of the stock market: 
 
Even if I did my negative surveys every five years, or others continued them when 
I’m gone, it wouldn’t matter.  People are still going to subscribe to these services 
[about the predictions of investment advisors].  They want to belief that somebody 
really knows.  A world in which nobody really knows can be frightening (Bloom, 
M.T. (1974), Rogues to Riches, Warner Books, New York, in Bernstein, 
2005/1992, p. 38, my insertion).  
The public is not interested in Cowles’s studies of unpredictability, but neither are 
academia at that time.  There seem to be two reasons for the lack of interest in 
academia in his research: 
 
1. economists did not regard financial markets as a serious topic at that time,  
2. the majority of economists were not yet educated in mathematics or statistics 
in those days (Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 93).  
 
Besides Cowles, Holbrook Working and Frederick Macaulay are prominent 
investigators of the predictability of financial markets.  Working (1934) studies 
wheat prices and concludes that the price changes largely follow a random walk by 
comparing wheat prices with random outcomes.  Macaulay (1938) refines the idea 
of random outcomes to a more complex level of randomness, and compares the 
stock market to “a loaded pair of dice, with the load shifted from time to time (Fox, 
2009, p. 27)”.  The reason for Macaulay for denying the normal distribution as a 
valid assumption, is that people take decisions about the future by which they react 
on the decisions of others, which is not reflected in a normal distribution: 
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Of course, the disturbing effects that such factors as presence of emotion, lack of 
logic and insufficiency of knowledge have on the economic behavior of 
individuals would not merit the attention we are giving them if socially they 
always 'cancelled out'.  If the vagaries of individual conduct were always 
'normally' distributed round a strictly rational 'mode', in other words, if the 
'deviations' were of the nature of 'accidental' rather than, for example, 'systematic' 
or 'constant' errors, their curbing effects on the development of economics as a 
strictly logical social science might be small or negligible […].  [….].  It [the 
normal distribution] is and always will be thoroughly unreal (Macaulay, 1938, pp. 
11-12, his italics, my insertion). 
In the first half of the 20th century, the pioneering research of Cowles, Working, 
and Macaulay, results in an empirical underpinning that investment advice does not 
predict.  Macaulay (1938) takes the analysis of returns on financial markets a step 
further by denying that financial markets display the type of randomness that can 
be captured by the normal distribution; an outcome which has not been adopted in 
the later modern investment theory. 
 
Chartist Theory 
To complete the highlights of the development of finance theory in the first half of 
the 20th century, chartist theory, or technical analysis, is treated briefly now.  The 
central idea of chartist theory is that past data of the stock market reveal everything 
an investor needs to know about the market.  The Dow Theory is worth mentioning 
because it is an example of a chartist theory, which together with the theory of 
valuation still belongs to the current practice of investing.  The Dow Theory is a 
theory named after the work of Charles Dow (1851–1902) for predicting stock 
prices (Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 24).  Dow’s name is familiar because he invented 
the well-known Dow Jones Average.  Underlying Dow’s theory is that trends tend 
to maintain until the market sends a signal for its reversal.  Dow uses the metaphor 
of ebb and flood.  The expression often used in practice of a ‘correction’ of the 
market is a term from Dow’s theory.  He actually never uses the term ‘Dow 
Theory’ himself (ibid., p. 28).  He is more interested in interpreting history than 
making a theory for predicting its future.   
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2.5: Markowitz’s Investment Theory 
Portfolio Theory 
Harry Markowitz’s portfolio theory (1952, 1959) is conventionally regarded as the 
starting point of modern finance (Poitras, 2007, p. 4).  With portfolio theory, an 
investor composes a statistically legitimate portfolio of individual securities, or an 
asset mix of bonds, stocks, and real estate (Markowitz, 1952, p. 91).  He founds his 
theory on mathematical statistics: he assumes that “[…] ‘beliefs’ or projections 
about securities follow the same probability rules that random variables obey 
(Markowitz, 1999, p. 5).”  The metaphor that investing is mathematical statistics is 
the modern aspect of investment theory.  In short, the mathematics in Markowitz’s 
article of 1952 illuminates that a higher return is accompanied by a higher risk and 
that diversification is a sensible idea:  
 
It boils down to nothing more than a formal conformation of two old rules for 
investing: Nothing ventured, nothing gained.  Don’t put all your eggs in one basket 
(Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 44). 
In his Nobel Lecture, Markowitz summarizes his contribution to price theory by 
showing how a rational individual investor would invest: 
 
My work on portfolio theory considers how an optimizing investor would behave, 
whereas the work by Sharpe and Lintner on the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM for short) is concerned with economic equilibrium assuming all investors 
optimize in the particular manner I proposed (Markowitz, 1990, p. 279). 
The price theory of consumers and producers differs from the price theory of 
capital markets: price theory relates price to quantity, while Markowitz (1959, p. 
259) leaves out quantity.  Instead, he relates the expected price gain, the investment 
return, to risk, because risk features in the future price of a security.  Though he 
does not model quantity, the probability beliefs about investment returns could 
include the influence of quantity, because the probability beliefs can include any 
theory of economics.  Please note that, because Markowitz adheres to the theory of 
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personal probability, for him risk and uncertainty mean the same.  Yet, to repeat, 
Knight (1921) distinguishes risk from uncertainty.   
 
The portfolio approach of Markowitz changes the notion of investment risk.  
According to Bernstein (2005/1992, p. 54) “Markowitz’s most original 
contribution” was to distinguish individual stock risk and portfolio risk.  A 
portfolio risks less than an individual security, because a portfolio benefits from 
diversification as the ups and downs of its individual securities partly compensate.  
An efficient portfolio makes the most of diversification.  Efficient means that a 
portfolio returns maximally at a particular level of expected risk, or to put it 
another way, risks minimally at a particular expected level of return.  As the 
measure of risk, he proposes the standard deviation of investment returns.  The 
standard deviation measures the dispersion around the expected return. 
 
Portfolio theory specifies and maximizes the potential of diversification.  
Markowitz’s reading of history is that no such theory of diversification then 
existed: “What was lacking prior to 1952 was an adequate theory of investment 
that covered the effects of diversification when risks are correlated […] 
(Markowitz, 1999, p. 5, his italics).”  John Burr Williams, applies in his seminal 
work The Theory of Investment Value (1938), the law of large numbers to discover 
the diversification potential of a portfolio.  The law of large numbers implies that 
the returns of the securities involved behave stochastically independent: then, the 
risk of the portfolio disappears at a large number of securities in the portfolio.  Yet, 
Markowitz becomes aware that Williams overestimates the potential of 
diversification: “The returns from securities are too intercorrelated.  Diversification 
cannot eliminate all variance (Markowitz, 1952, p. 79).”  The risk that can be 
eliminated, stems from idiosyncratic risk, that is the specific risk of securities.  But 
systematic, or market risk, cannot be diversified.  The notion of market risk will 
explained further on in the current Chapter.  In the Appendix A of the current 
Chapter, the mathematics of diversification is explained. 
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 Mathematical statistics supplies portfolio theory with ideas for efficiency criteria 
and computing procedures.  The efficiency criteria in portfolio theory focus on 
what is important to an individual investor: 
 
[…] determine the type of conclusions sought. [….].  The criteria of an analysis is 
its guide to what is important and unimportant, relevant and irrelevant (Markowitz, 
1991/1959, p. 205). 
The criteria of risk and return select the efficient portfolios, and are mirrored in the 
investor preferences in the utility function.  Markowitz proposes for individual 
investors a quadratic utility function (ibid., p. 286 and further), here in a simplified 
form: 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 − 𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 ∙ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)2 
 
The utility function treats the 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 as positive, and 
the (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)2, the standard deviation, or expected value of the squared 
returns, as negative.  Markowitz elaborates his choice of utility function and 
efficiency criteria in his seminal work of 1959.  He chooses to reduce the 
probability distribution to the criteria of mean and standard deviation, because the 
standard deviation is familiar in statistics, and has computational ease. 
 
The beliefs about expected returns, risks, and correlations, the subject of my 
dissertation, are, together with the efficiency criteria, put in Markowitz’s 
optimisation procedure to calculate the efficient portfolios.  The efficient 
portfolios, or efficient set, contains, to repeat, portfolios with the highest return at a 
particular risk.  An investor chooses the portfolio which maximizes her utility.  In 
Figure 2.1 the indifference curves, curves with combinations of risk and return at 
which the investor is indifferent, approach from the top left to meet the efficient 
56 
 
set, which approaches from the bottom right: the indifference curves of the investor 
and the efficient set meet at the point of tangency.  
 
Figure 2.1: Utility maximization in capital markets according to Markowitz 
 
Evaluation of Markowitz’s contribution 
In the evaluation of Markowitz’s theory, I will review the impact of diversification 
on risk, the use of the standard deviation as the measure of risk, Markowitz’s ideas 
about his possible predecessors, the role of Markowitz’s theory for further theory 
development, and the practical use of Markowitz’s approach.   
 
Markowitz finds a way to calculate the most interesting portfolios with respect to 
return and risk by optimising the benefits of diversification.  But, “How big is 
big?” in diversification?  “How big is big?” is a question of relevance about a 
theory or an empirical finding that McCloskey proposes to ask (McCloskey, 2000, 
Risk
Return
Indifference curves
Efficient set
Point of tangency
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p. 258).  Markowitz has noted, to repeat, that a correlation of zero between 
securities is too optimistic.  Let us perform a simple test of the contribution of 
diversification to a lower risk.  The risk, the standard deviation, of a worldwide 
portfolio of equities is 17.7% annually measured during 1900 to 2011:  the risk of 
17.7% includes the diversification effect of a huge amount of stocks (data from 
Dimson et al, 2012).  Indeed, again, investing in stocks does not mean that the 
correlation coefficient between individual stocks is zero, or even close to it, 
otherwise the risk of stocks should become close to zero as historically measured 
by the standard deviation of stocks during 1900 to 2011.  Thus, within an asset 
class, diversification benefits to a certain extent by elimination of the idiosyncratic 
risk of individual securities, but a large part remains undiversifiable as illustrated 
by the level of the standard deviation of a large amount of stocks of 17.7%.   
 
A correlation of higher than zero means that investment returns of individual stocks 
are not independently distributed in contrast to the outcomes of throwing a dice.  
We will see in a next paragraph that for example Sharpe (1963) invents a common 
cause, bèta, to determine which part of the return of a security is caused by the 
stock market as a whole.  Of course, stocks are not the only asset category, and the 
asset mix can diversify by mixing different asset categories, which could diversify.  
The diversification over diverse asset classes can be rewarding if a low correlation 
is accompanied with benign risk and return features: yet, in practice such 
categories are difficult to find. 
 
Besides diversification by adding more securities, time could diversify investment 
returns as well.  One can make the tossing of a coin amount to 50% heads and 50% 
tails, by tossing many coins at the same time, or, by tossing the same coin many 
times.  Both ways result in the same probability distribution of approximately 50% 
heads and 50% tails, if the number of trials is large.  Yet, time diversification in 
investing is not analogous to the tossing of coins.  When tossing a coin, the basis of 
the calculation expands proportionally.  But the case of coins is different from 
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investing: at investing, the basis of invested capital is fixed at the starting point and 
merely diminishes or increases because of the returns obtained.  Thus, the standard 
deviation around the mean return is a wrong measure for time diversification, 
because an investment portfolio is a capital at risk which is multiplied by returns.  
Therefore, risk, as measured around the value of invested capital, increases during 
time; think about the risk of multiple years of negative stock market returns.  
Samuelson (1969a) Merton (1973a), and Bodie (1995), demonstrate that time 
diversification does not exist in investing.  Another way to illustrate the denial of 
time diversification is the relation of risk and time in option pricing as expressed by 
the so-called square root of time formula in which risk enlarges with the square 
root of time; not many people will deny that an option with a longer horizon is 
more expensive than the same option with a shorter horizon.  Because it would be 
out of scope, I will not go into the debate on time diversification which offers other 
arguments, such as human capital, for the benefits of a longer investment horizon: 
the interested reader is referred to a summary of the subject by Mark Kritzman (pp. 
50-57, in Bernstein & Damodaran, 1998), or Pistorius (2004).   
 
Markowitz (1959) chooses to reduce the probability distribution of investment 
returns to the criteria of mean and standard deviation.  I have compared 
Markowitz’s choice of efficiency criteria with alternatives, such as stochastical 
dominance, the inclusion of skewness, and criteria which focus on downside risk 
(Pistorius, 1991).  Among other things, my conclusion was that stochastical 
dominance serves as a better efficiency criterion when probability returns are not 
normally distributed.  The inclusion of skewness as a third criterion next to the 
mean and the standard deviation, is superior as well when probability returns are 
not normally distributed.  Markowitz (1959) himself favoured the use of the semi-
deviation, measuring only the downside deviation instead of the two-way 
measurement of the standard deviation.  Nevertheless, Markowitz’s choice for the 
standard deviation as the measure of risk seems defensible, because the standard 
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deviation is familiar in statistics, and has computational ease in calculating efficient 
portfolios. 
 
What is Markowitz’s place in the history of finance?  To answer the question, we 
will discuss the competing theories of Arthur Roy (1952) and Bruno de Finetti 
(1940), who seem to be the most important competitors of Markowitz.  Other 
candidates could have been Fisher, John Hicks, and Dickson Leavens, who touched 
the subject of risk in investing, though not as systematically as Markowitz did 
(Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 55).  Roy (1952) seeks to explain the practice of 
diversification and proposes, instead of Markowitz’s criterion of the standard 
deviation, a level of disaster as the main measure of risk, which probability has to 
be weighed against the expected return.  Roy’s criterion of ‘level of disaster’ 
anticipates the value-at-risk approach, which has later become popular in risk 
management.  With the level of disaster as a risk criterion, he intends to get closer 
to the intuitions about risk as a situation one wants to avoid.  According to 
Bernstein, Roy’s article of 1952 reaches the same conclusions as Markowitz’s 
article:  
 
‘Portfolio Selection’ and ‘Safety First’ are similar in their lines of argument, and I 
am at a loss to explain why’s Roy’s paper failed to cut the swath that Markowitz’s 
paper did (Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 55). 
Bernstein’s best guess why Roy is forgotten is because he was the second to 
publicize (2005/1992, p. 56).  In an article about the history of investment theory 
Markowitz (1999, p. 6) is willing to share the fatherhood of modern portfolio 
theory with Arthur Roy.  Roy himself (1961) is critical about Markowitz’s 
monograph on portfolio theory (1959) on a number of points, of which his criticism 
on how to obtain probability beliefs, is a subject which will be thoroughly analysed 
in the next Chapter of the dissertation: 
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Before probability concepts can help us with the selection of our investments, we 
must be able to translate our expectations about future yields and process into 
subjective joint probability distributions. While Dr. Markowitz emphasises that 
past experience is unlikely to be a very good guide to future performance, he gives 
no clear indication of how either we, or our investment advisers, can provide 
ourselves with sufficiently precise or generally agreed expectations to merit their 
processing in an elaborate way (Roy, 1961, p. 99).  
Roy and Markowitz published in the same period, but Bruno de Finetti (1940) 
made an earlier contribution along the same lines as Markowitz (Rubinstein, 
2006b).  So, another claim to the fatherhood of modern portfolio theory can be 
given to Bruno de Finetti (1940):  
 
De Finetti’s line of analysis bears a remarkable resemblance to what Markowitz 
would develop completely on his own twelve years later, and for which Markowitz 
won the Nobel Prize (Bernstein, 2007, p. 108). 
It is not mere speculation that Finetti’s theory could have been known before 
Markowitz’s theory, despite being written in Italian: 
 
He [De Finetti] was sufficiently well-known, however, to have been invited to the 
United States in 1950 by the eminent American mathematician, Leonard Savage, 
to deliver a paper on probability at a conference at Berkeley (Bernstein, 2007, p. 
109). 
In the investment practice of today, Markowitz’s ‘mean variance’-approach is used 
frequently to specify diversification and to underpin an investment strategy on the 
subject of diversification.  But, hardly anyone uses the optimization procedure that 
Markowitz proposes, as his algorithm for calculating efficient portfolios has been 
replaced by more efficient, simpler, ways of calculation.  One simplification stems 
from James Tobin (1918-2002), who finds a weakness in Markowitz’s theory, that 
is that the riskless asset is absent, such as a treasury bill (Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 
71).  Adding the risk-less asset to the analysis, leads to Tobin’s (1958) so-called 
separation theorem: the selection of a Markowitz’s efficient portfolio is separate 
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from the decision to divide the portfolio in riskless cash and the risky portfolio 
(ibid., p. 72).  The risky portfolio turns out to be the same in each linear 
combination of cash and risky assets (ibid., p. 73).  Tobin’s innovation simplifies 
portfolio theory to calculating the risky portfolio, but cannot make the calculations 
of Markowitz’s risky portfolio easier. 
 
Markowitz’s optimization rule is difficult to execute in practice because the 
calculation procedure is complicated, and demands a lot of estimates of each 
individual security (Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 57).  For the practical application of 
portfolio theory, Markowitz himself made a suggestion in his monograph (1959).  
Because the returns of most stocks are correlated, all that had to be done was to 
consider whether each stock was more or less volatile than the stock market, and 
whether other influences were of relevance for a stock (Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 
77).  Sharpe (1963) dealt with the problem of the application of Markowitz’s 
portfolio theory.  He calls his model the diagonal model, though in general it is 
called the single-index model (Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 80).  The diagonal model 
relates the risk of stocks to that of the market.  Sharpe’s tool works well as an 
approximation of Markowitz’s model (ibid., p. 82). 
2.6: Efficient Market Theory 
Paul Samuelson 
The empirical findings of the first half of the 20th century, implying that the stock 
and commodities markets resemble a random walk, are continued in the second 
half of the 20th century.  Maurice Kendall (1953) analyses stock data and confirms 
Working’s earlier findings for the stock market.  Later in the fifties, Harry Roberts 
(1959) investigates technical analysis and suggests that all the typical patterns of 
technical analysis can be produced by chance as well (Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 
101).  Michael Jensen (1968) corrects the relative performance for risk, because 
higher returns can also stem from taking more risk, and denies the outperformance 
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of mutual funds (Bernstein, 2005/1992, pp. 140-141).  Many later studies (see for 
example: Shefrin, 1999) deny the idea that the advice of investment analysts is 
profitable for investors.  
 
The efficient market theory tries to explain the results of the empirical studies 
about the impossibility of beating the market index.  One of the founding fathers of 
the efficient market theory is Paul Samuelson (1915-2009).  Samuelson is a 
prominent economist, a Nobel Prize winner in 1970, and also contributed to the 
theory of financial markets.  He clarifies that predictability of financial markets is 
not worthwhile to pursue as a way to make a living:  
 
But a respect for evidence compels me to incline toward the hypothesis that most 
portfolio decision   makers should go out of business – take up plumbing, teach 
Greek, or help produce the annual GDP by serving as corporate executives 
(Samuelson, 1974, p. 17). 
According to Samuelson (1965b), the market price is the best estimate of its value.  
Indeed, if the intrinsic value of a stock would be higher and everyone would agree, 
then the stock price should go up.  But, maybe some investors possess better 
information, for example because they have made a better analysis of the 
fundamentals of a security.  Yet, looking at empirical studies about the 
performance of investment advice, or the performance of mutual funds, such a 
conclusion does not follow, on the contrary, the market performs better than a 
portfolio based on the investment advice or mutual funds.  Samuelson stresses that 
information is relevant for financial markets, because information leads to changes 
in market prices (Bernstein, 2005/1992, p. 120).   
 
His interest in informational efficiency came from his interest in option pricing 
(Read, 2013, p. 78).  He seems the first to formulate the hypothesis of 
informational efficiency for financial markets:  
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In his ‘Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly’, Samuelson put 
forth a simple proposition: in an informationally efficient market, prices must 
incorporate all information available to market participants.  This implies that it 
must not be possible to forecast any additional price changes.  Five years later, 
Eugene Fama more economically stated Samuelson’s result by saying that ‘prices 
fully reflect all available information’ (Read, 2013, p. 77). 
Non-predictability results from the economic law of full competition and is done in 
financial markets by arbitrage:  
 
In the limit that perfectly arbitraged markets are frictionless and trading is costless, 
there is nothing that can be further anticipated in prices, and only randomness and 
unpredictability remain.  Samuelson’s innovation that arbitrage is a condition of 
equilibrium was of course not completely novel in finance (Read, 2013, p. 79).  
Fama took Samuelson’s ideas further into a comprehensive theory (Bernstein, 
2005/1992, p. 126).  
Eugene Fama 
According to Fama (1970) the theory on efficient markets is not rigorous until the 
work of Mandelbrot (1963a, 1963b) and Samuelson (1965b).  Though a lot of 
empirical work has been done in the securities and the commodities markets, the 
empirical work lacks, according to Fama, an economic theory.  The research before 
Mandelbrot and Samuelson is based on the random walk as a fair game of 
probability with an expectation of zero, starting with Bachelier (1900): 
 
Thus, though his contributions were ignored for sixty years, the first statement and 
test of the random walk model was that of Bachelier in 1900.  But his 
‘fundamental principle’ for the behavior of prices was that speculation should be a 
‘fair game’; in particular, the expected profits to the speculator should be zero.  
With the benefit of the modern theory of stochastic processes, we know now that 
the process implied by this fundamental principle is a martingale (Fama, 1970, p. 
389). 
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The stochastic process to which Fama refers is a martingale process, which to his 
opinion is a better representation of the theory of the random walk.  A martingale 
means: 
A martingale is a mathematical model of a fair game, or of some other process that 
is incrementally random noise.  The term, which also denotes part of a horse's 
harness or a ship's rigging, refers in addition to a gambling system in which every 
losing bet is doubled […] (Karr, 2008). 
Besides the technical betterment of the random walk by introducing the martingale, 
Fama develops the theory of the efficient market.  His definition of an efficient 
market is “A market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information 
[…] (Fama, 1970, p. 383)”.  The efficient market model does not expect the actual 
market behaviour to behave as an exact random walk, but the point for practice is 
whether a market participant can make profit by exploiting stock price patterns of 
the past (Fama, 1965a, p. 56).   
 
Fama introduces as the cause of the randomness of price fluctuations new and re-
evaluated information:  
 
The price changes in a speculative series can be regarded as a result of the influx 
of new information into the market and of the re-evaluation of existing 
information.  At any point in time there will be many items of information 
available.  Thus price changes between transactions will reflect the effects of many 
different bits of information (Fama, 1963, p. 425). 
The definition of an efficient financial market is the same as for a market of goods 
in the theory of full competition, in which information is available to all 
participants at the same time:  
 
Random walk theorists usually start from the premise that the major security 
exchanges are good examples of ‘efficient’ markets.  An ‘efficient’ market is 
defined as a market where there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers 
actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of individual 
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securities, and where important current information is almost freely available to all 
participants (Fama, 1965a, p. 56). 
Essential is that Fama believes in the possibility to value a security correctly by a 
fundamental analysis.  In other words, he supposes that such a fundamental value 
exists.  He says that the work of security analysts is worthwhile: otherwise the 
market would behave in another way.  So, analysts make the market efficient.  
Because of uncertainty, however, the intrinsic value cannot be calculated exactly.  
Therefore the price will fluctuate randomly around the intrinsic value.  Fama backs 
the idea that a stock has a fundamental value which can be analysed if one is 
willing to take the trouble, and which leads to the predictability of the price of a 
stock.  I will now quote Fama at length on the topic of fundamental value and 
predictability because of its importance for the dissertation: 
 
The assumption of the fundamental analysis approach is that at any point in time 
an individual security has an intrinsic value (or in the terms of the economist, an 
equilibrium price) which depends on the earning potential of the security.  [….].  
Through a careful study of these fundamental factors the analyst should, in 
principle, be able to determine whether the actual price of a security is above or 
below its intrinsic value.  If actual prices tend to move toward intrinsic values, 
then attempting to determine the intrinsic value of a security is equivalent to 
making a prediction of its future price; and this is the essence of the predictive 
procedure implicit in fundamental analysis (Fama, 1965a, p. 55). 
As a standard for rational behaviour in price theory, using fundamental analysis is 
for investors the right thing to do: it is sensible to find out new information about a 
security.  But economists are also interested in the outcome if many analysts 
perform fundamental analysis: 
 
That is, the existence of many sophisticated analysts helps make the market more 
efficient which in turn implies a market which conforms more closely to the 
random walk model.  Although the returns to these sophisticated analysts may be 
quite high, they establish a market in which fundamental analysis is a fairly 
useless procedure both for the average analyst and the average investor (Fama, 
1965a, p. 58). 
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Surprisingly, the market is right, meaning that the price on the market is an 
accurate estimate of the intrinsic value of the security, because the estimates of 
security analysts are freely available:  
 
In an efficient market, competition among the many intelligent participants leads 
to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual securities 
already reflect the effects of information based both on events that have already 
occurred and on events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the 
future.  In other words, in an efficient market at any point in time the actual price 
of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value (Fama, 1965a, p. 56). 
Fama (1970) distinguishes a few variations of market efficiency, strong, semi-
strong and weak, of which the semi-strong is, in his opinion, supported by 
empirical evidence:  
 
He defined strong form efficiency as the most demanding information concept, in 
which all available public and private information has been incorporated and 
arbitraged into the price of a publicly traded security.  [….]. 
More common is semi-strong market efficiency, in which market prices reflect 
only all publicly known information about the overall economy and the 
fundamentals of a particular asset, perhaps based on financial analyses and 
corporate news releases (Read, 2013, p. 105). 
The intrinsic value changes because of new information, which will be priced in 
correctly.  The process of the pricing in of new information is independent, which 
is enough for prices to be a random walk. 
 
Fama (1965b) explains the random walk theory as consisting of two statistical 
hypotheses: 
(1) Successive price changes are independent, and (2) the price changes conform 
to some probability distribution (Fama, 1965b, p. 35).  
The first and most important hypothesis (ibid., p. 41) of independence means that 
price changes are not related in time, meaning that the price in a former period does 
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not influence the current price, so one cannot predict on the basis of historical 
information.  Being consequent, Fama rejects the predictability of chartist theories 
such as the Dow Theory because of independence of historical prices.  He 
describes the chartist theories as: 
 
Although there are many different chartist theories, they all make the same basic 
assumption.  That is, they all assume that the past behavior of a security's price is 
rich in information concerning its future behavior.  (Fama, 1965b, p. 34). 
The second hypothesis of the random walk theory is that “the price changes 
conform to some probability distribution (ibid., p. 35).”  The shape of the 
probability distribution does not need a specification for the theory to be valid, 
though the parameters of the distribution should be stationary (ibid., p. 41).  
Though, even stationarity is not necessary if independence is strictly met.  Yet, for 
the investor the probability distribution matters because it determines the risk of the 
investment.  The type of distribution is relevant for using statistical tools in 
empirical work as well.  The normal distribution is an ‘obvious’ candidate for stock 
market returns, an assumption which is questioned by Benoit Mandelbrot (1963a, 
1963b, 2004 with Hudson) who claims that distributions of financial markets have 
larger tails and peeks than assumed in the normal distribution: 
 
Mandelbrot’s main assertion is that, in the past, academic research has too readily 
neglected the implications of the leptokurtosis usually observed in empirical 
distributions of price changes (Fama, 1965b, p. 42). 
Mandelbrot’s theory will be explained at length later on in the Chapter.  He also 
happens to be Fama’s dissertation supervisor.  Fama agrees to Mandelbrot’s view 
that outliers in the data should not be easily ignored: 
 
Unlike the statistician, however, the investor cannot ignore the possibility of large 
price changes before committing his funds […] (ibid., p. 42). 
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Fama (1963, pp. 426-427) acknowledges Mandelbrot’s points that under the 
Paretian probability distribution: 
 
- the variance as the measure of dispersion becomes meaningless  
- if the variance is infinite, statistical tools for the normal distribution become unfit  
- the measure of the central tendency becomes doubtful because one extra data 
point can change the average  
- investing is more risky 
- stop loss orders do not work because of discontinuity of prices. 
 
Fama (ibid., p. 428) confirms in his PhD-thesis that the data analysis of changes in 
stock prices show that the Paretian hypothesis that Mandelbrot advocates, is valid: 
 
The conclusion of the dissertation is that for the important case of stock prices the 
stable Paretian hypothesis is more consistent with the data than the Gaussian 
hypothesis (Fama, 1965, p. 428). 
Though later in his career, Fama does no longer follow Mandelbrot’s theory and 
restricts himself to conventional statistics. 
Evaluation of the Efficient Market Theory 
In an evaluation of the efficient market theory, Fama (1965b, p. 36) distinguishes 
between two possible theories or views about financial markets which are 
consistent with independence of historical market prices.  The first theory, a 
psychological one, asserts that the price mechanism on the financial markets has no 
relationship to the economic and political reality, and is primarily based on noise 
related to speculative behaviour of investors: 
 
Independence of successive price changes for a given security may simply reflect 
a price mechanism which is totally unrelated to real-world economic and political 
events.  That is, stock prices may be just the accumulation of many bits of 
randomly generated noise, where by noise in this case we mean psychological and 
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other factors peculiar to different individuals which determine the types of ‘bets’ 
they are willing to place on different companies (Fama, 1965b, p. 36). 
The second theory, which Fama advocates, of financial markets covering 
independence of historical market prices is based on economic and political 
analyses (Fama, 1965b, p. 36).  By analysing, investors try to find out the intrinsic 
value of securities.  An intrinsic value is consistent with the efficient market 
theory.  An intrinsic value is non static, and changes because of new information.  
The intrinsic value of a security is not known for sure and will be estimated 
differently by participants, which creates noise.  
 
Fama (1965b, p. 36) finds the psychological view unappealing, but what does he 
mean by that?  That such a view is not realistic as an explanation because the 
behaviour assumed is irrational?  His argument is that many people in the industry, 
analysts and fund managers do not agree as noticed by their behaviour.  But that 
argument does not persuade, being that the argument is that something is true 
because it is common practice:  
 
Even random walk theorists, however, would find such a view of the market 
unappealing.  Although some people may be primarily motivated by whim, there 
are many individuals and institutions that seem to base their actions in the market 
on an evaluation (usually extremely painstaking) of economic and political 
circumstances.  That is, there are many private investors and institutions who 
believe that individual securities have ‘intrinsic values’ which depend on 
economic and political factors that affect individual companies (Fama, 1965b, p. 
36). 
Fama presents the alternative for his theory of real intrinsic value of a security as 
an extreme one: for him the alternative theory is that the market is merely 
psychology.  But eliminating psychology from markets is a rather reducing move, a 
move intended towards full rational behaviour.  It seems plausible that both 
psychology and economic factors play a role in the stock market.  For example, 
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that there is some relation between the market and the external world over which a 
psychological overlay is placed, like in Keynes’s beauty context.  
 
A criticism from within mainstream economics on the efficient market hypotheses 
is invented by for example Lucas (1978).  He claims that rational investors using 
all available information is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for a random 
walk: 
 
An alternative view believes that these residuals will not be mere white noise even 
if prices have reflected all available information.  For instance, Nobel laureate 
Robert Lucas (1978) and Stephen LeRoy (1973) created plausible scenarios in 
which prices fully incorporate all information but still behave unlike a random 
walk (Read, 2013, p. 84). 
For example McCloskey & Klamer (1995) claim that there is another fundamental 
problem with the efficient market theory: that is, what the available information is 
about.  Does information lead to predictability and equilibrium, or is the flow of 
information merely loosely reflected in the market, because the transfer mechanism 
from information to valuation is ambiguous, because of the interpretation of 
information and the problems of valuation?  Only simple information has 
straightforward implications for the value of a stock, say a takeover bid which is 
certain to take place, but most information has no clear implications.  Fisher Black 
(1986) wrote about the phenomenon of noise to clarify its difference with 
information.  Simple information is processed instantaneously because its effect on 
the value of the stock is clear.  The other information or noise is priced in a 
subjective way, which is hard to predict or to arbitrage.   
 
Besides the existence of a fundamental value, early writers such as Bachelier and 
Keynes, and the critics of the efficient market theory which will be treated later on 
in the Chapter, show that the reduction to information as the cause of randomness, 
ignores other causes, such as internal market dynamics, self-reflexivity, 
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expectations, beauty contest dynamics in trying to outguess the others, bubbles, 
behavioural causes, and other psychological mechanisms.   
2.7: CAPM 
Capital Asset Pricing Model 
There is a continuum of old and modern finance through security valuation.  Fama 
agrees with Markowitz on the added value of security analysis, but Fama takes the 
activities of stock analysts one step further in the analysis of financial economics 
by examining the effect of competition; full competition in a goods market leads to 
absence of profits, full competition under security analysts leads to zero extra 
profits in the security markets.  The subject of the current paragraph, the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model, aka the CAPM, incorporates Fama’s and Markowitz’s 
approach.  After Markowitz determined how a rational investor would act, the next 
logical step was a formulation of the market equilibrium of expected risk and 
return.  The CAPM is a product of the economic logic of diminishing marginal 
utility, meaning that risk is rewarded, and full competition, meaning that the 
market index cannot be beaten.  According to Bernstein (1992) a number of people 
worked independently on the formulation of such a model: Jack Treynor (1962), 
John Lintner (1965), Jan Mossin (1966), and Sharpe (1964).  I will focus on the 
contribution of William Sharpe (1964), who is probably the most well-known 
founder of the CAPM.   
 
In the CAPM, an optimal portfolio is always at the capital market line, which 
combines the risk free return and the market portfolio.  The capital market line in 
Figure 2.2, combines the risk free return and the market portfolio, the so called two 
fund theorem, which results in a higher level of efficiency than the efficient set of 
Markowitz.  The market portfolio consists of all securities, which are assumed to 
be correctly priced, so no advantage could be gained by choosing another portfolio 
than the market portfolio.  Because risk diminishes automatically by putting 
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securities in a portfolio, only undiversifiable risk yields an extra return above the 
risk-free rate.  Thus, unsystematic or idiosyncratic risk, the risk belonging to a 
specific stock which is independent of the market, does not matter for the value of 
the stock because it will be diversified away.  For a stock with a large unsystematic 
risk, i.e. with diversification potential, it means it should have a higher value than a 
fundamental analysis would result to in isolation.  Indeed, the stock should have a 
return which relates to merely the market risk.  For fundamental analysis this 
means the CAPM becomes a fundamental part in judging the value of a stock, not 
only the fundamentals matter, but also the interplay with the risk of the market. 
 
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium in capital markets 
 
 
For reaching the market equilibrium in capital markets, Sharpe (1964) made a 
number of assumptions for the CAPM in line with Markowitz (1952, 1959) and 
Tobin (1958): 
Risk
Return
Risk-free 
rate
Efficient set
Market portfolio
Capital market line
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 • Investors follow the Markowitz’s model for making investment decisions 
• The same rate of interest for lending and borrowing applies to all investors 
• All investors have homogenous expectations about expected returns, risk 
and correlations 
 
In the CAPM, more reward means to take more risk.  Because investors want the 
extra return without the extra risk, they compete in the market for getting an edge 
in the form of information, but will not succeed because of the mechanism of full 
competition.  CAPM presupposes informational efficiency, which means that 
prices of securities accurately reflect all available information (Fama, 1970).   
 
In other words, efficient markets are based on the rational expectations of 
investors.  Lucas (1978) says that rational expectations and informational 
efficiency are the same.  Or in the words of Read: 
 
This full information and full rationality approach in finance at the time was 
analogous to the rational expectations school of macroeconomics that was also 
developing in the 1960s (Read, 2013, pp. 102-103). 
John Muth (1961) has introduced the notion of rational expectations, i.e. 
expectations from common sense, as opposed to adaptive expectations.  His 
argument is that the professor of economics cannot predict, say, hog cycles better 
than the ‘hog’ (sc. pig) farmer.  Why is it an expectation from common sense?  
Because the argument tells us that economists would be rich, if they could make 
better predictions than hog farmers (McCloskey, 1998). 
 
Concerning the relation between the CAPM and the efficient market hypothesis, 
Fama (1970) notes that market efficiency cannot be determined without a theory 
about equilibrium.  So, without presupposing equilibrium there can be no expected 
return or risk, and no stochastical predictability of investments.  Fama (2011) calls 
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the logical combination of the postulates of market efficiency and market 
equilibrium the joint hypothesis problem.  Fama echoes Hayek (1948), a 
representative of the Austrian School, who sees foresight (predictability) and 
equilibrium as a tautology.  But Hayek differs from Fama, in the sense that he does 
not believe in either part of the tautology: 
 
It appears that the concept of equilibrium merely means that the foresight of the 
different members of the society is in a special sense correct (Hayek, 1980/1948, 
p. 42). 
Hayek’s argument against predictability is that economic knowledge is dispersed 
over the individual participants, which do not know each other’s future plans.  It is 
the market which brings the participants and their plans together: the precise 
outcomes that will emerge are unpredictable. 
After the CAPM: APT and the Anomalies 
The successor of the CAPM is the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross, 1976).  The 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) allows for other explanatory factors than CAPM’s 
market risk to determine an expected risk and return of a security.  The 
assumptions of APT are deliberately less restrictive than those of the CAPM:  
 
The primary goal of Stephen Ross’ APT was to relax the implication that every 
investor chooses the same portfolio.  Instead, Ross sought to show that different 
investors balance a spectrum of possible risks (Read, 2013, p. 130). 
Unlike the CAPM, which reduces all risk to market risk, APT is an open empirical 
theory, therefore it does not prescribe the factors that determine the expected risk 
and return of a security.   
 
Another follow-up of the CAPM is that it has inspired a large empirical branch in 
investment theory, which tries to identify anomalies in the efficient market 
hypotheses.  A number of well-known anomalies is found by Fama and Kenneth 
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French (1993), which find three factors explaining returns: besides the market, 
factors for small caps, and stocks with low book to price ratio, explain returns.  
Haugen (1995) suggests to renew modern finance, because empirical research such 
as Fama & French (1993) shows that value stocks have a higher return and a lower 
risk, thus, Markowitz’s portfolio theory and the CAPM are not appropriate.  
Besides Fama & French’s findings, lots of articles have been written about for 
example calendar, momentum, and behavioural anomalies.  It would be out of 
scope to treat and comment all the anomalies. 
 
Though a criticism of the econometric method would be out of scope here as well, 
it is nevertheless important to express my general view about the predictability of 
the anomalies found.  The empirical investigations attack the theory of the efficient 
market in the sense that all available information is not reflected, but that does not 
mean that financial markets have become predictable.  If some predictable pattern 
in the stock market continues to exist, than market forces will exploit the 
phenomenon, after which it stops existing: it resembles the non-existing 100 euro 
notes on the pavement near your house.  Yet, full arbitrage is not possible, because 
arbitrage is restrained by the availability of capital needed and the capacity to take 
the risks involved (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  In so far, the efficient market theory 
is useful because it explains that easy profits will not persist because of arbitrage.  
Of all the information available, the easy piece with clear consequences will be 
priced in for sure. 
2.8: Option Theory 
Another important part of modern investment theory is option theory.  Option 
theory treats the valuation of contingent claims and calculates the price of the right 
to sell or buy for example a stock against a specified price in a specified period.  
The theory of options has, of course, a history beyond the conventional notion that 
it is invented in the 1970s.  Anecdotal history tells the story of the Greek 
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philosopher Tales of Milete (624-545 BC) who successfully bought options on 
olive-presses (Aristotle, 1912).  De la Vega (1688) describes the mature option 
market of the Amsterdam stock exchange of the seventeenth century.  Bachelier 
(1900) seems to have made the first serious contribution on the pricing of options.  
Another early contributor to option theory is Vinzenz Bronzin in 1908:   
 
While Bronzin’s approach is more pragmatic than Bachelier’s, every element of 
modern option pricing can be found: risk-neutral pricing, no-arbitrage and perfect-
hedging pricing conditions, the put-call parity, and the impact of different 
distributional assumptions on option values.  [….]. 
His equation […] is closer to the Black-Scholes formula than anything published 
before Black, Scholes and Merton (Zimmerman & Hafner, 2006, p. 238). 
Because it is out of scope for the dissertation, the reader who is interested in a more 
detailed history of option theory is referred to Espen Haug & Taleb (2011). 
 
The credit for finding the solution for option pricing is usually given to Fisher 
Black & Myron Scholes (1973) and Robert Merton (1973b).  Option theory enables 
to calculate the price of a right to buy or sell, for example, a stock at a specified 
price in a specified period.  Black & Scholes (1973), and Merton (1973b), are able 
to solve the formula for option pricing, because they demonstrate that the risk 
premium above at the risk-free rate becomes irrelevant in the derivation of the 
formula.  Black & Scholes (1973) derive a formula for the pricing an option from 
both the CAPM and the so-called put-call parity.  The Black & Scholes formula is 
mathematically explained in the Appendix B of the Chapter.  Robert Merton 
(1973b) further demonstrates that the Black-Scholes formula depends on risk-free 
arbitrage: a position in stocks can dynamically hedge the exposure of an option.  
The option price equals the statistically expected loss of the hedging portfolio.  A 
long position in stocks, the holding of stocks, hedges a call option, a short position, 
selling the stocks short, hedges a put option. 
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Black, Scholes, and Merton imply that the risk of the underlying investment of an 
option can be estimated.  Otherwise, a market maker in options faces possible 
losses, because the dynamic hedging costs can be higher than expected if the risk 
realized is higher than the risk expected.  Yet, in the line of my argument in the 
dissertation, both risk and return are unpredictable: an option price reflects a 
subjective level of risk.  Option theory has had a huge influence on the practice of 
option trading and the development of financial engineering (Hull, 2009/1997, p. 
277).  Some, though, are critical of the perceived role of option theory in practice: 
Derman & Taleb (2005) do not believe that dynamic hedging is possible in 
practice: instead, they claim that static hedging with the put-call parity is the 
fundamental principle of option pricing. 
 
Option theory differs from the CAPM in the expected level of the return of risky 
assets: option theory expects that risky assets return the risk-free rate, CAPM 
expects a risk premium above the risk-free rate.  Option theory and the CAPM 
differ in the expected return of risky assets because they relate differently to risk 
preferences.  Option pricing is independent of risk preferences, and founded on the 
principle of risk neutral valuation (Hull, 2009/1997, p. 289).  The CAPM adheres 
to the preference of risk aversion, the economic principle of a diminishing marginal 
utility, and expects therefore that a higher return should compensate for a higher 
risk.   
 
How does option theory fits in with portfolio theory?  Using options as a part of 
Markowitz’s optimization procedure to find the efficient set of portfolios seems 
problematic, because the usual risk measure of portfolio theory, the standard 
deviation, is not fit for the asymmetric risks that options create.  Of course, the 
semi-deviation, which measures the volatility below a certain level, say, the risk-
free rate, could be an alternative measure of risk, but the semi-deviation as well 
would measure the risk too imprecise when options are involved.  On top of that, 
call options should profit from the risk premium of stocks, which the option 
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formula excludes.  And, put options should have a disadvantage because of the 
positive tilt of the risk premium.  Furthermore, option theory and portfolio theory 
differ fundamentally in handling risk: portfolio theory merely postulates theoretical 
risk reduction as a free lunch, instead option theory delivers a derivate that 
guarantees risk reduction at a real cost.  Markowitz’s optimization procedure is 
simply not designed to handle the asymmetric risk profile of options, the absence 
of the risk premium in option theory, and the fundamentally different character of 
risk reduction of options. 
2.9: The Criticisms of Modern Finance 
Leaving the anomalies of the efficient market out, the criticisms of modern finance 
can be loosely divided in five groups:  
 
• the ideological criticism of financial markets as merely gambling and at 
times harmful  
• the criticism of the conventional theory of statistics used in finance by 
Benoit Mandelbrot: fractal finance 
• the criticism of the rationality of financial markets: bubble theory 
• the behavioral criticism of the rationality of individuals in finance 
• the criticism of evolutionary finance 
 
Please note that another important criticism of non-mainstream economics about 
uncertainty and unpredictability will be treated at length in the next chapter.  The 
criticism about uncertainty is about applying statistics for prediction when 
information lacks about the future. 
The Ideological Criticism 
In 2008, the credit crisis has led to a crisis on the financial markets.  In the credit 
crisis, the ideology of the rational market as advocated by Alan Greenspan and 
others was put to a reality check.  Central in the rational market theory is the 
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efficient market hypothesis (Fox, 2009, p. xiii).  To repeat, the efficient market 
hypothesis assumes rational expectations, which mean that individuals cannot have 
better information than the markets as such.  Yet, though the efficient market 
hypothesis is a useful scientific model, it has become overstretched by the idea that 
the rational market comes up with the true price: 
 
Financial markets knew best.  They moved capital from those who had it to those 
who needed it.  They spread risk.  They gathered and dispersed information (Fox, 
2009, p xii). 
The rational market theory makes forget that the financial market is “a devilish 
thing” as well (ibid., p. xv).  Cassidy explains that stability of markets is an illusion 
because of the effect of bubbles: 
 
Once a bubble begins, free markets can no longer be relied on to allocate resources 
sensibly or efficiently.  By holding out the prospect of quick and effortless profits, 
they provide incentives for individuals and firms to act in ways that are 
individually rational but immensely damaging ─to themselves and others 
(Cassidy, 2010/2009, p. 9). 
To repeat the earlier findings of the Chapter, the perspective that financial markets 
resemble gambling is an old one, witnessed by the De la Vega’s (1688) eyewitness 
report of the Amsterdam Exchange since the 17th century.  In the 19th century, 
investing in stocks is still associated with gambling, but the vernacular science of 
financial investments turns it into a scientific topic, in which rational behaviour in 
the form of self-control and the study of information, is promoted as the key to 
successful investing (Preda, 2006).  A part of vernacular science includes 
probabilistic and abstract reasoning and results in the efficient market theory.  The 
perspective that financial markets can be managed by a scientific approach is 
enforced since modern finance emerged in the 1960s.   
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Though investing has unknown probability distributions, unlike gambling in a 
casino, investing is perceived unlike gambling because it has a rationale, arguments 
to believe that it is worthwhile.  Marieke de Goede (2005) takes a genealogical 
approach to investigate finance:  
 
A genealogy, in short, is a practice of criticism that is motivated by finding 
insecurities and uncertainties in that which is represented as stable, coherent, and 
self-perpetuating (De Goede, 2005, p. 14). 
Finance is now seen as a respectable scientific and public subject, instead of as 
gambling associated at times with fraud and manipulation; money on a savings 
account should be replaced by investments because it should, instead of doing 
nothing, be activated in the financial market.  The change of a perception of 
finance from gambling to a rational activity took time and was forced by the 
emergence of the financial markets, of which the actors needed respectability: 
 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the lack of a conceptual distinction 
between ‘finance’, ‘gambling’, and ‘speculation’ increasingly became an obstacle 
to the respectability of trading in stocks, shares, and credit certificates.  A 
separation between gambling and finance became thinkable only through a 
prolonged political, cultural, and legal struggle surrounding the meanings and 
boundaries of ‘the financial sphere’ and the character and behavior of ‘financial 
man’ (De Goede, 2005, p. 48). 
The genealogical approach underpins that the distinction of finance and gambling 
is merely political, ideological, instead of based on the nature of financial markets 
(De Goede, 2005, p. 114). 
 
A defence of modern finance against the ideological criticism and others criticisms 
to come, lies partly in the meaning of rational markets.  Finance adheres to the idea 
of rational markets as guided by arbitrage.  The mechanism of arbitrage is a 
paradigm of modern finance.  The mechanism of arbitrage implies that some 
individual participant on the financial needs to be rational and to apply arbitrage.  
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But for successful arbitrage not all market participants need to be rational, even a 
lot of irrational participants are no problem.  Moreover, it is a relative simple form 
of rationality because arbitrage is about getting a riskless profit and merely 
assumes that people want more money without an extra risk.  The rationality of 
arbitrage is far less demanding than the rationality of a regular market equilibrium 
with regard to the requested number of rational participant and the complexity of 
their preferences.  Of course, the argument of arbitrage has its limits, merely plain 
information can be arbitraged, but noise cannot be arbitraged. 
 
Whether the benefits of financial markets outstrip its negative sides, is outside the 
scope of the dissertation.  Yet, the question how people should cope with financial 
markets is relevant: suffices the current scientific approach of modern finance to 
handle investments, or does its epistemology, or lack thereon, urge us to look for 
alternative solutions? 
Benoit Mandelbrot’s Fractal Finance 
As McCloskey (1990) says, facts constrain stories.  The point now is what facts are 
in finance, because statistical theories frame facts.  Benoit Mandelbrot (1963a, 
1963b, 2004 with Hudson) starts by undoubtable facts, mostly simple data, that of 
prices on financial or commodity markets and their fluctuations.  Then, the choice 
of statistical theory, normally the theory coupled to that of the normal distribution, 
decides the description of the data for the purpose of explanation or prediction.  
But Mandelbrot proposes an alternative statistical theory, the theory of fractals, to 
explain the data on financial and commodity markets.  The normal distribution 
cannot explain Black Monday, the stock market crash 19 October 1987, on which 
the American stock market tumbled 29.2%: the odds of such a crash were less than 
1050 following a normal distribution (Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2004, p. 4).  The 
received view of perceiving facts on the financial markets can also offer an 
alternative explanation for the credit crisis of 2008:  
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The worldwide market crash of autumn 2008 had many causes: greedy bankers, 
lax regulators and gullible investors, to name a few.  But there is also a less-
obvious cause: our all-too-limited understanding of how markets work, how prices 
move and how risks evolve (Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2008/2004, p. xi). 
So, the assumptions behind the models in finance are a part of the problem.  The 
assumptions pretend that risk is manageable, but turbulence is normal, not 
abnormal, in financial markets.  According to Mandelbrot’s & Hudson’s, modern 
finance is problematic: 
 
Financial economics, as a discipline, is where chemistry was in the sixteenth 
century: a messy compendium of proven know-how, misty folk wisdom, 
unexamined assumptions and grandiose speculation (ibid., p. xv). 
Mandelbrot recognizes Bachelier’s random walk process as an important theory 
about the behaviour of financial markets, but replaces the normal probability 
distribution for the so-called stable Paretian probability distribution, because the 
statistical properties of the distribution of price changes on financial markets are 
deviant from the normal distribution in the sense the distribution are to peaked, 
leptokurtic, to be normal distributions: 
 
Despite the fundamental importance of Bachelier's process, which has come to be 
called ‘Brownian motion’, it is now obvious that it does not account for the 
abundant data accumulated since 1900 by empirical economists, simply because 
the empirical distributions of price changes are usually too ‘peaked’ to be relative 
to samples from Gaussian populations (Mandelbrot, 1963a, p. 394, his italics). 
Besides the probability distribution, the efficient market hypothesis which relates 
information, news, and fundamental analysis to the pricing of a security is flawed 
(Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2008/2004, p. 8).  An example of a flaw in the efficient 
market theory is that prices are dependent, instead of independent as presumed by 
the efficient market hypothesis, though the dependence of prices does not mean 
that the prices become predictable (ibid., pp. 11-12).  Another point is that the 
efficient market hypothesis does not explain the endogenous working of financial 
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markets, despite that a financial market does more than reflecting outside events 
(ibid., p. 21). 
 
The hypothesis of efficient processing of information seems not adequate as an 
explanation of the behaviour of financial markets, but that does not mean that 
markets become predictable.  For Mandelbrot, the economic significance, i.e. that 
prediction is impossible, of the efficient market hypothesis remains valid.  Though 
he does not believe in the prediction of markets, having a theory which explains the 
behaviour of financial markets is worthwhile as a product of science.  His theory is 
not meant to make money, but to enlarge wisdom.   
 
Mandelbrot uses the mathematics of so-called fractals, a small geometric form 
which accumulates to some complex phenomenon, to simplify the understanding of 
phenomena:  
 
A fractal, a term he [Mandelbrot] coined form the Latin for ‘broken’, is a 
geometric shape that can be broken into smaller parts, each a small-scale echo of 
the whole.  The branches of a tree, the florets of a cauliflower, the bifurcations of a 
river –all are examples of natural fractals (Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2008/2004, p. 
xx, my insertion).  
The theory of fractals translates into the Pareto probability distribution, a power 
law distribution.  Vilfredo Pareto (1848 – 1923) is an Italian economist, 
sociologist, statistician among others (Kirman, 2008).  Other names for the Pareto 
probability distributions are ‘Lévy’, ‘Lévy-Mandelbrot’, ‘L-stable’, or ‘stable 
Paretian’.  The Pareto probability distribution is known in popular terms by the 
20/80 rule, for example 20 percent of the habitants tend to earn 80 percent of the 
income in a country.  The Pareto distribution is featured by a long (fat) tail.  
Mandelbrot sees the Pareto distribution as representative for many economic 
phenomena:  
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It is not very seriously questioned, however, that the law of Pareto represents very 
satisfactorily, not only the ‘tail’ of the distribution of personal income, but also the 
tails of the distributions of firm sizes and of city sizes (Mandelbrot, 1963b, p. 
421). 
Mandelbrot & Hudson (2008/2004, p. viii) distinguish three forms of randomness: 
mild, slow, and wild.  Modern finance assumes mild randomness which is 
represented by the normal distribution.  But finance is represented by wild 
randomness: 
 
My contribution was, foremost, to recognize that in turbulence and much else in 
the real world, roughness is no mere imperfection form some ideal, not just a 
detail from a gross plan.  It is of the very essence of many natural objects ─and of 
economic ones (Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2008/2004, p. 125). 
The Paretian distribution which Mandelbrot proposes for finance, has next to its 
wild randomness, another feature which explains theories and ideas about financial 
markets: the feature is that the Paretian distribution creates the illusion of causality 
in stock markets: 
 
I shall also show the following: when the ‘spontaneous activity’ of a system is 
ruled by a Paretian process, the causally structural features of the system are likely 
to be very much more hidden by noise than is the case where the latter is Gaussian.  
Causal structures may even be totally ‘drowned out’.  On the other hand, Paretian 
noise generates all kinds of ‘patterns’ that seem to be perfectly clear-cut but have 
no value for purposes of prediction (Mandelbrot, 1963b, p. 422). 
Another consequence of accepting the Paretian distribution is that the standard 
deviation becomes useless, because it becomes infinite and that usual statistical 
methods do not work: 
 
It is well known that second moments are heavily used in statistical measures of 
dispersion or of ‘standard deviation’ and in ‘least-squares’ and ‘spectral’ methods.  
Hence, whenever the considerations of Section V are required to explain the 
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erratic behavior of sample second moments, a substantial portion of the usual 
methods of statistics should be expected to fail (Mandelbrot, 1963b, p. 432). 
If the Paretian distribution holds, Markowitz was wrong in choosing the standard 
deviation as the measure of risk.  The same goes for the CAPM, which assumes 
normal distributions.  
 
If probability distributions are Paretian, normal statistical analysis does not work, 
and finance becomes a science of interpretation like history.  Interestingly enough, 
Mandelbrot resembles Von Mises, Keynes, Knight, but has another theory, though 
from a source from within economics by the ideas of Vilfredo Pareto: 
 
Broadly speaking, a pattern is scientifically significant and is felt to have chances 
of being repeated, only if in some sense its ‘likelihood’ of having occurred by 
chance is very small.  This kind of significance is obviously to be assessed with 
the help of the tools of statistics; unfortunately, those have been mostly designed 
to deal with Gaussian alternatives and, when the chance alternative is Paretian, 
they are not conservative or ‘robust’ enough by far. [….].  But, when one works in 
a field where the background noise is Paretian, one must realize that one faces a 
burden of proof that is closer to that of history and autobiography than to that of 
physics (Mandelbrot, 1963b, p. 433). 
Though the Paretian distribution is probably not predictive because it is difficult to 
establish the relevant parameters, it has a chance of being a better theory for the 
random walk hypothesis than a normal (or lognormal) distribution (ibid., p. 434).  
But the consequences of the Paretian distribution are huge: regular statistics do not 
function anymore, the standard deviation is no longer representative, and that is 
negative for the assumed benefits of diversification.  Concerning the CAPM, it 
cannot function because it assumes the normal distribution.  
 
The implications of Mandelbrot’s theory are devastating for finance and regular 
statistics: stocks are riskier than modern finance postulates, diversification does not 
work well, and volatility is unstable.  Initially, Mandelbrot’s ideas spread in 
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finance but were ignored later on.  Though for example Taleb (2007), a popular 
opponent of modern investment theory and its related risk management practices, 
adheres to Mandelbrot’s ideas, Mandelbrot remains in the periphery of finance 
theory. 
Charles Kindleberger: Bubble Theory 
Kindleberger (1910-2003) is an economic historian specialized in the history of 
financial crises.  Financial crises happen over and again.  To mention some crises 
in the last 20 years: the Euro-crisis of 2012, the credit crisis of 2008, the dotcom 
bubble of 2001, the Russia-crisis of 1999, and the Asia-crisis of 1997.  He 
persuades that crises are a part of the economic system and have always existed.  
Crises relate to the behaviour of individuals and crowds.  His book (1978) Manias, 
Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises  received the recommendation 
of Paul Samuelson: 
 
Sometime in the next five years you may kick yourself for not reading and re-
reading Kindleberger's Manias, Panics, and Crashes. Paul A. Samuelson 
(Kindleberger, 2000/1978, front-page). 
According to Minsky (2000/1978, pp. 14-15) bubbles and their bursting behave 
according to a fixed pattern: 
 
• A bubble starts with a displacement, an outside shock to the economy, such 
as a new invention, or a monetary or political change.  A displacement 
brings opportunities for profits. 
• Then credit expands and fuels the boom.  Banks can expand the money 
supply. 
• Prices rise and a positive feedback develops by the entry of new investors. 
• The bubble reaches the stage of euphoria.  Speculation is added now.  
Profits are overstated. 
• Then the bubble bursts with the accompanying panic. 
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• Finally, the phase of capitulation is reached.  People have lost their 
confidence. 
 
Kindleberger uses the ideas of Herman Minsky (1982) for the interpretation of 
bubbles.  He dubs Minsky’s model as a classical economic model: 
 
Indeed, in its emphasis on the instability of the credit system, it is a lineal 
descendant of a model, set out with personal variations, by a host of classical 
economists including John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, Knut Wicksell, and Irving 
Fischer.  Like Fisher, Minsky attached great importance to the role of debt 
structures in causing financial difficulties, and especially debt contracted to 
leverage the acquisition of speculative assets for subsequent resale (Kindleberger, 
2000/1978, p. 14). 
Kindleberger (ibid., p. 13) does, of course, not mean that all economic upswings 
end up in bubbles. Nor does he seek some regularity in time to make predictions, 
like some business cycle theorists have done, such as Kitchin’s cycle of 39 months, 
Juglar’s cycle of 7/8 years, Kuznets’s cycle of 20 years, and Kondratieff’s cycle 
which is set off by major inventions. 
 
Kindleberger’s research shows that people behave irrational in markets.  Though 
the normal behaviour of people is rational, he relates manias and panics with 
temporal mass irrationality or mob psychology (ibid., p. 26).  More precisely, 
irrationality of the whole can emerge from rational individual behaviour.  He calls 
the idea that rational individuals act rationally as a whole a fallacy of composition, 
but emergence of irrationality out of individual rational behaviour happens on other 
occasions as well, for example when people stand up in a theatre to get a better 
view, with the consequence the irrational outcome that other people get a worse 
view (ibid., p. 217).  Individuals can be irrational as well, as for example illustrated 
by the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance: people possessing the same facts use 
different personally coloured ‘theories’, and reach other conclusions on the basis of 
the same facts (ibid., p. 2018).  Another example is that information is interpreted 
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on different levels of expertise, because not everyone is an expert, which leads to 
irrationality in the market. 
Robert Shiller 
A countermovement against the efficient market emerges along with an accent on 
the forgotten role of irrational behaviour (Read, 2013, p. 190).  Shiller (1981) is an 
early opponent of the efficient market theory:  
 
If, by the 1980s, there began to emerge a healthy skepticism of the efficient market 
hypothesis, there remained few convincing alternatives.  The chief advocate for 
the popularization of a reconsideration of the efficient market hypothesis was 
Robert Shiller.  He helped motivate a movement to construct a new behavioral 
paradigm to the pricing of financial instruments (Read, 2013, p. 188). 
Shiller (1981) finds that the variance of stocks was 5 to 13 times higher than an 
efficient market model would predict on the basis of available information.  Later 
on, Schiller (2000) explains in his book Irrational Exuberance that the bull market 
of the 1980s and 1990s is not related to economic fundamentals.  He expresses a 
number of possible causes for the irrational rise of the stock market in the 1980s 
and 1990s such as positive feedback models of for example adaptive expectations, 
cultural causes such as media and ‘new era’-thinking, and behavioural causes such 
as herd behaviour. 
 
Shiller (with Akerlof, 2009) works in the tradition of Keynes’s ideas of psychology 
of markets in the form of animal spirits, which translate into bubbles and Keynes’s 
beauty context which emphasizes the reflexivity of markets, meaning that the 
market reacts to itself.  So, to explain behaviour, Shiller replaces rational economic 
explanations by psychological and cultural explanations such as confidence, 
fairness, bad faith, money illusion, and stories.  In Chapter 5 about the culture of 
finance Shiller will also be treated. 
89 
 
Behavioral Finance 
In a general critique of the assumption of rational behaviour in economics, Herbert 
Simon (1955) introduces the alternative notion of bounded rationality.  Bounded 
rationality limits the knowledge and the calculative ability of the decision maker.  
Yet, in classical decision theory the rational decision maker is omniscient, and does 
not make mistakes in his calculations.  A consequence of bounded rationality is 
that a decision maker does not optimize, but satisfices.  The school of behavioural 
finance continues the path of bounded rationality.  Behavioural finance has 
emerged as a new branch of investment theory.  Behavioural finance studies the 
psychology of decision making in investing.   
 
Daniel Kahneman (2011) distinguishes two systems of thinking, the heuristic 
automatic mode (system 1) and the effortful attentive mode (system 2).  The 
heuristic mode of thinking that leads to behavioural biases, is the regular way of 
thinking, the effortful mode can cope with heuristic biases.  Behavioural finance 
has found that “Uncertainty is poorly represented in intuition, as well as in 
perception (Kahneman, 2003, p. 701).”  Thus, translating intuition into personal 
probability is troublesome.  For example, Amos Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
show that judgment under uncertainty is biased, because of the heuristics of 
representativeness, availability, and anchoring.  The heuristic of representativeness 
shows that probability judgments based on representativeness, similarity, can be 
flawed, because probability is influenced by a larger array of factors than mere 
similarity.  The availability bias explains why people misjudge the probability of 
an event merely because some events can easily be brought to mind.  The 
anchoring bias suggests that judgments are influenced the information presented by 
the starting point.   
 
Relevant to the investment decisions in the dissertation, is that historical data often 
are available as a basis to form judgments about future returns, and that investment 
theory ‘prescribes’ how to present the data, so the judgment under uncertainty is 
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biased at a higher level than presented by the examples of the behavioural theory of 
Tversky and Kahneman.  Behavioural finance also offers an explanation why 
decision makers about investments are captured by the perspective of investment 
theory.  Ellsberg (1961) described the phenomenon of ambiguity aversion, meaning 
that people do not like uncertainty and prefer a presentation which is more 
elaborate, which is more generally described as attribute substitution (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002).   Specifically to investment theory it means that models are the 
attribute of substitution: 
 
[…] our brain has the latent tendency to substitute complex problems with less 
complex problems.  And these less complex, though often mathematically rigorous 
problems are then resolved as a substitute solution for the complex problems.  
That is called attribute substitution (Kocken, 2012, p. 18). 
Shefrin (1999, p. xii), a prominent writer on behavioural finance, expresses as an 
important lesson from behavioural finance that investors should be aware of their 
overconfidence.  Research shows that most investors make psychological errors in 
making investment decisions.  Overconfidence also applies to the use of models in 
finance, and, in addition, investors select the information that confirms their earlier 
choice, in other words their opinions about the model are flawed by the 
confirmation bias (Rosenberg & Kocken, 2013).  Behavioural finance offers insight 
in why investors keep on using flawed model by the cognitive biases that pervade 
their thinking.  Because of their critique of expected utility theory, Tversky and 
Kahneman develop an alternative, the prospect theory (1979).  For a summary of 
behavioural finance see Shefrin (1999), Kahneman (2003, 2011) and Thaler & 
Sunstein (2008).   
 
Gerd Gigerenzer (2000) is a critic of the program of heuristics and biases as 
performed by Tversky & Kahneman and others.  In the conventional program of 
behavioural finance heuristics and biases are measured against the norms of 
probability theory.  But the norms of probability theory adapted are doubtful: 
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What in the heuristics-and-biases literature is called the ‘normative theory of 
probability’ or the like is in fact a very narrow kind of neo-Bayesian view that is 
shared by some theoretical economists and cognitive psychologists and to a lesser 
degree by practitioners in business, law, and artificial intelligence (Gigerenzer, 
2000, p. 244). 
Gigerenzer advocates the notion of ecological rationality: “[…] rationality that is 
defined by its fit with reality (Gigerenzer et al, 1999, p. 5).”  Ecological rationality 
is a form of bounded rationality and explains how people cope with uncertainty.  
The difference between ecological rationality and the rationality assumed by 
Tversky and Kahneman is that ecological rationality does not focus on probability 
theory.  Ecological means that, instead of probability theory, the structure of the 
environment is relevant for decision making.  The specific circumstances 
determine what is rational to include in decision making; probability theory is too 
general and therefore unfit in most circumstances of practical decision making.   
 
As a case of pluralism in economics (Mirowski & Sent, 2002), the emergence of 
behavioural finance is a favourable development.  Measured by the tolerance of 
academic economics and finance, behavioural finance is successful as an 
alternative for neoclassical finance.  It seems that no other alternative investment 
theory has gained the level of attention in the academic world and in the investment 
practice as behavioural finance.   
 
The explanations of behavioural finance and the rhetoric of investment theory for 
the shortcomings of investment theory coincide.  For example, the metaphor that 
investing is mathematical statistics, could be seen as a framing effect, which makes 
us see in a particular way.  Behavioural finance also shows the conceptual 
difficulty that people experience with statistics.  The strength of behavioural 
finance that is predicts individual behaviour in decision making, and that it has a 
coherent theory why people act the way they do.  But as a matter of prediction of 
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the financial markets, behavioural finance has no other status than other alternative 
investment theories, that is behavioural finance explains but does not predict 
financial markets.   
Evolutionary Finance  
Finance applies statistics to financial markets as a top-down approach. Statistics 
assumes that the underlying process produces random outcomes which are stable, 
stochastically predictable.  The arguments for applying the stability hypothesis in 
finance, such as rationality, the efficient market hypothesis, arbitrage, fundamental 
intrinsic value, and market equilibrium have been discussed in Chapter 2 and will 
be analyzed at length in Chapter 3 of the dissertation.  An alternative approach, 
however, is evolutionary finance, which is a bottom-up approach that starts with 
the behaviour of market participants.  The evolutionary approach has gained 
ground in a variety of sciences.  The constitutional metaphor of the bottom-up 
approach of evolutionary finance is evolutionary biology, instead of mechanical 
and statistical physics as used in neoclassical finance.  The Santa Fe Institute, a 
research center for the evolutionary approach in science which was founded in 
1984, has played an important role in promoting the evolutionary approach.   
 
Evolutionary finance grounds in a number of related theories, such as dynamic 
systems, reflexivity, complexity, and emergence.  
 
Dynamic systems 
In evolutionary finance, financial markets are seen as a dynamic system, in which 
the causes of changes are endogenous, from within the system (Beinhocker, 
1997/1996, p. 100).  For example, the interaction between the behaviour of 
individuals can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1948).  An example of 
a self-fulfilling prophecy starts with a false rumor that a certain bank has become 
insolvent, after which some customers of the bank start to withdraw their money, 
and attract other customers who do the same.  Then the bank will indeed fail if left 
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by itself, and the prophecy has become self-fulfilling.  A self-fulfilling prophecy is 
a wrong belief about a situation, but becomes true because behaviour adapts to the 
belief: 
[…] public definitions of a situation (prophecies or predictions) become an integral 
part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments.  This is peculiar to 
human affairs (Merton, 1948, p. 195). 
A self-fulfilling prophecy is fed by feedback loops: in the example of the 
insolvency of the bank, first merely some people believe the rumor, then the 
withdrawal of money creates more believers and then the bank will fail.  But such 
feedback loops are no part of neoclassical economics. 
 
Another form of a feedback loop is the phenomenon of reflexivity.  An advocate of 
reflexivity is George Soros (1987, 2008).  Soros (2008, p. 10) describes reflexivity 
as a circular feedback loop between beliefs and reality: beliefs and reality influence 
each another.  Thus, beliefs in financial markets influence the economic reality, 
which reinforces beliefs.  In contrast to neoclassical finance, in Soros’s view the 
beliefs of market participants are flawed by definition because of uncertainty.  The 
consequence of the flawed beliefs of financial markets leads to boom and bust 
cycles, in which optimism feeds optimism and pessimism feeds pessimism.  In the 
case of financial markets, optimism and pessimism are instantaneously visible in 
the market prices. 
 
Complexity 
Another aspect of evolutionary finance is that financial markets are a non-linear 
system, which can result in complex patterns (Beinhocker, 1997/1996, pp. 102-
107).  Thomas Schelling (1978), an economist awarded the Nobel prize in 2005, 
investigates how individual behaviour relates to the outcome at the collective level: 
if individual behaviour depends on individual behaviour of others then the 
collective behaviour is probably not merely the total of the behaviour of the 
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individuals, but can have an unexpected outcome because of the interaction 
between the behaviour of individuals.   
Schelling performed his analysis in a qualitative manner, that is non-mathematical.  
We will see later on in the current paragraph that mathematical and experimental 
methods also have been employed in evolutionary economics and finance. 
 
An important feature of complexity is the so-called tipping point, in which the state 
of a system changes to another form, like water transforms to ice (Popescu, 2015, 
p. 14).  A tipping point in financial markets is for example a regime shift from a 
bull to a bear market.  The technique of agent based modelling enables to simulate 
bottom-up behavior and interaction between individual agents including 
institutions, and helps understanding tipping points in finance and 
macroeconomics.  Networks, this is the way in which agents are connected and 
cluster in finance and economy, are an important part of understanding tipping 
points and complexity in general (Beinhocker, 2006).  Agent based modelling 
reveals how small changes in individual behavior because of interactions between 
people and institutions can lead to dramatic consequences on the collective level.  
Agent based modelling also gives clues for policymakers how to interfere in the 
markets to improve stability or to reduce the consequences of tipping points. 
 
Emergence 
Emergence is typically an output of bottom-up processes: “The movement from 
low-level rules to higher-level sophistication is what we call emergence (Johnson, 
2001, p. 18).”  Emergence results from complex systems: the properties of the total 
of individual parts cannot be reduced to the properties of its individual parts, but 
emerge from the interaction of the individual parts.  Examples of emergence are 
phenomena such as ant colonies, life, consciousness, intelligence and music 
(Hofstadter, 1979).   
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Formal and experimental evolutionary finance 
I will now illustrate some insights from formalized models of evolutionary finance 
in which the behaviour of the market is simulated.  Hommes (2005) reviews 
heterogeneous agent models in which agents have a bounded rationality and act 
behavioural on simple heuristics.  Another feature of the agents is that they are 
heterogeneous, which means that they act differently, for example, agents belong to 
different groups such as fundamental investors, who focus at intrinsic value and 
chartists, who focus at trends in historical market prizes.  The models stemming 
from heterogeneous, bounded rational agents result in dynamic behaviour and can 
explain phenomena such as excess volatility and stock market crashes.  Though the 
evolutionary finance models reviewed by Hommes (2005) are equipped with sparse 
bottom-up assumptions, they succeed in explaining the actual outcomes of the 
financial markets. 
 
Evolutionary finance is also suited for an experimental approach, meaning that a 
group of people can engage in an experiment as financial market participants.  
Such an experiment enables to study for example the relationship between past 
performance and expectations on financial markets.  Anufriev, Hommes, and 
Philipse (2013) found in explaining the outcomes of such an experiment that a 
model in which behaviour switched between adaptive and trend-following 
behaviour was best suited to explain negative and positive feedback loops. 
Evaluation of the Criticisms 
Concerning the depth of the rival theories of finance, they all have substantial 
backing and empirical proofs which can compete scientifically with modern 
investment theory.  The ideological criticism uses elements of behavioural and 
bubble criticisms and combines them with the criticism on free markets in general.  
In essence, the ideological criticism says the investing in financial markets 
resembles gambling which is politically sanctioned.  Investment theory seen is 
through the ideological perspective is a rationalisation of a dubious practice. The 
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ideological criticism is related to a broader criticism of money, economics and free 
markets, which lays outside the scope of the dissertation. 
 
Mandelbrot provides within the rational mathematical tradition an alternative 
statistical theory, which does not predict, but can model market phenomena in 
ways not possible for traditional statistics.  Fractal finance models seemingly 
predictive patterns in financial markets, such as wild volatility and bubbles.  His 
contrasting statistical theory shows that empirical research in finance is highly 
theory-driven, meaning here the regular theory of statistics.  To my opinion, 
Mandelbrot’s theory is a very interesting alternative to modern finance, because it 
provides a better model for the dynamics at financial markets.  Interestingly 
enough, Mandelbrot’s idea roots in economics as well: the economics of Vilfredo 
Pareto. 
 
The bubble theory of Minsky has a different view on markets than modern finance 
and explains bubbles and their bursting.  Kindleberger has a large collection of 
historical cases which follow Minsky’s model.  Shiller also advocates the bubble 
theory of markets.  The bubble theory is persuasive and recognizable.  The theory 
does not claim predictability of markets. 
 
Behavioural finance is insightful and explains behaviour of market participants and 
their behaviour.  The interesting point of behavioural finance is that it has a 
coherent way of explaining what investors do wrong in given circumstances.  
Behavioural finance can also explain why investors keep on using investment 
theory, or more general, keep on believing in prediction of financial markets by the 
biases of attribute substitution, the confirmation bias, and overconfidence. 
 
Evolutionary finance seems a promising alternative finance theory because the 
evolutionary approach can explain the instability of financial markets out of the 
bottom-up outcomes of the interaction of market participants.  The evolutionary 
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approach to finance is meant to explain and does not intend to predict 
─evolutionary biology does not claim to predict either.  Evolutionary finance does 
not exclude other alternative finance theories and relates to elements of the 
alternative investment theories of behavioural finance, bubble theory, and fractal 
finance which have been treated in the current chapter of the dissertation.   
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Appendix 2A: The Mathematical Statistics of Diversification 
To understand Markowitz’s theory, some technical exploration into the 
characteristics of the probability distribution and the effect of diversification is 
helpful.  Mathematical statistics provides the mechanics of diversification.  The 
expected return, the standard deviation, and the correlation specify the statistics in 
portfolio theory.  The expected return is the average, or mean return: ‘expected’ 
here has a statistical meaning.  ‘Expected’ in statistics means the value of the 
investment return at 50% of the probability mass of the distribution (Newbold, 
1984).  The probability mass is the sum of the probabilities of possible returns: the 
mass amounts by definition to 100%.  For investors, the probability of actually 
receiving the mean return is low: expected return is not to be understood as a return 
that an investor can anticipate.  The expected return is to be understood as a 
minimal (or maximal) return with a probability of 50%  ̶ if the probability beliefs 
are correct.  The standard deviation, the risk, measures the dispersion around the 
expected return.  The standard deviation weights larger deviations more heavily, 
because the deviations from the mean are squared in the calculation of the standard 
deviation.  In Figure 2.3 a probability distribution of returns relates to Markowitz’s 
efficiency criteria of mean and standard deviation: 
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Figure 2.3: Probability distribution, standard deviation and mean  
  
 
In portfolio theory, expected return and risk are the main characteristics of an 
individual security.  Yet, at the portfolio level, the interplay between individual 
securities matters: the correlation coefficient expresses the interplay.  The 
correlation coefficient measures the linear relationship between two variables on a 
scale from -1 to +1.  If the correlation coefficient is 1, the returns always move 
together in the same direction, a correlation of 0 implies that returns have no linear 
relationship, and a correlation coefficient of -1 means that the returns behave in 
exactly the opposite direction.   
 
I will now show mathematically, how diversification between two securities lowers 
the risk of a portfolio (Bodie et al, 1989).  Please note that the calculation of the 
expected return of a portfolio does not demand an elaboration: it is simply a 
weighted average of the expected returns of the securities in the portfolio.  The 
standard deviation, or risk, of a portfolio of two securities is formulated as:  
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 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝  =  �  (𝑤𝑤2𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎2 + (1 − 𝑤𝑤)22𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 + 2w(1-w) ρ 𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏)  
 
 
The symbols used mean: 
 
𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝  = standard deviation of portfolio p 
𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎  = standard deviation of security a 
𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏  = standard deviation of security b 
𝑤𝑤   = weight in the portfolio 
𝜌𝜌    = correlation coefficient 
 
The formula illustrates that the risk of a portfolio depends on the standard 
deviations of the individual securities, σa and σb, their weights, w, and on the 
correlation coefficient, ρ, between them.  A correlation coefficient less than one, 
yields a diversification benefit.  If the correlation coefficient is at its upper limit of 
1, the portfolio risk equals the weighted sum of the risks of the individual 
securities.  If the correlation coefficient is at its lower limit of -1, the third term of 
the right hand side of the formula becomes negative, and leads to an extraordinary 
diversification benefit.  In the special case that the correlation coefficient is 0, the 
third part of the right hand side of the formula becomes 0.  Then, the risk of a 
portfolio reduces to the weighted risks of the individual securities: 
 
 
𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝  =  �(𝑤𝑤2𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎2 + (1 − 𝑤𝑤)2𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2 )  
 
 
The formula with two securities illustrates the general mechanism of 
diversification.  Yet, normally an investor can diversify over a lot of securities.  
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Now, the analysis will cover the effect of an increasing number of securities.  To 
benefit the analysis, the securities in the portfolio have the same risk, expected 
return, and correlation coefficient. 
 
If the correlation coefficient between the securities is 0, the risk of the security, 
divided by the square root of the number of securities, determines the portfolio 
risk: 
 
 
𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝 =  𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎
√𝑟𝑟
 
 
Symbol used: 
  𝑟𝑟 = number of securities 
 
The formula demonstrates that more securities lower the risk of the portfolio.  
Because of the square root in the denominator of the right hand side of the formula, 
an extra security in the portfolio leads to a diminishing marginal risk reduction.  If 
the number of securities is high, the portfolio risk eventually becomes 0.  A 
correlation coefficient of 0 resembles an insurance-like activity, because insurance 
assumes individual risks to be more or less uncorrelated.  The formula expresses 
the law of large numbers, which reduces the risk of an insurance-like portfolio to 0 
at a large number of ‘cases’. 
 
The general formula for calculating portfolio risk, when securities have the same 
expected return, risk, and correlation coefficient, is expressed like (Bodie et al, 
1996/1989, p. 227): 
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𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝 =  �  1𝑟𝑟 𝜎𝜎2 +  𝑟𝑟 − 1𝑟𝑟  𝜌𝜌 𝜎𝜎2  
 
 
Supposing that the risk of the individual security is 25%, Figure 2.4 illustrates the 
risk reduction as a function of the number of securities and the correlation 
coefficient: 
 
Figure 2.4: Idiosyncratic risk reduction with correlation coefficients of 1, 0 
and -1 
 
Risk reduction by adding securities is at its most effective at a correlation 
coefficient of 0, represented in Figure 2.4 by the solid bold line.  Suppose the 
correlation coefficient would be -1, then two securities would be enough for an 
optimal risk reduction to 0.  If the correlation coefficient is 1, risk cannot be 
reduced.  At a level of correlation coefficient of 0.5, some risk reduction can be 
achieved, but the optimal reduction requires fewer securities in comparison with a 
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correlation of 0.  Diversification cannot eliminate all variance (Markowitz, 1952, p. 
79).  To repeat, in modern portfolio theory the correlation coefficient is above 0, 
because merely idiosyncratic risk of individual securities can be diversified, in 
contrast to systematic risk, that is market, risk.  The idealized example of the 
mechanism of diversification meant to clarify Markowitz’s notion of risk 
reduction, but of course the correlation coefficients between securities will mostly 
differ, just like their expected risk and return.  
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Appendix 2B: The Black & Scholes Option Formula 
The Black & Scholes option formula deals with the so-called European option, in 
which a holder can only exercise his right to buy or sell at the end of the duration.  
In the formula, Black & Scholes assume that the stock will not deliver a dividend.  
The Black & Scholes call option formula is expressed as (based on Hull, 1997): 
 
𝐶𝐶 = 𝑆𝑆 𝑁𝑁(𝑒𝑒1) − 𝑋𝑋𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁(𝑒𝑒2) 
 
where: 
 
𝑒𝑒1  =  ln(𝑆𝑆/𝑋𝑋) + (𝑟𝑟 + 𝜎𝜎2/2)𝑃𝑃
σ√𝑃𝑃
 
 
𝑒𝑒2  =  𝑒𝑒1 −  σ√𝑃𝑃 
 
The meaning of the symbols used is: 
 
𝐶𝐶        = the current value of the call option 
𝑆𝑆         = the current price of the stock 
𝑁𝑁( ) = the standardized normal distribution 
𝑁𝑁(𝑒𝑒)   = the probability that a drawing out of 𝑁𝑁 is lower than 𝑒𝑒 
𝑋𝑋         = the exercise price of the call option 
𝑒𝑒         = the base of the natural logarithm 
𝑟𝑟         = risk-free interest rate (continuously compounded with 𝑒𝑒) 
𝑃𝑃         = time to maturity 
𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟        = natural logarithm 
𝜎𝜎         = standard deviation, or risk, of the stock price   
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Chapter 3 
Investment Theory, Probability 
Theory, and Uncertainty 
 
“Some consumers of Statistics want to believe in the magic of Statistics.  They view 
Statistics as a type of Mathematics and are offended to learn that judgment is 
involved at all. [.…].  It is the very fact that judgment is a part of a statistical 
analysis that opens the question of the honesty of Statistics (Paul Velleman, 2008, 
p. 8).” 
3.1: The Logos of Probability 
Markowitz’s portfolio theory (1952, 1959) claims that it can handle investment 
decisions with mathematical statistics.  The focus of the current Chapter directs 
primarily at the logos, the rational arguments, of the probability beliefs used in 
portfolio theory, and also at the logos of the probability beliefs used in the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the continuation of Markowitz’s theory. 
 
The Chapter intends to contribute to the literature on the rhetoric of investment 
theory by a close reading of the epistemological assumptions in Markowitz’s 
primary texts (1952, 1959).  The discussion has partly been presented in Pistorius 
(2014).  Markowitz argues that statistical knowledge about future investment 
returns is possible by invoking the theory of subjective probability.  My intention is 
to explain his reasoning and its implications, and to show that the assumption of 
stochastical predictability in portfolio theory is flawed.  To repeat, stochastical 
predictability differs from deterministic predictability: ideally, a deterministic 
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prediction results with certainty in a particular outcome; a stochastical prediction 
yields certainty over a range of possible outcomes with probabilities attached. 
 
Though Markowitz’s theory has, of course, been commented extensively in the 
literature, the epistemological part about the probability beliefs in portfolio theory 
seems to be ignored, because the validity of subjective probability theory is a basic 
assumption in mainstream economics.  To repeat, Markowitz’s portfolio theory is 
not merely of theoretical importance: the theory constitutes investment and risk 
practice in the financial sector and its beliefs have caused financial damage, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
3.2: Probability Beliefs in Portfolio Theory  
We now investigate Markowitz’s ideas about predictability of investment returns.  
He explores in Portfolio Selection (1959) how beliefs about investment returns fit 
in with the theory of probability.  Markowitz founds his theory on mathematical 
statistics: he assumes that “[…] ‘beliefs’ or projections about securities follow the 
same probability rules that random variables obey (Markowitz, 1999, p. 5).”   
 
Portfolio theory applies decision theory, which uses probability theory to predict or 
estimate the probability of future outcomes.  He leaves no doubt that investment 
returns are uncertain, and that security analysts cannot overcome uncertainty:   
 
Uncertainty is a salient feature of security investment.  Economic forces are not 
understood well enough for predictions to be beyond of doubt or error.  Even if the 
consequences of economic conditions were understood perfectly, non-economic 
influences can change the course of general prosperity, the level of the market, or 
the success of a particular security.  [.…]. We are expecting too much if we 
require the security analyst to predict with certainty whether a typical security will 
increase or decrease in value. [….].  The existence of uncertainty does not mean 
that careful security analyses are valueless. [.…] Carefully and expertly formed 
judgments concerning the potentialities and weaknesses of securities form the best 
basis upon which to analyze portfolios (Markowitz, 1991/1959, p. 4). 
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Markowitz says that investment returns are uncertain because of multiple economic 
and non-economic causes, and that both causes are difficult to predict.  As a 
consequence, a security analyst cannot predict the future return of a security with 
certainty.  Nevertheless, the judgment of a security analyst possesses information 
about the value of a security and its uncertainties.  Markowitz’s predecessors, to 
repeat, Williams (1938) and Graham et al (1934), provide the theories about how 
to calculate the value of a security.  Portfolio theory as such has no economic 
theory about the beliefs applied, and can, to repeat, incorporate any economic 
theory which brings in probability beliefs. 
 
Markowitz prefers probability beliefs derived from the judgments of security 
analysts above probability beliefs based on merely historical observations: 
 
Portfolio selection should be based in reasonable beliefs about future rather than 
past performances per se.  Choice based on past performances alone assumes, in 
effect, that average returns of the past are good estimates of the ‘likely’ return in 
the future; and variability of return in the past is a good measure of the uncertainty 
of return in the future (Markowitz, 1991/1959, p. 14, his italics). 
He says that reasonable probability beliefs include the past, but that merely past 
performance seems no good guide for future returns.  But what is his argument that 
past returns do not equal future returns?  It could be the instability of the 
probability distribution of returns, which results from the multiple economic and 
non-economic causes.  Obviously, he seems to believe that the economic theory of 
valuation, as used by security analysts, offers a solution to overcome instability, 
because the market price of a security will, in the future, return to its ‘equilibrium’ 
value.  But the judgments of security analysts, derived from the theory of valuation, 
are not directed at making a probability distribution.  So, the judgments need to be 
translated into beliefs about the probability distribution of investment returns. 
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Markowitz explains the nature of a probability belief by a hypothetical example, in 
which a person wins the same amount of money by choosing between two 
probability events (1959, p. 27).  He has to choose between the event that ‘it does 
not rain tomorrow’, and the probability of 80% of winning in a fair ‘wheel of 
fortune’.  He will try to discover the probability that ‘it does not rain tomorrow’: if 
the probability is lower than 80%, he will choose the wheel of fortune, otherwise 
he will choose the event that ‘it does not rain tomorrow’.  The example illustrates 
that a probability could be estimated by comparing an uncertain event with a 
lottery, or more generally with a probability distribution.  The outcome of the 
comparison is, that some probability distribution will be felt as representative for 
the uncertainty of an event.  The lottery metaphor that a probability belief is a 
lottery bet, is the centrepiece of the theory of subjective probabilities. 
 
Markowitz founds his theory on subjective, also called personal, probabilities.  
Subjective and objective probabilities refer to two distinct theories: 
 
In an objectivist theory, probability is seen as an attribute of the world. [.…].  In 
the subjectivists’ theory, probability is […] an indication of a particular 
individual’s state of knowledge about uncertain events (Langlois, 1982, p. 7). 
In portfolio theory, objective probabilities could only refer to the past, of which 
Markowitz is, to repeat, no advocate because the past lacks the judgment of 
security analysts.  Neoclassical economics, to which Markowitz’ theory belongs, 
adheres to subjective probability for the purpose of decision theory.  Adherents to 
subjective probability theory, should not be confused with adherents to 
methodological subjectivism in economics (Langlois, 1982, p. 2).  Adherents to 
methodological subjectivism, such as economists of the Austrian school, found 
economics on subjective people, but reject subjective probability theory: the 
Austrian school does not consider statistics an appropriate tool for most decisions 
in economics. 
 
110 
 
The distinction between objective and subjective, personal, probabilities relates to 
the various approaches within probability theory.  Three ways to estimate 
probabilities are: ‘classical’, ‘frequentist’, and ‘subjective’ (Gilboa, 2009).  The 
objective classical approach assumes that all outcomes are equally probable.  The 
‘principle of indifference’ explains the classical approach: the indifference stems 
from an absence of a good argument to give unequal probabilities to the outcomes.  
The classical approach restricts to artificial producers of chance, such as the tossing 
of a coin.  The objective, frequentist approach regards the probability of an event as 
the relative frequency in past observations: the approach is the statistics often used 
in empirical science.  The frequentist approach assumes that the law of large 
numbers applies: the law of large numbers relates the mean of a sample to the 
mean of its population.  The subjective, or personal approach, uses the machinery 
of probability to explicit beliefs, but mixes with the probabilities of the objective 
approaches as well (Savage, 1954). 
 
Subjective probabilities are connected to the term ‘Bayesian’: yet, ‘Bayesian’ has 
two meanings.  First, in statistical theory ‘Bayesian’ means that new evidence 
updates probabilities.  The Bayesian method of updating probabilities, or Bayes’s 
rule, competes with the frequentist approach in making inductive inferences on 
observations.  But, because frequency theory can express Bayes’s rule, the rule 
“does not serve as the distinguishing mark of subjectivism (Langlois, 1982, p. 7).”  
The second meaning of ‘Bayesian’ refers to the theory in neoclassical economics 
that, to maximize expected utility, subjective probabilities can replace objective 
ones when objective probabilities are not available (Gilboa et al, 2008). 
Leonard Jimmy Savage (1954) has invented the paradigm that it is rational to 
maximize expected utility with subjective probabilities, if objective probabilities 
are absent.  He deducts from a number of axioms of rational behaviour, that 
decision making under uncertainty maximizes expected utility under subjective 
probabilities.  In short, the axioms of rational behaviour treat completeness and 
transitivity of preferences between bets, separation of tastes from believes, and the 
111 
 
sure thing principle, in which the dominance of the probability distribution suffices 
to make a decision (Gilboa et al, 2008).  Savage prefers the term ‘personal’ instead 
of ‘subjective’ probability.  In the dissertation, both terms mean the same. 
 
Savage claims that the use of personal probabilities is consistent with rational 
behaviour.  Thus, even if probability beliefs are uncertain or vague, it is rational to 
quantify the beliefs to make decisions.  It is rational, because all the information 
the decision maker possesses, is fully expressed in a rational, coherent manner.  
The economic literature has heavily debated Savage’s assumptions of rationality.  
Gilboa (2009, Chapter 12) presents an overview of the criticism of Savage’s 
axioms.  For Markowitz’s portfolio theory, especially the Ellsberg paradox seems 
relevant, because the paradox distinguishes objective and personal probability.  The 
paradox (Ellsberg, 1961), also known as ambiguity aversion, shows that decision 
makers favour objective to personal probability.  To illustrate the paradox, Ellsberg 
designs two experiments, of which one will be explained here.  A decision maker 
has to choose between two urns: he is told about one urn that 50% of its balls are 
red, and 50% black.  The other urn contains red and black balls as well, but no 
indication is given about the distribution between the red and black balls.  
Probably, the decision maker estimates the personal probabilities for the second urn 
as 50% probability of red, and 50% of black.  Thus, the probabilities of taking a red 
ball in the first and the second urn are both 50%.  But if the decision maker is 
asked to choose to take a red ball out of urn one or urn two to win a price, he will 
prefer urn one.  The reason for preferring urn one, is that objective probability feels 
safer than personal probability.  Ellsberg’s critique undermines Savage’s personal 
probability theory: if people would maximize expected subjective utility, they 
should be indifferent to choosing between urn one and urn two. 
 
To repeat the findings of Chapter 2, Simon (1955) introduces a general critique of 
the assumption of rational behaviour in economics with the alternative notion of 
bounded rationality.  Bounded rationality limits the knowledge and the calculative 
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ability of the decision maker.  Yet, in classical decision theory the rational decision 
maker is omniscient, and does not make mistakes in his calculations.  A 
consequence of bounded rationality is that a decision maker does not optimize, but 
satisfices.  The school of behavioural finance continues the path of bounded 
rationality.  Behavioural finance has found that “Uncertainty is poorly represented 
in intuition, as well as in perception (Kahneman, 2003, p. 701).”  Thus, translating 
intuition into personal probability is troublesome.  Rationality for the goal of 
maximizing expected utility in economics relates to ethics: the source of ethics in 
economics is the notion of utility, which belongs to the virtue of prudence 
(McCloskey, 2006).  I will in Chapter 4, among other things, contrast the 
‘prudence-only’ rationality of investment theory to the broader virtue approach of 
McCloskey (1996a, 1996b, 2006).  Klamer’s approach of values (2003, 2014) will 
be treated in Chapter 5 and provides an alternative for the rationality as assumed in 
neoclassical economics as well.  Klamer’s value approach inquires which values 
are important and relates the values to decision making. 
3.3: Markowitz’s Defence of Personal Probabilities  
Markowitz uses personal probabilities in portfolio theory for two reasons: it is 
rational coherent behaviour, and personal probabilities in investment theory should 
be able to predict.  But rational behaviour and predictability are two separate 
arguments: rational behaviour does not automatically lead to predictability.  
Moreover, Savage’s approach is about rational decision making, and not 
necessarily about prediction:  
 
[…] that theory [the theory of personal probability] is a code of consistency for the 
person applying it, not a system of predictions about the world around him 
(Savage, 1954, p. 59, my insertion). 
Let us now discuss how Markowitz (1959) relates the use of personable 
probabilities to predictability.  Out of his discussion of Savage’s theory of 
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probability beliefs, he draws, in his own words, ‘two morals’, about the 
predictability of the probability distributions of investment returns, which I will 
fully quote to support my analysis: 
 
1. The existence of personal probabilities does not necessarily imply that, as of the 
moment, the individual is positive that his beliefs are ‘good beliefs.’  He may 
admit the possibility that he currently is either always overoptimistic or always 
overpessimistic, or in some other way subject to biased judgment.  However, the 
idea of probability beliefs does imply a belief in an ability to learn with time and 
experience, to end a long life of predictions and constant education without 
substantial biases on the whole. 
2. The connection between objective and subjective probabilities is quite close.  
We noted that they mixed on a par with each other in the calculation of expected 
utility.  The discussion of this section indicates another connection.  To assert that 
some physical experiment has a  .6 probability of producing a result A is to assert 
that , if this physical experiment is carried out and if a large number of other 
physically independent experiments (of the same or different kinds) all with a 
probability of  .6 of producing some particular (though perhaps different) result A 
are also carried out, then the relative frequency of A will almost certainly be  .6.  
Similarly, to assert that a  .6 personal probability is associated with an event is to 
assert the belief that it is virtually certain that the relative frequency of correct 
predictions among a set including this and a large number of other psychologically 
independent events is  .6.  Thus personal probabilities and subjective probabilities 
are connected via the notion of relative frequency in the long run (Markowitz, 
1991/1959, pp. 272-273, his italics). 
Concerning Markowitz’s first conclusion about subjective probability beliefs: he 
acknowledges that the exercising of personal probabilities can lead to a possibly 
biased judgment, but it also implies an ability to learn and become better at 
estimating.  His argumentation suggests that he assumes that the probability 
distribution of investment returns can be known in principle, which means the 
probability distributions are not ontological, but merely epistemological uncertain. 
Yet, we have to ask ourselves under which conditions it is possible to learn about 
probability beliefs.  We can learn about the ‘real’ probability distribution of 
investment returns if the distribution is stable over time, or if changes of the 
properties of the distribution can be predicted.  I claim in the dissertation that the 
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probability distribution of investment returns is unstable.  The current Chapter 3 
reviews the arguments against stability in economic phenomena such as returns on 
financial markets and presents my own thought experiment about the possibility of 
predictability for investment theory. 
 
Let us illustrate what happens when probability beliefs are updated.  The 
probability distribution of investment returns applied could differ manifest from 
reality, if an event such as the credit crisis of 2008 with the accompanying negative 
results in the financial markets occurs.  In the reasoning of Markowitz, the answer 
to a phenomenon like 2008, is the Bayesian approach of updating the probability 
estimates with the new information.  But if the probability distribution of 
investment returns is unstable, updating does not lead to a better level of 
predictability, because the ‘real’ distribution of investment returns cannot be 
learned.  It is uncertain how often a crisis such as in 2008 will happen, and a next 
crisis could turn out even worse than 2008.  If the probability distributions would 
be stable, objective probabilities will become available if the number of 
observations becomes sufficiently high: both the frequentist and Bayesian method 
in statistics can be used to update and learn from new observations, both by a 
bigger sample.  My conclusion is that personal probability beliefs about investment 
returns can only by coincidence be correct.  So, though personal probabilities 
sharpen the intuition, they are not able to stochastically predict  the future. 
The second conclusion of Markowitz claims that personal probabilities are like 
subjective probabilities by the notion of relative frequency in the long run.  Meant 
here is seemingly that personal probabilities are individual probabilities, and that 
subjective probabilities are the accumulation of personal probabilities.  My view is 
that he refers to Savage’s point that the personalistic view of probability can 
contain reasonable, objective views like the notion of relative frequency as well: 
   
I would reply [to the critics] that the personalistic view incorporates all the 
universally acceptable criteria for reasonableness in judgment known to me and 
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that, when any criteria that may have been overlooked are brought forward, they 
will be welcomed into the personalistic view (Savage, 1954, p. 67, my insertion). 
My view is that the second moral of Markowitz about similarity to the objective 
frequency approach is only valid if the probability distribution is, again, stable, or 
if the changes in the distribution are predictable.  Just like his first moral, the 
second moral is founded on the assumption of stability.  So, both his morals to 
justify the predictability of probability beliefs in investment theory depend on the 
assumption of stability, or the ability to predict changes in the stability. 
3.4: Investment Theory after Markowitz’s Portfolio Theory 
After Markowitz discovers how a rational investor would act, the next logical step 
in price theory is a formulation of the market equilibrium of expected risk and 
return.  As discussed in Chapter 2, Sharpe (1964) builds a theory of equilibrium in 
financial markets, aka Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  Sargent (2008) 
explicitly assumes stability in the pattern of the economic variable to be predicted.  
Rational expectations for financial markets mean that the possible levels of risk and 
return on investments are known in advance, which is the same as stochastical 
predictability of risk and return. 
 
Equilibrium in financial markets is a centrepiece of the CAPM, and an indirect 
subject of portfolio theory, since Markowitz refers to valuation theory as a source 
for probability beliefs.  Valuation is a sort of equilibrium theory: the theory 
assumes that the price of a security converges to its fundamental value.  Portfolio 
theory and the CAPM act at different levels: portfolio theory is about the individual 
investor and CAPM about the market equilibrium, which emerges if all investors 
act like Markowitz assumes rational investors to do.  Yet, one can wonder, whether 
the personal probability approach of Markowitz differs much from the rational 
expectations approach of the CAPM, because both assume stochastical prediction.  
If the stability of expected risk and return of investments is a valid assumption, 
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portfolio theory resembles CAPM in its assumptions about statistics: Markowitz’s 
rational investor learns about the real probability distribution during time, and, 
CAPM’s rational investor can be wrong as well, though not on average in the sense 
of the market as whole, and also learns during time. 
3.5: Evaluation of Probability Theory in Investment Theory 
To select investment portfolios in practice, portfolio theory needs reasonable 
future expected returns and standard deviations (Markowitz, 1952).  Reasonable 
expected returns and standard deviations are to be interpreted here as more or less 
predictive.  Markowitz leaves no doubt that he believes in the predictability of 
investment returns in the long run: to repeat, he concludes about personal 
probabilities that they are meant to learn and end up “[…] without substantial 
biases on the whole” (1959, pp. 272-273). 
 
Markowitz’s theory is grounded on Savage’s personal probability theory.  Savage 
claims that rational, coherent behaviour under uncertainty is accompanied by 
personal probabilities.  Whether the probability beliefs are reliable is not relevant 
for Savage’s theory: the use of probability beliefs is rational and coherent.  So, 
even if the probability belief about the investment returns in Markowitz are 
unreliable, in other words, if investment returns are stochastically unpredictable, it 
still makes sense to use mathematical statistics in investment theory because it is 
rational and coherent behaviour under uncertainty.  Of course, one has to agree 
with the definition of rationality applied by Savage to support his ideas.  To repeat, 
the economic literature has heavily debated Savage’s assumptions of rationality, 
and in the Chapters 4 and 5 the scope of rationality as presumed in neoclassical 
economics, which reduces ethics to utility, will be broadened.   
 
What does using personal probabilities mean for decision making about investing?  
Let us start with answering the question by investigating the meaning of the 
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expected return of an investment.  With personal probabilities, one cannot claim as 
certain that the probability of obtaining an expected return of stocks of, say, 8%, 
will be met at least be in 50% of the cases: but the claim would be true by 
definition, if the expected 8% was the true expected return.  An investor could 
choose a more cautious estimate to compensate for the uncertainty.  But even so, 
the correction could be too small: one seldom encounters expected stock returns 
below those of bonds.  The estimation of risk cannot be sure either, though one 
could prefer a more cautious estimate of that as well.  But how can one judge what 
is the right amount of caution (think about the credit crisis of 2008)?  The point of 
the examples is that the gap between the personal and the true probabilities cannot 
be bridged.  Using personal probability beliefs in practicing investment theory 
gives us no clue to the probability as such, that the probability beliefs for the 
investment decisions are correct.   
Moreover, using personal probabilities in investment theory leads to the same 
decisions as using true probabilities: so, personal ‘becomes’ as it they were true 
outcomes, which is dangerous, because decision making on the basis of personal 
probabilities should not be done merely by statistics: under the condition of 
uncertainty, statistics should merely be used to explicit the intuition to help making 
judgments. 
 
Let us now turn to the theory of objective probabilities, which founds the CAPM.  
Davidson (1982/1983, 1991, 2009) has extensively reflected on current mainstream 
economics in the light of Keynes’s ideas about uncertainty in economics.  Current 
mainstream economics, following Paul Samuelson and Robert Lucas, believes that 
economics must be based on stochastical predictability:  
 
Acceptance of the presumption of an ergodic economic environment is often 
rationalized by the necessity of developing economics as an empirically based 
science (Lucas and Sargent, 1981, pp. xi-xii).  Indeed, Samuelson (1969[b], p. 
184) has made the acceptance of the ‘ergodic hypothesis’ the sine qua non of the 
scientific method in economics (Davidson, 1991, pp. 132-133, my insertion). 
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The ergodic hypothesis as used in the rational expectation hypothesis assumes that 
objective probability information is available from past data.  The assumption is 
needed to make economics a predictive science, and accommodates a stochastical 
framework as well.  But Davidson’s point is that past data cannot predict the future 
stochastically because unexpected changes occur. 
 
In Knight’s (1921) terms, stochastical predictability is a situation of ‘risk’.  But if 
probability distributions in investing are unstable, portfolio theory and the CAPM 
ignore Knight’s situation of ‘uncertainty’, in which probabilities are unknown.  
Statistics under Knightian uncertainty becomes ‘merely’ an argument.  Yet, 
defenders of the received view express the general climate which ignores 
Knightian uncertainty:  
 
While the distinction between risk and uncertainty so defined is often encountered 
in the literature, its role until recently has been reduced to the ceremonial: 
economists, especially those working in the neoclassical tradition, invoke the 
distinction only in order to rule out uncertainty. [….].  There are good reasons for 
doing so.  In the modern theory of choice, subjective probabilities are derived from 
agents' orderings over lotteries.  Hence (simplifying) it follows that to deny the 
existence of subjective probabilities is to deny that agents are able to choose 
consistently among lotteries.  Most economists are unwilling to do without the 
assumption of consistent choice (LeRoy & Singell, 1987, p. 395). 
The discourse of modern investment theory as part of mainstream economics 
simply does not ‘allow’ talking and thinking in Knightian terms of risk and 
uncertainty, as risk means the same as uncertainty. 
 
I agree that explicating subjective probability beliefs is useful: I am not against 
using statistics in investment theory.  If the beliefs are not predictive, they still 
could be of importance for theoretical or historical analysis: they can imagine the 
future as a probabilistic restatement of intuitive beliefs, or of alternative scenario’s, 
or analyse the past, with historical observations as input.  But I reject that 
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investment returns are stochastically predictable, and therefore the role of the 
portfolio theory cannot be prediction.  It follows that if one does not believe in the 
‘weaker’ form of predictability of subjective probability, the stronger assumption 
of predictability as assumed in the CAPM cannot be persuasive either. 
 
I cannot prove by empirical induction that predictability is impossible: the proof of 
unpredictability lies outside the paradigm of statistics, because statistics assumes 
that the substrate that produces probability outcomes, is stable.  The inference to 
the best explanation that investment returns are unpredictable, seems more 
persuasive than the arguments of investment theory that personal or objective 
probability beliefs predict.  Savage’s second pillar of rationality seems a better 
argument for using Markowitz’s theory.  But rationality in economics has been 
critically evaluated as well, and cannot ‘repair’ unpredictability. 
3.6: Risk against Uncertainty 
Current investment theory advocates the use of probability theory, though other 
currents within economics and finance oppose such a use of probability theory and 
prefer the assumption of uncertainty instead of calculable risk.  The literature 
review about uncertainty in economics and investment theory in the current 
paragraphs, treats the accounts of statistics and uncertainty, arguments against 
predictability, and both its meanings for investment theory.  In paragraph 3.10 a 
thought experiment about predictability in investment theory will be treated.  The 
review selects those ideas from the history of uncertainty in economics which are 
relevant for investing.  The ideas about uncertainty in economics apply to 
investment theory as well because investment theory is a part of economics.  The 
review does not intent to present a full history of uncertainty in economics, for 
which is referred to Wubben (1993).  From the history of economics the ideas of 
Knight, Keynes, and Von Mises seem the most relevant for the review.  The three 
economists appear to be the most important writers on uncertainty for investment 
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theory: besides being original thinkers, they involve statistics in their analysis.  Of 
course, other important economist thought about uncertainty in economics too.  For 
example, Hayek (1948) highlights the dispersion of knowledge as a cause of 
unpredictability: yet, to my knowledge, Hayek, though introducing a theory for the 
reason of economic uncertainty, did not specifically criticize the traditional 
philosophy of probability.  Israel Kirzner (1985), another Austrian economist, 
highlights the role of the entrepreneur, whose alertness discovers opportunities in 
the market.  Kirzner, however, did not seem to have reflected on the philosophy of 
probability either.  Shackle (1955) did write extensively on probability and 
economics, but does not seem to contribute to my purpose of clarifying the nature 
of stochastical predictability in investment theory after treating the ideas of Knight, 
Keynes, and Von Mises. 
 
For the same reasons of being original thinkers and involving statistics in their 
analysis, I will discuss the ideas of Deirdre McCloskey and Nassim Taleb from the 
contemporary literature about uncertainty. 
Knight 
Knight was probably the first to treat uncertainty in economics in full.  He 
distinguishes uncertainty from risk (Knight, 2009/1921, p. 9).  Risk means that 
probability distributions are known, and uncertainty that probability distributions 
are unknown, because a group of instances, representative cases, lacks to make a 
probability distribution: 
 
The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in 
the former the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either 
through calculation a priori or from statistics of past experience), while in the case 
of uncertainty this is not true, the reason being in general that it is impossible to 
form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in high degree unique 
(Knight, 2009/1921, p. 121).     
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He classifies three types of probabilities, of which ‘a priori probability’ and 
‘statistical probability’ belong to risk, and the third one ‘estimates’ belongs to 
uncertainty: 
 
1.  A priori probability.  Absolutely homogeneous classification of instances 
completely identical except for really indeterminate factors.  This judgment of 
probability is on the same logical plane as the propositions of mathematics […]. 
2.  Statistical probability.  Empirical evaluation of the frequency of association 
between predicates, not analysable into varying combinations of equally probable 
alternatives.  It must be emphasized that any high degree of confidence that the 
proportions found in the past will hold in the future is still based on an a priori 
judgment of indeterminateness.  [….].  The main distinguishing characteristic of 
this type is that it rests on an empirical classification of instances. 
3.  Estimates.  The distinction here is that there is no valid basis of any kind for 
classifying instances (ibid, pp. 115-116, my emphasis). 
Artefacts, like games of chance, produce a priori probability.  A priori probability 
allows mathematical calculation because cases are perfectly homogeneous.  The 
second type of ‘statistical probability’ cannot achieve the perfection of a priori 
probability:  
 
The practical difference between a priori and statistical probability seems to 
depend upon the accuracy of classification of the instances grouped together.  In 
the case of the die, the successive throws are held to be ‘alike’ in a degree and a 
sense which cannot be predicated of the different buildings exposed to fire hazard 
(ibid, p. 112, my italics). 
A priori probability and statistical probability share the law of indifference.  The 
law of indifference implies that the outcome of an individual case is unpredictable, 
because the specific causes which decide the outcome of an individual case are 
unknown.  If the outcomes of a group of particular cases within a larger group 
differ from the ones of the larger group, a narrower group of instances could 
achieve statistical probability once again: therefore, an insurance company may 
differentiate the insurance premium for groups of customers, depending for 
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example on age or residence.  To predict a priori probability and statistical 
probability, we assume that the probability distribution remains the same for some 
future period (ibid, p. 116).  Knight calls the third type ‘estimates’ uncertain 
because the probabilities are unknown.  Estimates lack past cases to represent the 
future because the case at hand is unique: the lack of a “[…] valid basis of any kind 
for classifying instances (ibid, p. 116)” separates estimates from a priori and 
statistical probability.  For Knight, economics is in general about uncertainty, and 
thus about estimates. 
Keynes 
Keynes expresses his account of probability in A Treatise on Probability (1921).  
He was the first to treat the idea of logical probability in a structured way 
(Hacking, 2009/2001, p. 144).  A theory of logical probability aims to discover the 
probability, the degree, to which an inconclusive argument is true.  In the theory, 
the probability that an argument is true depends on the knowledge available.  
Keynes’s theory of logical probability belongs to the logic of inductive inference, 
and assumes objective probability (Cottrell, 1993).  Logical probability is 
nowadays less in vogue than subjective or objective probability.   
 
How does Keynes’s early probability theory relate to his later account of 
uncertainty in economics as displayed in The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest, and Money (1936)?  Efforts to connect Keynes’s probability theory to his 
later account of uncertainty have led to various interpretations (Dequech, 2000).  
His probability theory and his economics seem to be independent: Keynes (1936, 
1937) hardly refers to his theory of logical probability in his account about radical 
uncertainty in economics (Cottrell, 1993, pp. 42-43).  An explanation for the 
apparent discontinuity between The Treatise on Probability (1921) and The 
General Theory (1936) could be, that it is merely a matter of accent: The Treatise 
is about induction from assumed true premises, while The General Theory 
investigates the content of the premises as such (Cardim de Carvalho, 1988, p. 72).  
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For the dissertation, his theory of logical probability seems less relevant, because it 
assumes true premises. 
 
In the current section I will use Skidelsky’s account (2009a, pp. 84-86) of Keynes’s 
breakdown of types of probability in A Treatise on Probability.  Keynes 
distinguishes cardinal and ordinal probability, and irreducible uncertainty.  A 
cardinal probability is a measurable probability such as used in insurance.  In 
economic practice, cardinal probability is rare.  Ordinal probability ranks 
probabilities of events in a qualitative sense, and occurs often.  Ordinal probability 
lies in between the certainty of cardinal probability and irreducible uncertainty.  
Irreducible uncertainty neither compares nor quantifies: its probability is unknown.  
In The General Theory he leaves out ordinal probability to contrast irreducible 
uncertainty to cardinal probability as proposed by mainstream economics.  
Keynes’s account of irreducible uncertainty is comparable to Knightian 
uncertainty:  
 
By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish 
what is known for certain from what is only probable.  The game of roulette is not 
subject, in this sense, to uncertainty […].  [.…].  The sense in which I am using the 
term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of 
copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new 
invention, or the position of private wealth-owners in the social system in 1970.  
About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever.  We simply do not know (Keynes, 1978/1937, pp. 113-114). 
Von Mises 
Like Knight and Keynes, Von Mises distinguishes between known and unknown 
probabilities:   
 
There are two entirely different instances of probability; we may call them class 
probability (or frequency probability) and case probability (or the specific 
understanding of the sciences of human action) (Von Mises, 2012/1949, p. 107).   
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Von Mises relates class probability to a closed group such as a lottery or a table of 
mortality, in his words: 
 
[…] We know or assume to know, with regard to the problem concerned, 
everything about the behaviour of a whole class of events or phenomena; but about 
the actual singular events or phenomena we know nothing but that they are 
elements of this class (ibid, p. 107). 
Class probability resembles Knight’s situation of risk and Keynes’s cardinal 
probability.  In class probability a pool diminishes risk to the certainty of some 
cost.  Von Mises stresses that the pooling of the class is essential, but not the 
calculus of probability: 
 
Insurance, whether conducted according to business principles or according to the 
principle of mutuality, requires the insurance of a whole class or what can 
reasonably be considered as such.  Its basic idea is pooling and distribution of 
risks, not the calculus of probability.  [….].  The calculus of probability is mere 
by-play.   
This is clearly evidenced by the fact that the elimination of hazardous risk by 
pooling can also be effected without any recourse to actuarial methods (ibid, p. 
109). 
Von Mises coins uncertainty ‘case probability’.  Case probability applies to 
economic phenomena.  Non-economic examples of case probability are elections, 
sport games, and medical advice.  Von Mises relates uncertainty to multi-causality: 
 
Case probability means: we know, with regard to a particular event, some of the 
factors which determine its outcome; but there are other determining factors about 
which we know nothing (ibid, p. 110). 
Knight, Keynes, and Von Mises share a common denominator about uncertainty in 
economics: risk, cardinal probability, or class probability merely deal with a small 
group of economic phenomena, and, uncertainty and case probability reign over 
economic phenomena. 
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3.7: Arguments for Uncertainty in Economics 
Knight 
What are Knight’s arguments for his idea that economic phenomena belong to 
uncertainty instead of risk?  Let us start with the metaphor that he proposes for 
economics in order to include the dynamics of economic phenomena.  He perceives 
economic phenomena as organic rather than mechanical: 
 
Perhaps the most straightforward way to approach Knight’s philosophy is to recall 
the distinction he constantly makes between the mechanical and the organic 
(biological) frameworks.  Mechanistic thinking views human behaviour and 
institutions as static, machine-like entities, whereas organicistic thinking invokes 
notions such as change and process.  [….].  Knight’s distinction between risk and 
uncertainty contrasts the mechanical and organic domains (Langlois & Cosgel, 
1993, p. 458). 
Only if economics takes uncertainty as its premise, it would acknowledge Knight’s 
organic metaphor.  The organic metaphor brings change to the fore.  Economic 
change is the major theme of Joseph Alois Schumpeter: “[…] he [Schumpeter] 
strongly felt that capitalism was unique in history because of its ceaseless and self-
generated changefulness (Heilbroner, 1997/1996, p. 299, my insertion).”  
Schumpeter stresses the role of the entrepreneur, who changes the economy 
because he innovates.  After Schumpeter (1911) introduces the theme of change, 
Knight (1921) follows up and elaborates on uncertainty (Wubben, 1993). 
 
Knight’s second argument illuminates the organic metaphor by investigating the 
assumptions of perfect competition in classical economics.  His account of classical 
economics comes close to Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1890); 
especially Knight’s assumptions about knowledge of the future and its 
consequences resemble Marshall’s (Knight, 2009/1921, p. 25).  Perfect competition 
assumes omniscience, perfect information, which guides the competitors to a 
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profitless equilibrium.  But in practice, the assumption of perfect information does 
not appear to hold, because companies make profits: 
 
The primary attribute of competition, universally recognized and evident at a 
glance, is the ‘tendency’ to eliminate profit or loss, and bring the value of 
economic goods to equality with their cost. [….].  But in actual society, cost and 
value only ‘tend’ to equality; it is only by an occasional accident that they are 
precisely equal in fact; they are usually separated by a margin of ‘profit’, positive 
or negative (Knight, 2009/1921, p. 8). 
 
Knight claims that companies make profits (and losses) because of uncertainty.  
Though change creates uncertainty, change would not cause a problem for the 
theory of perfect competition if it could be predicted: “Hence it is our imperfect 
knowledge of the future, a consequence of change, not change as such, which is 
crucial for the understanding of our problem (ibid, p. 101).”  In short, omniscience 
is a sufficient condition for the absence of profit, yet profit occurs in practice, 
therefore Knight can refute the assumption of omniscience. 
 
Knight’s argument that uncertainty leads to profits, relates directly to investment 
theory.  My view is that omniscience would turn stocks into risk-free bonds.  A 
stock can, like a bond, be valued as the sum of its discounted future cash flow.  The 
cash flow to the owner of a stock consists of the dividends, the parts of the profit 
that return to the stockholder.  Yet, perfect competition eliminates profit.  Without 
profit, a dividend merely equals a return at the risk-free interest rate.  A dividend 
under omniscience bears no risk, because in a world of perfect information pooling 
insures risk.  Thus, in classical economics, stocks should behave like perpetual 
risk-free bonds, and deliver the risk-free rate of return.  Analogously, perfect 
monopolies and oligopolies would imply predictable profits, which would be 
priced as risk-free bonds as well, because of risk-free arbitrage.  In practice, listed 
companies make profits because of uncertainty; otherwise stocks would become 
risk-free bonds.  To summarize: transposing Knight’s thought experiment of 
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classical deterministic price theory to stochastical investment theory, leads to 
absurdity: omniscience and the phenomenon of stocks exclude each other: profits 
and stocks exist because of uncertainty.   
Keynes 
Knight and Keynes differ in their starting point of arguing against predictability in 
economics: Knight begins with the assumption of uncertainty and shows that 
profits cannot be made without uncertainty, while Keynes invents an alternative 
economic theory which involves uncertainty.  Moreover, Keynes invents as well a 
theory about investing.  Uncertainty implies for Keynes a different understanding 
of economics and human behaviour.  He criticizes classical economics, in which 
uncertainty reduces to risk, and ethics to utility calculations: 
 
The calculus of probability, though mention of it was kept in the background, was 
supposed to be capable of reducing uncertainty to the same calculable status as 
that of certainty itself; just as in the Benthamite calculus of pains and pleasures or 
of advantage and disadvantage, by which the Benthamite philosophy assumed men 
to be influenced in their general ethical behaviour.  [….].  Thus the fact that our 
knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a 
peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of the classical economic theory 
(Keynes, 1978/1937, pp. 112-113). 
While Post Keynesians stress that Keynes (1937) upgrades uncertainty to the core 
of his economics, New Keynesians incorporate Keynes’s economics into the 
mainstream, and leave uncertainty out (Skidelsky, 2009a).  In the dissertation, I 
will opt for the Post Keynesian interpretation of Keynes, because they try to stay 
close to his ideas about uncertainty.  For Keynes uncertainty implies that the 
government should interfere in the market, because markets are instable and not 
always self-correcting.  Instability and a lack of self-correction imply that a deep 
recession is not exceptional, but a feature of the market (Skidelsky, 2009a, p. xvii).  
One cause for instability is that negative economic conditions undermine animal 
spirits, naïve optimism, which underpin a downturn.  Whereas Knight stresses that 
classical economics excludes profit, Keynes claims that classical economics 
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excludes the influence of money, interest rates and financial markets.  Please see 
Chapter 2 for a discussion of Keynes’s ideas about his explicit theory of financial 
markets under uncertainty, which combines the psychology, reasoning, and 
consequences of human interacting.   
Von Mises 
Uncertainty usually has a negative connotation in economics (Wubben, 1993).  But 
the Austrian School of economics takes a positive stance towards uncertainty, and 
makes it central to its theory.  As a consequence, the School denies the aspiration 
of prediction in the social sciences.  In his opus magnum Human Action (1949), 
Von Mises opposes mechanical causality and, instead, proposes teleological 
causality, because mechanical causality cannot explain human, intent, behaviour: 
only teleological causality can.  Further, not merely one person acts intently: many 
people interact with each other.  Therefore, human action is a sufficient condition 
for uncertainty in economics: 
 
The uncertainty of the future is already implied in the very notion of action.  That 
man acts and that the future is uncertain are by no means two independent matters.  
They are only two different modes of establishing one thing (Von Mises, 
2012/1949, p. 105). 
Another argument for uncertainty in economics is that no reasonable person would 
ask the same sort of certainty from the natural sciences: 
 
Natural science does not render the future predictable.  It makes it possible to 
foretell the results to be obtained by definite actions.  But it leaves unpredictable 
two spheres: that of insufficiently known natural phenomena and that of human 
acts of choice.  Our ignorance with regard to these two spheres taints all human 
actions with uncertainty (ibid, p. 105). 
Von Mises’s second argument compels because it reduces the scope of what is 
predictable: though natural sciences can predict specific parts of the world ceteris 
paribus, it cannot predict how the world looks like in the future.  So why expect 
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economics to predict the future economy, knowing that intent human choosing is 
teleological and interactive?  
McCloskey 
McCloskey (1990) is a contemporary critic of predictability in economics.  She 
regards economic forecasting as a narrative of the claim to economic expertise.  
The narrative originates out of the society’s expectation that economists can 
perform the magical task of forecasting.  But such easy and profitable forms of 
predicting do not exist, just as there is no 20 euro bill on the pavement in the 
neighbourhood of your house: easy opportunities of that kind would just be seized, 
and therefore do not exist (McCloskey, 1994, pp. 72-73).  She puts the forecasting 
abilities of economists to the test by asking the American question: “If You’re So 
Smart Why Ain’t You Rich? (1990).”  The answer to the question is one of 
common sense: economists earn a living by ‘selling’ their predictions.  To earn a 
living by actually trying to make a profit from putting the predictions to the test in 
the markets is difficult.  Otherwise forecasters would be rich by exploiting their 
forecasts.  Her criticism of predictability is aimed at one dimensional predictions 
such as the expected return of an investment or the expected level of an economic 
indicator, but is applicable to stochastical predictability as well.  Exploiting both 
types of predictions would assume time and capital available.   
Taleb  
Taleb (2007) is a popular contemporary opponent of predictability in financial 
markets.  He rejects the statistical fundaments of the CAPM, in which investment 
returns are supposedly stationary and normally distributed.  He claims that 
investment returns have ‘extreme’ instead of normal distributions, which leads to 
radical uncertainty.  He advocates Mandelbrot’s (2004 with Hudson) fractal theory 
to describe uncertainty, though a fractal distribution could not predict either.  
Unlike the normal distribution, a fractal distribution allows for exceptional events 
with a low probability. 
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Taleb’s key point is that black swans determine the risk of investment portfolios by 
the changes they provoke.  A black swan for Taleb is an event with the features: 
rare, very influential, and unpredictable.  A black swan is Popper’s exemplar on the 
fallibility of induction: only one black swan had to be found to falsify the statement 
that ‘all swans are white’.  The black swan has become a popular expression in 
talking about the unexpected.  Yet, Davidson (2010) argues that a black swan is 
merely a variation on Knightian uncertainty, in which past instances lack to predict 
the future. 
3.8: Coping with Uncertainty 
In the dissertation I will use Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty, 
about which Keynes and Von Mises have comparable accounts.  To prevent 
possible misunderstanding, I will further clarify the meaning of Knightian risk and 
uncertainty.  Uncertainty is the opposite of certainty and risk.  Both certainty and 
risk are species of determinism; certainty determines causally, and risk determines 
stochastically.  The arguments against predictability persuade that Knightian risk is 
a by-product of certainty, and not relevant for most of economics including 
investment theory.  Though risk does not apply to economics and investment 
theory, irreducible uncertainty neither does.  Under irreducible uncertainty, 
predictability of specific economic phenomena would be impossible.  Irreducible 
uncertainty would as well deny predictability on more general, non-profitable 
levels.  But few would probably argue against the rationale of the general 
tendencies of price theory, or against those of diversification and some level of 
informational efficiency in investment theory. 
 
Because uncertainty is ambiguous, Knight, Keynes, and Von Mises unsurprisingly 
stress different topics in their treatment of coping with uncertainty.  In the 
contemporary literature, McCloskey and Taleb emphasize on their part new topics, 
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and reflect on the scientific practice which had arisen after, and despite of, the 
seminal contributions of Knight, Keynes, and Von Mises.  
Knight 
Knight calls an opinion about uncertainty ‘judgment’ or ‘intuition’.  He typifies the 
epistemological state of uncertainty, which ‘lies’ in between risk and irreducible 
uncertainty, as ‘partial knowledge’: 
 
The essence of the situation is action according to opinion, of greater or less 
foundation and value, neither entire ignorance nor complete and perfect 
information, but partial knowledge (Knight, 2009/1921, p. 102). 
Partial knowledge underlies an estimate and includes that the estimate can be 
wrong.  How wrong an estimate is, is uncertain, or at the most, roughly assessable: 
 
We know that estimates or judgments are ‘liable’ to err.  Sometimes a rough 
determination of the magnitude of this ‘liability’ is possible, but more generally it 
is not (ibid, p. 116). 
Knight does not imply by an estimate or judgment that a probability distribution 
actually is being made.  In fact, the ability to form a judgment by intuition is what 
counts in business (ibid, p. 118).  In practical situations an estimate seems to be 
reduced to the expected mean of the probability distribution or a qualitative 
prediction, accompanied by some confidence level, the probability of being right: 
 
Yet it is true, and the fact can hardly be overemphasized, that a judgment of 
probability is actually made in such cases.  [….].  The ‘degree’ of certainty or of 
confidence felt in the conclusion after it is reached cannot be ignored, for it is of 
the greatest practical significance.  The action which follows upon an opinion 
depends as much upon the amount of confidence in that opinion as it does upon 
the favorableness of the opinion itself (ibid, p. 117). 
Knight observes that in the phase after the decision, the estimate ‘becomes’ certain 
because earlier doubts are being ignored: 
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To be sure, after the decision is made he will be likely to sum all up in a certain 
degree of confidence that a certain outcome will be realized, and in practice may 
go farther and assume that the outcome itself is a certainty (ibid, p. 117). 
For Knight, risk equals the measurable, and uncertainty the non-measurable.  He 
distinguishes between objective and subjective probabilities along the same lines: 
 
We can also employ the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ probability to designate 
the risk and uncertainty respectively, as these expressions are already in general 
use with a signification akin to that proposed (ibid, p. 121). 
He explains the assumptions and consequences of subjective probabilities at length, 
though he does not seem to oppose the use of subjective probability as such.  
Unlike Knight, Keynes and Von Mises do oppose subjective probability explicitly. 
 
Knight relates uncertainty, imperfection of knowledge, to economic phenomena 
and the appropriate behaviour towards them:  
 
The task […] is to inquire more fully into the meaning of this assumption [of 
practical omniscience].   [….] .  On the basis of the insight thus gained, it will be 
possible to illuminate that large group of economic phenomena which are 
connected with the imperfection of knowledge (ibid, p. 101). 
Under perfect knowledge economic behaviour consolidates cases.  But how to 
decide upon a single case?  Indeed, conduct for an individual instance is the same 
for risk and uncertainty: “[…] when an individual instance only is at issue, there is 
no difference for conduct between a measurable risk and an unmeasurable 
uncertainty (ibid, p. 121).”  He adds, however, that in the case of risk, insurance 
overcomes the ‘uncertainty’ of a onetime trial.  Insurance results in the same risk 
and cost as a pool does.  So, economic behaviour towards risk, pools internally or 
externally by insurance. 
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Pooling also handles uncertainty, and results generally in a lower, though not 
measurable, uncertainty:  
 
And even the third type, true uncertainties, shows some tendency toward regularity 
when grouped on the basis of nearly any similarity or common element (ibid, p. 
124). 
Knight characterizes probability estimates about uncertain phenomena as rendering 
“the greatest logical difficulties of all (ibid, p. 116)”.  My view is that Knight 
means that uncertainty is more difficult to understand intellectually than risk.  The 
law of indifference explains risk, because specific causes are not determinable.  His 
account of uncertainty seems to imply that causes could be determinable, but that 
representative cases lack.  Thus, uncertainty can be handled by a probability 
distribution, by a statistical relation to some cause(s), or by a judgment.  
Mathematical statistics applies both to probability distributions and regressive 
statistical relations.  Of course, representative cases and regressive predictive 
relations can only work if they are stationary for some future period. 
Keynes 
As Markowitz (1959, p. 257) notes in his seminal work on portfolio theory, Keynes 
opposes subjective probabilities.  Keynes does not believe that the availability of 
past data solves the problem of subjective probabilities.  His approach of logical 
probability excludes subjective probability: “It [logical probability] is not, that is to 
say, subject to human caprice.  A proposition is not probable because we think it so 
(2008/1921, p. 4, my insertion).”  Logical probability relates probability to 
evidence, not to psychological reasons. 
 
Keynes (1936, 1937) investigates at length the psychological side of subjective 
probability in the form of expectations, and explains that the present situation 
dominates expectations if no information about the future is available.  He derives 
how decision makers use the assumptions of stability and correct valuation, 
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because they act according to the convention that the future circumstances 
resemble the present ones, and that the current price correctly reflects the 
knowledge of the market: 
 
In practice we have tacitly agreed, as a rule, to fall back on what is, in truth, a 
convention.  The essence of this convention—though it does not, of course, work 
out quite so simply—lies in assuming that the existing state of affairs will continue 
indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change.  [….]. 
We are assuming, in effect, that the existing market valuation, however arrived at, 
is uniquely correct in relation to our existing knowledge of the facts which will 
influence the yield of the investment, and that it will only change in proportion to 
changes in this knowledge; though, philosophically speaking, it cannot be 
uniquely correct, since our existing knowledge does not provide a sufficient basis 
for a calculated mathematical expectation (Keynes, 1997/1936, p. 152). 
Like Knight, Keynes relates subjective probability to the confidence in a forecast: 
 
It [the state of long-term expectation] also depends on the confidence with which 
we make this forecast—on how highly we rate the likelihood of our best forecast 
turning out quite wrong (ibid, p. 148, his italics, my insertion). 
Keynes (1936) has a number of suggestions how to decide under Knightian partial 
knowledge, or degrees of knowledge in Keynes’s (1921) terms.  He is sober about 
applying probability to economic phenomena.  But what does his account of 
subjective probabilities mean for his economics?  His view is that economics is a 
moral science, which deals with introspection, values, motives, expectations, and 
psychological uncertainties.  For Keynes, it is rational in economics to form 
expectations, and make decisions, by using conventions, stories, rules of thumb, 
habits and traditions. 
 
Another way of tackling uncertainty is to find causal evidence in past data to make 
the uncertainty partly predictable.  Yet, Keynes was a known critic of 
econometrics, as for example witnessed by his discussion with Jan Tinbergen 
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(Keynes, 1939).  For the reason of scope, I will merely summarize his critique on 
econometrics by the account of Skidelsky (2009a, pp. 88-89).  His critique is that 
econometrics wrongfully uses the stability assumption and that its ‘free format’ 
modelling expects too much from the data.  According to Keynes, one should not 
use statistics as a default choice: statistics in regressions only make sense for 
simple and less abstract relations. 
Von Mises 
Like Keynes, Von Mises opposes the use of the probability calculus for subjective 
probability.  In attacking the culprit of the theory of subjective probability, he 
refutes the metaphor that case probability, Knightian uncertainty, is a lottery.  The 
metaphor is flawed, because a tertium comparationis, a common element between 
case probability and a lottery, lacks: 
 
It is usual to search for the underlying tertium comparationis [at analysing 
metaphors].  But even this is not permissible with regard to the metaphor [of case 
probability] we are dealing with.  For the comparison is based on a conception 
which is in itself faulty in the very frame of the calculus of probability, namely the 
gambler’s fallacy (2012/1949, pp. 114-115, his italics, my insertions). 
Von Mises refers to the gamblers fallacy to mark the faulty reasoning.  The 
gambler’s fallacy means for short that a decision maker expects a representation of 
the probabilities in the short run, assuming that the probability outcome depends on 
the recent past.  For example, a roulette player expects that the next run will be red, 
because the last 10 runs were black.  The tertium comparationis, the common 
element between case probability and a lottery is missing, because it is based on a 
fallacy: the estimate of Roosevelt winning the elections and winning is in a lottery, 
are both one time trials, which cannot be ‘corrected’ by a large number of series of 
the same event later on. 
 
Von Mises (2012/1949, p. 107) stresses that the mathematics of probability is a 
minor issue compared to that of inference, or induction.  Case probability for 
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events in the natural sciences such as medicine, does not predict, because 
frequency does not predict for unique cases: 
  
All such predictions about external events [a doctor’s chances for full recovery], 
i.e., events in the field of the natural sciences, are of this character.  They are in 
fact not forecasts about the issue of the case in question, but statements about the 
frequency of the various possible outcomes.  They are based either on statistical 
information or simply on the rough estimate of the frequency derived from 
nonstatistical experience (ibid, p. 110, my insertion). 
To put it differently, to Von Mises statistics is merely about history, and not about 
predicting:  
 
Statistics provides numerical information about historical facts, that is, about 
events that happened at a definite period of time to definite people in a definite 
area.  It deals with the past and not with the future.  Like any other past 
experience, it can occasionally render important services in planning for the future, 
but it does not say anything that is directly valid for the future.  There is no such 
thing as statistical laws.  (Von Mises, 1962, p. 56). 
Moreover, multi-causal phenomena imply many interpretations, and can only be 
interpreted by some theory.  The only method for tackling multi-causal phenomena 
is that of understanding, Verstehen, interpreting, which resembles Knight’s partial 
knowledge and the accompanying judgment, or Keynes’s set of answers from rule 
of thumb to moral evaluations: 
 
The fundamental deficiency implied in every quantitative approach to economic 
problems consists in the neglect of the fact that there are no constant relations 
between what are called economic dimensions.  [….].  Understanding, by trying to 
grasp what is going on in the minds of the men concerned, can approach the 
problem of forecasting future conditions.  (Von Mises, 2012/1949, p. 118). 
Understanding, or Verstehen, is to be understood as the counterpart of explaining, 
Erklӓren, as used in reaction against Comte’s positivism.  Understanding is about 
judgment, intentional behaviour, and values (Von Mises, 1962, p. 48). 
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 Both class and case probability have incompleteness of knowledge in common: 
both cannot predict in a causal, deterministic way, though the outcome of class 
probability is predictable as a whole (Von Mises, 1949).  The multi-causality in 
class probability can be reduced to calculable risk and bought off with a premium.  
But multi-causality in case probability cannot follow the same procedure and has 
necessarily to be interpreted.   
McCloskey 
Concerning inductive inference under uncertainty, McCloskey criticizes, together 
with Stephen Ziliak (2008), the test of statistical significance in economics and 
science in general.  McCloskey & Ziliak (2008) did not specifically aim their 
criticism to (empirical) investment theory.  Statistical significance performs a test 
whether a sample is big enough to confirm a hypothesis, given some likelihood.  
The likelihood is normally a probability equal or less than 2.5% that a hypothesis is 
not accepted by mere chance.  Yet, statistical significance as an instrument of 
induction is inappropriate:  
 
Fit is not the same thing as importance.  Statistical significance is not the same 
thing as scientific finding.  R2, t-statistics, p-value, F-test, and all the more 
sophisticated versions of the them in time series and the most advanced statistics 
are misleading at best (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008, p. xv). 
Ziliak & McCloskey argue against the use of statistical significance, because 
economics should be about economic significance.  Statistical significance does not 
persuade that a hypothesis is correct or meaningful for most economic research.  
Relevant is that inductions reflect meaningful relations and show the size of the 
influence under investigation. 
Taleb  
The function of investment models cannot be that they predict: they are merely a 
description of the presupposed features of the risk and return of some investment 
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portfolio (Taleb, 2007).  Concerning statistics, the regular concepts of standard 
deviation, correlation, and regression, make no sense because the supposed normal 
probability distribution is invalid.  A particular point is his statistics regress 
argument: to establish the type of probability distribution on past data, one has to 
assume that the probability distribution is of a certain type, which leads to the 
circularity of data and the type of distribution (2010/2007, p. 269).  My view is that 
Taleb is obviously against subjective probability.  He proposes that the central idea 
of uncertainty is to focus on the consequences of possible outcomes, but not on the 
unknown probabilities.  Because probability does not work, Taleb’s investment 
approach is to combine very conservative investments with very aggressive ones. 
3.9: Implications of Uncertainty for Investment Theory 
Because of the lengthy discussion about uncertainty and probability theory in the 
preceding paragraphs, I will first summarize the various arguments for, and 
alternative theories under, uncertainty: Knight argues that the phenomenon of 
profit excludes a situation of known risk, and that the organic metaphor of change 
is more appropriate for economics.  Keynes relates financial markets explicitly to 
uncertainty, and invents an investment theory upon rational expectations under 
uncertainty.  Furthermore, he introduces the role of animal spirits in economic 
phenomena.  Von Mises’s argument for uncertainty is first that intent human action 
features teleological causality, which cannot be predicted, and second that natural 
sciences do not predict the world as a whole either, so why claim predictability for 
economics?  McCloskey refutes uncertainty by the absence of profitable 
predictability: if forecasting is easy, economists would get rich by exploiting their 
knowledge.  Taleb’s argument for uncertainty is that black swans determine risk 
and returns of investments; but one cannot predict black swans.  Many other 
arguments could, of course, be brought forward for uncertainty, but the ones 
presented here suffice to make the case for uncertainty in investing. 
 
139 
 
Economic and investing phenomena float in between risk and irreducible 
uncertainty, and are called ‘uncertain’.  By definition, the level of uncertainty 
cannot be certain, otherwise it would be become calculable risk.  Certainty and 
uncertainty express themselves both in numbers and qualitative judgments.  
Certainty in the form of Knightian risk is numerical, and a deterministic prediction 
can be a number or a qualitative judgment.  Uncertainty can be numerical or 
judgmental as well.  An uncertain judgment has some implicit or explicit likelihood 
attached.  One cannot tell which method of induction is superior: statistics is about 
an expectation and its dispersion, an opinion or judgment is about a direction with 
or without a dispersion.  For example, an investment manager can decide on 
investing by statistics, or by the judgment that, say, the economy will do better than 
expected, which, if correct, could lead to a high return of the stock market.  Von 
Mises, Keynes, and Taleb reject a subjective probability interpretation: statistics is 
merely a description of the past.  Knight does not reject subjective probability, 
seemingly because it is common practice.  My position is that I am not against the 
use of subjective probabilities, because it is a way of presenting one’s expectations.  
Yet subjective probabilities are an interpretation, not truth, and are not superior to a 
qualitative judgment.  
 
Keynes’s theory of uncertain expectations contrasts the contemporary investment 
theory of the CAPM.  His account of financial markets is distinct from other 
markets, because financial markets possess instant reflexivity.  Markets for goods 
and services take much longer to react on expectations.  His alternative investment 
theory implies that rational expectations do not lead to predictability, but to 
instability.  The CAPM connects rational expectations to efficient markets, market 
equilibrium and predictability.  Yet, under the condition of uncertainty, Keynes’s 
theory seems more relevant than the CAPM. 
 
In my view Knight’s term ‘uniqueness’ has a twofold connection to uncertainty.  
The first unique situation is a decision about something new without any 
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resemblance to the past.  The second unique situation emerges because of 
unpredictable change.  Then, many past instances are available, but are not 
representative.  An example of the second form of uniqueness is a financial market, 
such as the stock market.  My dissertation is about the second form of uniqueness: 
vast amounts of data are available for a lot of investment decisions, but the future 
lacks stability.  Of course, some ‘likeness’ with the past can be found, say, for a 
financial crisis or a recession, which makes an investigation of the past useful.  
Theory may as well help to find a representative instance: both history and 
imagination by theory can be helpful.  Though, it should be argued why history or 
imagination are representative and predictive to the case at hand. 
 
A second point of reflection is the meaning of Knight’s partial knowledge, or 
Keynes’s degrees of knowledge.  In Keynes’s terms, uncertainty cannot be 
expressed as cardinal; the only possible level of distinction is ordinal.  Often the 
ordinality between arguments is unclear.  My view is that no intermediate ‘risk’ 
state between risk and irreducible uncertainty exists, because if the risk of risk 
would be known, it can be put into a probability distribution and becomes risk in 
the form of Knight’s statistical probability.  Again, risk in the notion of Knight 
(1921) always means calculable risk.  For example, if we know that an investment 
has an expected return of 6% and a risk of 20%, and that the risk of the risk is 5 
percentage points, than the expected return remains 6% and the risk becomes 25%.  
Yet, if we do not know the risk of the risk, we merely have partial knowledge, and 
thus uncertainty.  The distinction between risk and uncertainty is relevant because 
any statement under uncertainty has no apodictic proof: its arguments need to be 
judged. 
 
A third reflection on Knight is the effect of diversification under uncertainty.  If the 
future probabilities are known, then randomness is merely a problem of 
organization.  Merely pooling and assessing the cost effectuate the economics.  The 
cases under risk are supposed to be independent, otherwise pooling does not 
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deliver certainty.  But in portfolio theory investments are dependent.  Dependence 
implies that a residual uncertainty remains.  What is the character of residual 
uncertainty, does a residual uncertainty resemble an unpooled risk?  The question 
reminds of the subjectivist’s position in probability theory: for subjectivists, risk 
and uncertainty mean the same in a one trial decision.  Yet, the Ellsberg paradox 
shows that in one trial decision, risk and uncertainty still differ.  Thus, residual 
uncertainty is of lesser certain status than unpooled risk. 
 
So how does McCloskey’s critique of statistical significance apply to investment 
theory?  First, it relates directly to the econometric, empirical part of investment 
theory, which is outside the scope of the dissertation.  Second, an echo of the way 
of thinking in statistical significance pervades financial risk management.  In 
financial risk management, the so-called value at risk, the absolute or relative 
money value which can be lost with a small theoretical probability, is set at a 95% 
or 99% probability interval.  The value at risk is the minimum loss that can occur 
with a probability of 2.5%.  The method of value at risk assumes that uncertainty 
can be quantified.  The connection with statistical significance testing is the 
supposed certainty of the procedure.  The point here is that the value at risk gets an 
absolute meaning, while under uncertainty no such guarantee can be given. 
 
Besides her point about the theory and practice of statistical significance testing, 
McCloskey (1990, 1994, 1996, and 1998) has an answer in coping with 
uncertainty: in order to better understand the arguments used under uncertainty, a 
rhetorical analysis is appropriate.  Rhetoric has evolved in the realm of 
uncertainty in decision making and administering justice in Greek antiquity.  It is 
no coincidence that the current dissertation is concerned with the logos, the rational 
arguments, of unpredictability.  Logos is, besides pathos and ethos, one of the three 
classical ways to make an appeal on an audience. 
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Taleb points at the instability of future risks and returns on financial markets with 
help of the black swan argument.  His arguments against the use of the regular 
statistics and the proposal for Mandelbrot’s alternative statistics leave portfolio 
theory and the CAPM disarmed of mathematical statistics. 
3.10: A Thought Experiment with Predictability in Investment 
Theory 
The current section presents a thought experiment about the assumption of 
stochastical predictability in investment theory.  The experiment puts the statistical 
outcomes of Markowitz’s investment theory, the CAPM, and empirical origin, to 
the test of risk-free arbitrage, which is the other dominant branch of investment 
theory, represented by for example option theory.  In a model of risk-free arbitrage, 
a number of transactions in financial, physical, or possibly artificial products, 
creates a financial product.  Risk-free arbitrage implies, in contrast to modern 
portfolio theory, certainty of outcomes.  The thought experiment uses the paradigm 
of risk-free arbitrage of finance to illustrate that the paradigm of predictability of 
finance is flawed. 
 
As shown in the current Chapter, stochastical predictability founds the 
epistemology of predictability in investment theory: Markowitz (1952, 1959), 
Sharpe (1964), and others, imply that it is reasonable to assume stochastical 
predictability of risk and return in investment theory.  Indeed, statistics and 
prediction in investment theory look like a tying sale, but they are better to be 
understood as subjects to be separated. 
As explained in the current Chapter, Knight (1921) calls stochastical predictability 
‘risk’: a situation under risk results in predictability when a ‘whole’ group of cases 
is available, a situation in economic phenomena which is, however, confined to 
artificial producers of chance and the actuarial domain.  He calls a situation without 
stochastical predictability ‘uncertain’.  My conclusion of Knight’s distinction 
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between risk and uncertainty has been that the application of statistics has no 
privileged position in comparison to other sorts of arguments under the situation of 
uncertainty, because the apodictic predictive quality of stochastical predictability 
lacks.  Thus, the application of statistics under uncertainty is merely a form of 
argument, which can be good or bad like any other argument. 
 
What are the arguments for stocks to achieve a risk premium for achieving a return 
above the risk free rate?  Basically, there are two arguments: one economic 
argument and one empirical argument.  The theoretical economic argument is that 
investors are risk averse because of diminishing marginal utility, and that therefore 
extra risk needs to be accompanied by an extra reward.  Please note that if investors 
would be risk neutral, the extra reward would not be demanded.  In the case of the 
stock market, the risk is the systematic market risk, which, by definition, cannot be 
hedged away, because the market contains all securities.  I agree to this economic 
reasoning.  The point of the thought experiment, however, is to clarify that the 
level of market risk and return is not stochastically predictable, that is, belonging to 
the category of Knightian risk.  
 
The other argument in favour of a positive risk premium for stocks stems from 
empirical data.  For example, Dimson et al (2014) have shown that in the period of 
1900 to 2013 American stocks resulted in an annualized real (corrected for 
inflation) yield of 6.5%, which is 4.5% above the return of bonds.  An investment 
in a portfolio of worldwide stocks would have resulted in the period of 1900 to 
2013 in an annualized real yield of 5.2%, which is 3.3% above the return of bonds.  
The question is whether the historical return of stocks is representative for the 
future.  The rationale of rising stocks could be, say, that if the economy grows, 
profits of stocks as a subset of the economy could grow as well, and if the 
valuation of the stock remains constant, then prices of stocks should go up.  But 
things can go wrong as well, the economy might not grow, or the share of the 
profits of public companies decreases, or the valuation goes structurally down 
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because, say, the cult of equities is over.  So, the past does not need to resemble the 
future: therefore the risk premium for stocks is uncertain and not-specifiable.     
 
If stochastical predictability would be a valid assumption in investment theory, 
then one should be able to buy investment products, say, ‘investment model’-
stocks, with fixed parameters of risk and return above the return on risk-free bonds.  
Financial institutions, such as investment banks, would engineer such products by 
the technique of risk-free arbitrage.  If the parameters of risk and return would be 
fixed in the opinion of the provider of the ‘investment model’-stocks, the 
engineering of risk-free arbitrage would be simple:  
 
1. Offer an ‘investment model’-stock with a guaranteed specified risk (say 
20%) and return (say 5%), 
2. Invest the cash received in real stocks, 
3. Pass through the actual return of the real stocks to the buyers of the 
‘investment model’-stock. 
 
The scheme mentioned above can be extended beyond Markowitz’s investment 
theory and the CAPM; the scheme goes for investment strategies on empirical or 
other grounds as well.  But, the advocates of, say, valuation as a source of 
prediction, or of a model that offers a 60% probability of beating the S&P 500 
index, will not offer ‘investment theory’-stocks based on their strategies with a 
specifiable risk and return, because their statistics do not possess the apodictic 
quality of stochastical prediction either.  Of course, all sorts of bigger or smaller 
inefficiencies emerge in financial markets, which could be exploited.  But the 
inefficiencies are often temporarily, because players on the market catch on to 
them. 
 
Of course, no one would offer such ‘investment model’-stocks as postulated in 
investment theory, simply because the risk and return of stocks are not fixed, so a 
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guarantee on that would be irrational and risky.  An investment banker would 
merely create ‘investment model’-stocks, if he could arbitrage without risk.  Then, 
‘investment model’-stocks would become a billion dollar market.  In the fictional 
world of ‘investment model’-stocks, investment managers could truly claim 
reliability of risk and return to their clients, because the models for decision 
making and risk management, both derived from investment theory, would be 
epistemologically sound.  In the following, I will explore what would be the 
outcomes of ‘investment model’-stocks that the risk-free arbitrage could offer 
within the realm of stochastical predictability. 
 
An Example of Arbitrage 
First, let us give an elaborated example of the principle of arbitrage.  Suppose an 
American firm needs to pay a bill in Japanese yen in a year, and wants to avoid the 
currency risk.  How could the firm pay the bill in a year without engaging in the 
currency risk?  Well, a bank can offer the firm a forward contract at a fixed rate of 
exchange, which the bank engineers in a number steps: 
 
1. The bank borrows the dollar amount at the current interest rate in the 
United States. 
2. The bank changes the money borrowed for Japanese yens. 
3. The bank puts the amount on a Japanese yen account to receive interest. 
4. At the end of the year, the firm delivers the bank the dollar amount, by 
which the bank pays off the amount borrowed. 
5. At the same time, the firm receives the required amount of Japanese yen, 
which the bank had put on the Japanese yen account. 
 
The procedure explained yields a fixed rate of exchange for a currency hedge.  The 
interest-rate parity theorem relates the interest rates to the forward price of a 
currency (Ross et al, 1996/1988, p. 832): 
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            1 + 𝑈𝑈 1 + 𝑈𝑈∗  =  𝐹𝐹(0,1)𝑆𝑆 (0)  
 
The symbols used mean: 
 
𝑈𝑈   = the interest rate on a risk-free deposit in the home currency 
𝑈𝑈∗   = the interest rate on a risk-free deposit in the foreign currency 
𝐹𝐹(0,1) = the current forward price of a foreign currency, 0 denotes the 
start    
                of the term, 1 denotes the end of the term 
𝑆𝑆 (0)    = the spot price of a foreign currency 
 
Theoretically, the price of the currency forward depends only on the difference 
between the interest rates of the two currencies.  If the price of the currency 
forward deviates from the theoretical price, arbitrage aligns the price with that of 
the interest-rate parity.  The argument of interest-rate parity is not merely 
theoretically true, it works in practice as well.  Interest-rate parity is an example of 
deterministic, in theory, risk-free arbitrage in investment theory.  In practice, 
arbitrage is not risk-free, because capital is needed for some period and risks occur 
as well, because of for example the trading in different markets (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997).  Risk-free arbitrage can take a stochastical form as well. 
The Thought Experiment  
How could a financial firm create ‘investment model’-stocks using risk-free 
arbitrage?  In our thought experiment, the firm can create the risk and return of an 
‘investment model’-stock by drawing from a normal probability distribution.  The 
parameters of the normal distribution are a yearly expected return of, say, 8% and a 
standard deviation, the risk, of, say, 20%.  Microsoft Excel could perform the 
draws from the normal distribution and deliver the required stochastically 
predictable risk and return.  If only one ‘investment model’-stock would be 
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marketed, its risk would not be diversifiable and resemble the undiversifiable 
market risk. 
 
But in risk-free arbitrage a financial firm wishes to arbitrage the risk of drawing of 
the investment returns from a normal distribution if possible.  Because of the 
random nature of the return of an ‘investment model’-stock, the method of 
arbitrage would have to be similar to that of a casino or an insurer.   
 
The method of arbitrage is to issue a high number of ‘investment model’-stocks.  
Because of the high number of stocks, the issuer attains a calculable and low risk of 
having to pay more than the expected return.  The risk becomes calculable and low, 
because the drawings of the returns of the ‘investment model’-stocks are 
independent, or to put it differently, the correlation coefficient between the 
‘investment model’-stocks is zero.  In fact, a large number of issued ‘investment 
model’-stocks and the corresponding large number of independent drawings, 
reduces the issuer’s risk of paying more that the promised return close to zero. 
 
To repeat some of the mathematical statistics of diversification of Appendix A of 
Chapter 2: if the correlation coefficient between the securities is zero, which is the 
case in the creation of artificial ‘investment theory’-stocks, then the risk of the 
‘investment model’-stock, divided by the square root of the number of issued 
stocks, decides the portfolio risk of the issuer, in the form of a formula: 
              𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝 =  𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠
√𝑟𝑟
 
 
The symbols used mean: 
 
𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠  = standard deviation of the ‘investment model’-stock 
𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝  = standard deviation of the issuer’s portfolio ‘p’ of ‘investment model’-     
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          stocks  
𝑟𝑟  = number of issued ‘investment model’-stocks 
 
 
The formula of portfolio risk demonstrates that a higher 𝑟𝑟, the number of 
‘investment model’-stocks, lowers 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝, the risk of the issuer.  Figure 3.1 shows the 
portfolio risk of the issuer as a function of the number of issues, supposing that the 
risk of the ‘investment model’-stock is 20%: 
 
Figure 3.1 Risk as function of the number of issues of ‘investment model’-
stocks 
 
 
In Figure 3.1, the portfolio risk reduces rapidly as the number of issues enlarges: 
one ‘investment model’-stock has a risk of 20%, the portfolio risk of 1000 
‘investment model’-stocks drops to 0.6%.  Thus, a financial firm can hedge a 
guaranteed, specified level of volatility if the number of issues is large.  If, 
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however, the number of issues would be relatively small, the financial firm could 
offer a lower expected return to reduce the sample risk.   
 
Though the issuer of ‘investment model’-stocks could hedge, protect, the risk, 
‘investment model’-stocks have to deliver a guaranteed return above the risk-free 
return as well.  The issuer has to figure out, how to extract the extra return above 
the risk-free return of the product by some form of risk-free arbitrage.  The issuer 
receives cash from the buyer of the ‘investment model’-stock.  With the cash, the 
issuer could buy real stocks, and use the return of the real stocks to pay the return 
on the ‘investment model’-stocks.  Yet, real stocks are no risk-free hedge for 
‘investment model’-stocks.  The cash outflow from the issuer to the buyers of the 
‘investment model’-stocks will be predictable: it will be, to repeat, close to the 
level of the specified return.  But the return of real stocks will be volatile and 
uncertain, and will not match the stable specified return of the ‘investment model’-
stocks: so, real stocks do not hedge ‘investment model’-stocks risk-free.  
Moreover, the hedge may turn out worse, because of the Knightian distinction 
between uncertainty and risk: the returns of real stocks are stochastically 
unpredictable, uncertain, and the returns of ‘investment model’-stocks are 
stochastically predictable, like Knightian risk.   
 
A high yield bond could be an alternative for real stocks to hedge the return of the 
‘investment model’-stock.  The issuer could buy a high yield bond, and supposing 
the coupon of the bond equals the yield, use the coupon to pay the specified return 
on the ‘investment model’-stocks.  Suppose further that the coupon of the bond 
equals the specified return, and that the duration of the bond and the ‘investment 
model’-stock have the same length.  Then, the yield of the bond hedges the 
specified return of the ‘investment model’-stock.  But, uncertainty characterizes a 
high yield bond: it is incalculable whether the issuer of the bond pays the interests 
and repays the loan.  A high yield bond does not resemble an ‘investment model’-
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stock, because the risk and return of the bond belong the Knightian uncertainty and 
not to Knightian risk, the category in which ‘investment model’-stocks reside. 
 
The point of the thought experiment is that a financial firm never can arbitrage, 
free of risk, an expected return of ‘investment model’-stocks above the risk-free 
return.  Instead of a real stock, or, a high yield bond, an ‘investment model’-stock 
resembles roulette or an insurance activity.  The most, an ‘investment model’-stock 
resembles roulette, because an ‘investment model’-stock issues a probability 
distribution like roulette does.  Instead, an insurer collects a probability 
distribution.  Casinos and insurers carry out their business on the law of large 
numbers.  How do casinos and insurers make a profit?  Insurers charge a fee which 
includes a profit margin and covers for losses, say, the expected loss of an 
insurance for car damage.  In the chance game of roulette, a player can bet, among 
other things, on numbers up to 36 (Wikipedia, 2013).  Casinos tilt the probability 
distribution of roulette towards an expected return by introducing a zero in the 
European roulette, or a zero and a double zero in the American roulette.  If the turn 
of the roulette results in zero or double zero the casino wins.  In the case of the 
European roulette with the single zero, the expected return for the casino is 1 37� , or 
2.7%, without the zero the roulette would result in a zero sum game because the 
profits and losses of placing bets combined would be zero.  An ‘investment 
model’-stock compares to a roulette: yet, the expected pay-out to the holders of 
‘investment model’-stocks should be positive because of the specified return above 
the risk-free rate, instead of negative like for the player of roulette, because of the 
zero.   
 
The moral is that the provider of stochastical predictable risk should receive an 
expected return, and the buyer should pay, because Knightian risk results in a zero 
sum game.  No serious financial firm would provide ‘investment model’-stocks.  If 
a financial firm would market ‘investment model’-stocks, the arbitrage strategy 
would be to borrow at the risk-free rate, to buy a diversified portfolio of 
151 
 
‘investment model’-stocks, and to earn the risk premium above the risk-free rate 
without taking risk, because, again, the different issues of ‘investment theory’-
stocks are statistically independent.   
 
In the hypothetical case that the market would offer merely one ‘investment 
model’-stock instead of many issues, then too buying the stock would be 
interesting: risk models would work perfectly and because of the Ellsberg paradox 
objective risk and return parameters are preferable above subjective ones.  
 
About the claim of economic expertise, McCloskey (1990) says to the economic 
and investment advisors: “If You Are So Smart, Why Ain’t You Rich?”.  I would 
like to add another American saying about the narrative of statistical expertise to its 
advocates: “Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is!”.  If the statistical expertise 
about investment theory is correct than its advocates should be willing to provide 
the ‘investment model’-stocks to the market.  Like McCloskey’s test, my test is a 
fair one too, because to market ‘investment model’-stocks means to believe in 
stochastical predictability of stocks.  Yet, the advocates of stochastical 
predictability will reject the test wisely. 
 
In Appendix 3A a mathematical proof formalizes the conclusion of the thought 
argument that risk-free arbitrage cannot engineer ‘investment theory’-stocks with a 
specified risk and a return above the risk-free return. 
Option Theory 
One might object that option theory has not yet been considered as a solution to the 
engineering problem of ‘investment theory’-stocks.  Surely options on stocks can 
create all sorts of pay-offs.  Options are available in a great variety of exercise 
prices and can combine all sorts of exposure to the price of a stock (see Chapter 2 
for an explanation of option theory).  But, can options create ‘investment theory’-
stocks?   
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 Despite their flexibility, options cannot create an ‘investment model’-stock.  To 
explain why, I focus on the put-call parity as an instrument of risk-free arbitrage.  
The formula of put-call parity (based on Hull, 1997) looks like: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟) = 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒(𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)   ̶   
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈) + 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒(𝑍𝑍𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒) 
 
In the formula the call and the put have the same exercise price and time to 
maturity.  The zero coupon bond is bought to exactly match the strike price of the 
options at the end of the duration.  The put-call parity does not need a formula to 
price the option, or for that matter assumptions about the level of risk or return, 
though pricing formulas for options need to fit in the call-put parity.  Abstracting 
from the zero coupon bond, the plain intuition behind the parity is that the pay-off 
of a stock equals the pay-off of a long call, the right to buy the stocks against a 
strike price, and a short put, the duty to deliver the stocks, against the same strike 
price, as expressed in Figure 3.2: 
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Figure 3.2: Put-call parity, a long call and a short put equal the pay-off of a 
stock 
 
 
 
 
The put-call parity lets a short put and a long call create a normal stock, but no 
‘investment theory’-stock.  To create an ‘investment theory’-stock, the levels of 
risk and return have to be specific and remain stable.  Options are bought against a 
specified level of risk, but their value depends on the price of the real stock, which 
has no fixed risk and return level.  The dependence on the real value of the stock 
means that the realized risk is uncertain and that no case of stochastical 
predictability is reached.  The only way options could arbitrage ‘investment 
theory’-stocks risk-free would be if stocks would have specified levels of risk and 
return. 
154 
 
3.11: Closing Remarks about the Thought Experiment 
Suppose the reader thinks I have made a mistake in my reasoning, and that, after 
all, risk and return of investments are specifiable.  Then, ‘investment model’-stocks 
could easily be made because real stocks would provide the hedge.  Merely passing 
through the return would do the job of providing for ‘investment theory’-stocks.  
Yet, to know risk and return in advance and being able to provide ‘investment 
theory’-stocks with a fixed, specifiable risk and return, mean the same thing: the 
fact that financial firms cannot deliver ‘investment model’-stocks with a specifiable 
risk and return means that risk and return are uncertain. 
 
I hope to have persuaded that stochastical predictability in investment theory is a 
false assumption.  The thought experiment which shows the impossibility of risk-
free arbitrage of ‘investment theory’-stocks seems fair, because of the analogy with 
the artificial device of a currency hedge with the interest rate parity.  Only the 
certainty of interest rate parity, gives a bank the incentive to offer the currency 
hedge.  But with ‘investment theory’-stocks such a certainty does not exist. 
   
“So what? It is obvious!” some might reply.  Well, for the ones who are not 
convinced of unpredictability, the thought experiment could make them doubt.  It is 
essential that the use of statistics does not fool one into the idea of predictability.  
And for the ones who regard the thought experiment as trivial, it is time to make a 
step forward in using and interpreting investment theory.  Then, we agree that the 
function of the models of investment theory is not prediction.  The investment 
model enables the investors to ‘manage’ the future with historical and theoretical 
insights.  So, investment theory can only support decisions.  Indeed, if statistics 
merely supports, it should compete with other theories in handling uncertainty: 
investment theory would be a part of the approach, not the approach. 
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Besides uncertainty, investment theory results in certainties as well as represented 
by the parities.  Risk-free arbitrage in the form of interest-rate parity, or put-call 
parity from option theory, are ‘accounting’ truths: 
 
Schelling and I are claiming that if you examine important economic arguments 
you will find 9 times out of 10 an accounting identity overlooked by the man in 
the street or even by the economist in the study (McCloskey, 2000, p. 175). 
Arbitrage assumes that ‘A is B’, which makes a trade riskless.  Yet, risk-free 
arbitrage is not possible in the case of investment theory of Markowitz, the CAPM, 
and other currents of empirical investment theory because capital allocation to 
investment portfolios is about expectations of risk and return.  The expectations are 
never reducible to stochastical predictability.  To put it bluntly: logic (A=B) 
grounds arbitrage, while subjective beliefs about the future ground portfolio theory.  
So, the models or metaphors of risk-free arbitrage and capital allocation for 
investments differ.  The difference does not mean that nothing can be said about 
expected returns of investments.  On the contrary, in the absence of predictability, 
theories about expected returns should compete, and deliver stories beyond the 
narrative of a positive risk premium of stocks above the risk-free rate.  It sounds 
logical that a positive risk premium should compensate the risk, but if risk and 
return are unpredictable, how would you know in advance?  It is, however, rational 
constructivism that makes one think that risk ought to be rewarded, since that 
would be fair.  
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Appendix 3A: A Formal Proof of the Thought Experiment 
A mathematical proof formalizes the conclusion of the thought experiment that 
risk-free arbitrage cannot engineer ‘investment theory’-stocks with a specified risk 
and a return above the risk-free return.  Because the risk and return of an 
‘investment theory’-stock would be similar to that the risk and return of a casino 
with roulettes, I start with the formula of the expected return of the roulettes, and 
the clients of the casino: 
  0 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟) +  𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟)  
 
Or, rearranged: 
  𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟) =  − 𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟) 
 
Symbol used means: 
  𝐸𝐸(𝑒𝑒) = expected return of 𝑒𝑒 
 
The formula above, shows, that the parity of the zero sum game of a casino, 
demands that the positive expected return of the roulettes, opposites the negative 
expected return of the buyers.  Other costs and profits are left out to maintain 
clarity. 
 
The parity of the zero sum game of a casino resembles the parity of ‘investment 
model’-stocks.  Now, the formula includes the time value of money, because in the 
thought argument ‘investment model’-stocks replace real stocks in a portfolio.  
Strictly though, ‘investment model’-stocks and chance games like roulette do not 
need to be placed in time like real stocks to produce probability distributions, 
because ‘investment model’-stocks and roulette are artificial; a computer program 
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produces the artificial outcomes in a split second. The formula of the expected 
return of an ‘investment model’-stock of the issuer and its buyers is: 
 0 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟) − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 +  𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) 
 
Or rearranged: 
 
𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) = 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 − 𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟)  
 
Symbol used: 
  𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = risk-free rate 
 
The formula shows that the 𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) is 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓, the risk free rate when the 
𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟) is assumed to be zero.  Any return that the issuer would claim, 
would lessen the expected return of the buyers.  To repeat, no other sources of 
return from real stocks, high yield bonds, or options, deliver a risk-free arbitrage 
above the risk-free return, or for that matter a sensible hedge with risk to cope with 
the return obligation of a ‘investment model’-stock.  If the issuer wants a risk-free 
hedge, he has no choice but to put the money from the buyer on a deposit, in order 
to give the buyer at least the risk-free return. 
 
Finally, the formalization of the thought experiment will now include the 
stochastical nature of the ‘investment model’-stock.  The formula of the zero sum 
of the probability distributions of ‘investment model’-stocks of the issuer and its 
buyers is: 
  0 = 𝑁𝑁(𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟) − 𝑁𝑁�𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓� + 𝑁𝑁(𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) 
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in which the symbols used mean: 
 
𝑁𝑁(𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟) =  𝑁𝑁�𝜇𝜇, 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝� = 𝑁𝑁(0, 0) = 0 
 
𝑁𝑁�𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓�          =  𝑁𝑁(𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 , 0) = 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓             
𝑁𝑁(𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)    = 𝑁𝑁�𝜇𝜇, 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝� = � 𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇, 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
Symbol used means: 
  𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇, 𝜎𝜎) = normal probability distribution of expected return 𝜇𝜇 and standard      
                  deviation 𝜎𝜎 
 
In rearranged terms, the formula of the zero sum game of ‘investment model’-
stocks becomes: 
 
0 = 0 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + � 𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇, 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
or, 
 
 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = � 𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇, 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
The 𝑁𝑁(𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟), the normal distribution of the issuer, results, to repeat, in an 
expected return of zero and a standard deviation of zero, because, 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝, the standard 
deviation of the issuer’s portfolio ‘p’ of ‘investment model’-stocks, reduces to 
zero, at a huge number of issues.  The 𝑁𝑁�𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓�, the normal distribution of the risk-
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free rate, has no risk, and reduces to 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓, the risk-free rate.  The 𝑁𝑁(𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟), the 
normal distribution of the buyers, adds the individual distributions of buyers of the 
‘investment model’-stocks.  Please note that the buyers experience randomness, 
because their risk is 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠, the risk of the individual ‘investment model’-stock.  To 
repeat, the randomness of 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 accumulates to zero in 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝, the risk of the issuer’s 
portfolio.  The expected return of the buyer, 𝜇𝜇, will equal 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓, the risk-free rate. 
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Chapter 4 
Beyond Statistics: A New Rhetoric 
for Investment Theory 
 
“One word is worth a thousand pictures (John Kenneth Galbraith, 1977).” 
4.1: Rhetoric 
The Current Rhetoric 
The current rhetoric of investment theory of nowadays equals the original rhetoric 
in the seminal work of Markowitz (1952, 1959).  The logos of the rhetoric of 
investment theory was discussed in the preceding chapters.  Chapter 3 has 
investigated the epistemological beliefs of investment theory.  Markowitz’s 
arguments for using statistics in investment theory stem from Savage’s theory of 
maximizing utility by using subjective probabilities.  The continuations of 
Markowitz’s portfolio theory, CAPM and empirical investment theory, are founded 
on the idea of objective probabilities, or to put it otherwise, the frequency theory of 
probability.  The philosophy of probability justifies the beliefs in investment 
theory.  Yet, merely using objective probability theory, does not make probabilities 
objective in the Knightian sense.  In what follows I will, again, couple ‘subjective 
probability’ to Knightian ‘uncertainty’, and ‘objective probability’ to ‘risk’.  In 
Knight’s account, objective probabilities mean the same as ‘stochastically 
predictable’.  Deciding whether probability is ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’ in the 
Knightian sense is crucial because it changes what can be legitimately expected of 
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decision-making.  It appears that Markowitz has put investment theory in the 
category of risk, instead of in the category of uncertainty where it should belong. 
 
In Chapter 3, the views on the use of statistics in economics of Knight, Keynes, 
Von Mises, McCloskey, and Taleb have been evaluated.  To repeat the common 
denominator of their view: stochastical predictability is a rare case for economic 
phenomena, so uncertainty or Von Misean ‘case probability’ is relevant for 
economics.  Further, a probability statement under uncertainty has the same 
epistemological status as a qualitative judgment or a regression on historical data.  
Under uncertainty, statements about economic phenomena are not cardinally 
measurable like in stochastical predictability: one can merely compare ordinally the 
trustworthiness of the statements under uncertainty.  Besides the historical and 
contemporary arguments against predictability in economics, I have exposed my 
own thought experiment against predictability in Chapter 3: a rational financial 
firm would never market a synthetic stock with a specified risk and return like 
investment theory assumes, because an ‘investment theory’-stock cannot be hedged 
risk-free. 
 
The arguments against predictability entail that estimated probabilities are 
subjective in the Knightian sense, so what does that mean for decision making?  As 
shown in Chapter 3, the gap between the subjective and the true probabilities 
cannot be bridged; merely making larger allowances for risk would not be enough 
to create stochastical predictability.  Using subjective beliefs in the Knightian sense 
in practicing investment theory gives us no clue to the probability as such that the 
probability beliefs for the investment decision are right.  Moreover, using 
subjective probabilities in investment theory leads to the same decisions as using 
objective probabilities.   So, subjective is used as being objective, which is 
dangerous because decision making on the basis of subjective probabilities should 
not be done by statistics only: under condition of uncertainty statistics should 
merely be used to explicit the intuition and to help making judgments. 
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 If science delivers trustworthy outcomes, then science should dominate the input of 
a decision (Collins & Evans, 2007).  But what to do when one cannot trust the 
scientific outcomes like in investment theory?  To mind comes looking for 
alternative theories.  Yet, no scientific theory can overcome the uncertainty of risk 
and return of investments.  Then, should we abandon investment theory?  Probably 
not.  The use of expert knowledge remains preferable, because expert knowledge 
is, despite its flaws, a better alternative than uninformed knowledge as input into a 
decision (Collins & Evans, 2007).  I agree that a decision without investment 
theory is worse than a decision with the theory, though we must propose a new 
rhetoric for investment theory to lower the importance of statistics, and to promote 
the use of the practical reason, instead of the theoretical reason.  In the current 
Chapter material from Pistorius (2014) is used. 
Plato on Rhetoric 
Let us now explain what rhetoric is about.  The ancient tradition of rhetoric as a 
discipline starts in the Greek antiquity.  My concern here with ancient rhetoric is 
practical, and confined to what is relevant to the dissertation.  Thus, although 
rhetoric in the antiquity was mainly concerned with the spoken word, for the 
dissertation merely the rhetorical specialities of writing are relevant.  Note also that 
ancient rhetoric is analysed here for the purpose of contemporary appropriation.  
Contemporary appropriation entails that anachronisms are not problematic, as they 
would be in a historical approach (Worthington, 2007).  Another difficulty is that 
competing accounts of the classical discipline of rhetoric differ about how to 
compose and analyse (Gunderson, 2009).  Of the competing accounts I will focus 
on the common elements. 
 
In Greece in the fourth century BC, the theorization of rhetoric matured.  At that 
time Plato seemingly opposed rhetoric, while Aristotle favoured it.  Plato was 
opposed because of the supposed contrast between rhetoric and philosophy: 
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rhetoric is not about correctness, but merely about persuasiveness.  His negative 
opinion pervades the customary account of rhetoric today.  But was Plato, as for 
example Vickers (1988) claims, merely an enemy of rhetoric?  In the Gorgias, 
Plato (1925) indeed attacks rhetoric as used in the Athenian democracy because 
rhetoric capitalizes on the ignorance of its audience, and is not used for 
deliberation.  Thus, he considers rhetoric not as an art, because a genuine art is 
aimed at our good, such as medicine or gymnastic.  Rhetoric is like cookery, a 
mere flattery, since it just aims at pleasure.  Cookery makes food taste better, but it 
is not, like medicine, aimed at preserving or bettering someone’s health.  
According to Plato, rhetoric is a device for persuasion to unethical purposes and 
does not aim at the truth, which can only be found by philosophy.  Philosophers, 
being persons who wish to argue carefully, are inclined to reject rhetoric as 
characterized by Plato (Griswold, 2012).  But there is more to rhetoric than what 
Plato (1925) allows in the Gorgias. 
 
Though Plato (1925) denies in the Gorgias that rhetoric is an art, in the Pheadrus 
(1914) he suggests that it could become one.  With the sophists he agrees that the 
purpose of rhetoric is persuasiveness.  Persuasion ought to move the soul towards 
the good, so the rhetorician should have knowledge about the soul in order to 
persuade.  Yet, rhetoric becomes an art if rhetoric and dialectic are combined, 
because rhetoric and dialectic together avert the risk of the improper use of 
rhetoric.  Dialectic is Plato’s philosophical method to find truth, which is to be 
found in the mind, and consists of a discourse by reasoned arguments.  By the 
combination of rhetoric and philosophy, Plato, albeit apparently the enemy of 
rhetoric, widens the scope of rhetoric beyond political and juridical discourse.  
Moreover, rhetoric belongs to the philosophical discourse: it is the art of 
communicating the truth.  So, Harvey Yunis disagrees with the usual account of 
Plato’s opinion about rhetoric: 
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Any account of Plato’s contribution to rhetoric must overcome the traditional view 
of Plato as the unyielding partisan of philosophy and inveterate opponent of 
rhetoric in the foundational dispute between the two domains (Yunis in 
Worthington (ed.), 2010/2007, p. 75). 
 
Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric  
Aristotle arguably did not doubt the merit and the status of rhetoric.  He has 
invented a complete theory of rhetoric.  Aristoteles’s Art of Rhetoric (2006) is 
fundamental to studying classical rhetoric (Worthington, 2007).  He considers 
logos, or rational argument, the most important means of persuasion (2006, § I.i.3).  
For my purposes, a treatment of some basic elements of his theory suffices.  His 
ideas will serve as an illustration of the various parts of the canon of rhetoric. 
 
For making an appeal to an audience, Aristotle (2006) discerns three sources of 
persuasion:  ethos, pathos and logos.  Ethos is the moral character as presented by 
the speaker, it aims at being trustworthy.  Trust is evoked in the audience by 
practical wisdom, virtue and goodwill of the speaker.  The second source of 
persuasiveness is pathos: the speaker has to consider the feelings his words will 
arouse in the listeners.  The third and most important source of persuasion is logos, 
the arguments about the subject which appeal to the ratio.  Logos makes use of 
induction and deduction.  An inductive argument is given by an example, a 
deductive one is the enthymeme.  In economics, a case study can be called an 
inductive argument, since a case study is an example which can represent other 
cases as well.  The deductive argument of the enthymeme is a syllogism in which 
the premises are probable, or a shortened syllogism, in which parts are absent to 
make the listener draw the conclusion (Lanham, 1991).  A syllogism is a logical 
argument, in which the conclusion is inferred from two premises.  In the short 
enthymeme are to be added the conclusion and a premise to get a full enthymeme.  
The enthymeme occurs a lot in economic reasoning. 
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The first element of rhetoric is invention (the Greek and Latin terms are heuresis 
and inventio respectively).  Invention or discovery is about the finding of the 
arguments.  The main source of invention is the commonplace.  Commonplaces 
(topoi, loci communes) are general argumentative patterns, from which specific 
arguments can be generated for a given conclusion or supposition.  An example of 
a commonplace is (2006, § II.xix.2):  “[…] if of two like things the one is possible, 
so also is the other.”  The commonplace of ‘possibility’ reasons by analogy that 
something which happens in one case can happen in another similar case as well. 
The second part of rhetoric, arrangement (taxis, dispositio), discerns the order of a 
speech, which is introduction, narration, proofs, and peroration: 
- The introduction (prooimion, exordium) is the beginning of the speech and is 
meant to capture the listener’s attention,  
- The narration (prothesis, narratio) is the statement of the case,  
- The proof (pistis, probatio) is a confirmation or thought experiment that the 
narration is true,  
- The peroration (epilogos, peroratio) concludes a speech with e.g. a recapitulation.   
Aristotle considers the narration and the proof as the most important parts of the 
arrangement. 
The third part of the canon of rhetoric is style (lexis, elocutio), which means ‘how 
to say things well or elegantly’.  Two characteristics of style are clearness and 
propriety.  Clearness improves comprehension and persuasiveness.  Propriety of 
style has an emotional, an ethical and a proportionate element.  An emotional 
relationship to the subject creates sympathy.  Ethos is shown by the use of the 
language appropriate to the situation.  Being proportionate to the subject means for 
example not to make a small matter look big.  Style in Aristotle’s theory also 
includes the fourth element of the canon of delivery (hupkrisis, actio) and the fifth 
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canon of memory (mnēmē, memoria).  Delivery and memory are not relevant for 
written text, so I will not go into them.  Another form of style is the trope, which in 
Greek literally means ‘turn’.  A trope is a figure like a metaphor, which changes 
the meaning of one or more words (Lanham, 1991). 
Rhetoric in the 20th Century 
In Western history rhetoric played an important role in education.  The re-
emergence of the discipline of rhetoric in the 20th century can be seen as a reaction 
to logical positivism (Worthington, 2007).  A number of 20th century ideas about 
rhetoric can be illustrated by the work of Chaim Perelman (1958 with Olbrechts-
Tyteca) and Stephen Toulmin (1958), and by the development of literary criticism.  
Perelman coined the term ‘The New Rhetoric’ (1979).  His main work is The New 
Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (1958).  In the 1940’s he was attempting to 
resolve the dilemma of the logic of value judgments.  According to logical 
positivism, value judgments like judicial ones are not scientifically founded.  But 
he could not agree with the positivist conclusion that value judgments are merely a 
matter of taste.  An outcome of his search for a foundation of value judgments was 
a rediscovery of Aristotelian rhetoric.  Besides Perelman, Toulmin (1958) has been 
influential in rhetorical theory in the 20th century.  He also turns away from logical 
positivism.  In The Uses of Argument (1958) he proposes a new argumentation 
theory based on actual ways of argument such as legal reasoning.  His theory 
investigates the ‘partial argument’, which is close to Aristotle’s enthymeme. 
 
Besides within philosophy, rhetorical analysis developed in literary criticism as 
well.  Literary criticism has, like rhetoric, a long tradition: 
A partial list [of literary criticism] in historical order would include rhetorical, 
philological, Aristotelian, belletristic, hermeneutic, historical, new critical, 
psychoanalytic, neo-Aristotelian, archetypical, neorhetorical, Marxist, reader-
response, deconstructive, linguistic, feminist, and new historicist criticism 
(McCloskey, 1998, p. 16, my insertion). 
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Literary criticism investigates metaphors, narratives, and other rhetorical elements 
that writers use to achieve persuasion.   
4.2: The Rhetoric of Economics 
McCloskey’s discourse analysis of economics in The Vices of Economists; The 
Virtues of the Bourgeoisie (1996) will be used here as a frame of reference for 
further describing the current rhetoric of investment theory, and for inventing a 
new rhetoric.  The Vices of Economists is a rhetorical criticism of the discourse of 
economics in general.  Adopting McCloskey’s discourse analysis, investment 
decisions require two things: an analysis of its rhetoric, and bourgeois virtues for 
coping with investment decisions.  The analysis of rhetoric provides insights into 
the beliefs, the justifications, and the broader context of investment theory.   
 
First, I will discuss four books that make up her conception of the rhetoric of 
economics.  In the books she analyses the phenomenon of rhetoric as used in 
economic texts.  In the preface of The Rhetoric of Economics (1998) McCloskey 
refers as key literature to:   
 
1. If You’re So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise (1990)  
2. Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics (1994) 
3. The Vices of Economists: The Virtues of the Bourgeoisie (1996) 
4. The Rhetoric of Economics (1998, second edition) 
 
The works seem to constitute the end product of her work about rhetoric.  She 
started publishing about rhetoric with the article The Rhetoric of Economics (1983), 
out of which the book with the same title originated (1985a), with a revised second 
edition in 1998.  Both the article-version and the first edition of the book attracted 
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attention of philosophers of economics because of her critical stance towards the 
modernist methodology.  Modernism is called positivism in philosophical terms. 
 
A comprehensive answer to the criticisms of philosophers of economics came in 
Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics (1994), in which she elaborates her 
views about philosophy and philosophy of science.  Too, she discusses the 
differences between rhetoric and philosophy, and the relation between the two 
reflective approaches.  The book If You’re So Smart: The Narrative of Economic 
Expertise (1990), is of special interest for my dissertation, because here she 
presents economic forecasting as a narrative of economic expertise.   
In The Vices of Economists; The Virtues of the Bourgeoisie (1996) she remarks that 
economics has become a game in the sandbox, in which economists play like little 
boys.  But the sandbox is not like the real world, despite the seriousness of the boys 
in their play.  The book is a rhetorical criticism of the discourse of economics in 
general.  After picturing three vices of current economics, it suggests a future 
bourgeois moral for the field, that of virtue ethics.  It considers prudence not as the 
only virtue, but as one of the necessary virtues, such as temperance and justice.  
She elaborates her ideas about virtue ethics in The Bourgeois Virtues, Ethics for an 
Age of Commerce (2006).  Since The Vices of Economists is a rhetorical criticism 
of the discourse of economics in general, the three vices will now be treated in 
some depth: 
 
1. Statistical significance 
The belief that statistical significance replaces scientific significance in 
testing a hypothesis follows the ideas of Lawrence R. Klein (McCloskey, 
1996).  As explained in Chapter 3, statistical significance is not sufficient 
to accept a scientific result, because it has nothing to do with relevance.  
Moreover, it leads to irrelevant science.  What does matter, is the 
magnitude of a scientific finding.  Because the testing of statistical 
significance is almost obligatory in science, abolishing it is controversial 
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(Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008).  Though it does apply to the empirical side of 
investment theory this will not be elaborated in the dissertation because it 
is outside its scope.  In The Cult of Statistical Significance: How the 
Standard Error Costs Us Jobs, Justice and Lives Ziliak and McCloskey 
(2008) explain the compelling case against the use of statistical 
significance in science. 
 
2. Blackboard economics 
Given an axiomatic set of assumptions in a model, the existence of some 
economic outcome can by proved by a calculation or inference on the 
‘blackboard’.  Blackboard economics is considered as science and has been 
promoted by Paul Samuelson.  But the ‘Samuelsonian vice’ has led 
mainstream economics to become purely theoretical.  Of course, 
McCloskey (1996, p. 72) agrees that “Theory is good.  It is the disciplined 
imagination of economics.”  Mathematics also explicates the mechanism of 
an economic theory (1998).  But the problem is that blackboard economics 
has been overdone. 
 
3. Social engineering 
The most important vice is the belief that the first two vices can be used for 
economic policy.  The question ‘why is social engineering as proposed by 
Jan Tinbergen a vice?’, has a simple answer: ‘it does not work’.  The 
arguments for the failure of social engineering are not new:   
 
[…] the Austrian School long ago and the Rational Expectations School 
during the past quarter century have pointed out that it is ourselves we are 
trying to engineer.  That’s the big problem.  The reflexivity of economics 
sets stringent limits on what we can predict and control (McCloskey, 
1996, p. 103). 
To my opinion the third vice applies arguably to predicting in investment theory. 
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McCloskey’s discourse analysis also tries to analyse economics as products of a 
scientific culture.  According to McCloskey, the dominant culture of science is 
modernism, the official methodology for mainstream economics which is based on 
logical positivism.  McCloskey’s (1998, p. 148) view is that economics choose 
modernist methodology, because the argument of philosophy is one of authority.  
But her point is that philosophy itself has changed its mind, as expressed by for 
example Michael Polanyi (1958), Paul Feyerabend (1975), and Richard Rorty 
(1979).  Polanyi (1958) argues that the modernist idea that subjective ‘observation’ 
is not scientific, is outdated, which he elaborates in his book Personal Knowledge  
 
[…] is to show that complete objectivity as usually attributed to the exact sciences 
is a delusion and is in fact a false ideal (Polanyi, 1974/1958, p. 18). 
Another modernist principle is that science and non-science can be demarcated by 
methodology.  The prescript presupposes the existence of such a methodology.  But 
Feyerabend does not believe in one strict methodology; on the contrary, he 
recommends an anarchy in methodology as an “excellent medicine for 
epistemology, and for the philosophy of science (2010/1975, p. 1).”  His point is 
that methodology depends on the character of the scientific problem and that 
methodology cannot be fixed.   
Rorty discusses a more general point about modernism.  He regards the problems 
of modernist methodology as coming from the misleading metaphor that the mind 
is a mirror of nature (1979).  The metaphor implies an external reality independent 
of our mind.  But in the pragmatist philosophy such dichotomies as internal and 
external, or, objective and subjective, are considered as flawed.   
 
Rhetoric and Philosophy of Economics 
McCloskey does not believe in the official methodology of modernism for 
mainstream economics, and has found substantial evidence and support from inside 
philosophy for her anti-modernist position.  Notwithstanding, her alternative of 
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rhetoric of economics has received critical attention from philosophers of 
economics.  The philosophy of economics and the rhetoric of economics have in 
common that they reflect on economics.  Both aim to achieve a better insight into 
the working of the science of economics.  But how do they relate to each other?  
Can rhetoric be seen as a branch of philosophy of economics?   
According to one of the leading philosophers of economics, Hausman (1981), the 
philosophy of science broadened its perspective in the 1960s and 1970s from 
methodologically prescribing how science should work, to empirically describing 
how science is actually being done.  The broader perspective of philosophy of 
science has also arisen from the loss of trust in logical positivism.  Despite 
Hausman’s (1989) interest in eclectic methodology, he is critical of McCloskey’s 
rhetorical approach:   
 
But McCloskey offers little solid argument for employing his favored literary 
tools, and he has a hard time explaining how his proposed successor to economic 
methodology is supposed to retain any normative role.  And the normative role of 
methodology is unavoidable; whether methodological rules are garnered from 
imitation, methodological asides, or systematic methodological treatises, there is 
no doing economics without some standards or norms.  Furthermore, if economics 
is to make any rational claim to guide policy, these standards or norms cannot be 
arbitrary (Hausman, 1989, p. 123). 
The criticisms of McCloskey’s approach by Hausman (1989), Hausman & 
McPherson (1988), and Hollis (1985) provide an opportunity for explicating the 
difference between the primary beliefs of rhetoric and those of philosophy of 
science.  McCloskey (1994) has replied to the individual criticisms and devoted 
Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics to elaborating her point of view about 
rhetoric and its relation to philosophy.  Hausman & McPherson (1988) miss the 
normative element in McCloskey’s rhetorical approach.  They describe her 
standards as those held within a discipline or intellectual standards in general.  
Anything more would be normative methodology, which McCloskey has rejected.  
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But they dislike the division between general standards and normative 
methodology, in their words:  
 
What's left when the formulas and rigid rules are gone is the exercise of informed 
judgment, guided by broad and evolving principles of assessment, which in turn 
still rest on implicit or explicit epistemological theories.  That's Methodology, too 
(Hausman & McPherson, 1988, p. 6). 
One might conclude that Hausman’s & McPherson’s and McCloskey’s points of 
view have come rather close, apart from the dispute over the existence of implicit 
or explicit epistemological theories.  Yet, Collins & Evans (2009/2007, p. 39) seem 
to agree with McCloskey’s point of view: in their discussion about the nature of 
expertise, reflective ability is a generalized skill, a form of expertise applicable to 
all sorts of sciences and arts, which is different from an epistemological theory. 
 
Martin Hollis (1985), a philosopher of social science, criticizes McCloskey’s 
rejection of modernism in the 1983 article-version of The Rhetoric of Economics.  
His criticism is that a rejection of modernism should not imply a rejection of 
traditional epistemology:   
 
For instance, no Cartesian or traditional rationalist would accept any of them.  So 
there can be no general presumption that to reject modernism is to abandon the old 
search after truth by methods grounded in traditional epistemology (Hollis, 1983, 
p. 2).  
The criticism of Hollis amounts to that of Hausman & McPherson (1988): his 
problem is that the rhetorical approach has no epistemology, in other words, no 
methodology to determine truth. 
 
But according to McCloskey, epistemology itself, the philosophy of knowing, is 
the root of the problem (1994).  What Hollis means by epistemology presupposes 
the existence of an objective form of truth, while she presupposes merely a 
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pragmatic form of truth, like that proposed by Rorty (1979) and his predecessors in 
pragmatic philosophy.  Given her position, it makes sense to distance oneself from 
strict methodology, just like the anti-methodology standpoint that Feyerabend 
(1975) proposes.  Nevertheless, the methodologists of economics see rhetoric as a 
part of methodology.  But McCloskey has no wish to be part of methodology, 
because the current philosophy of science cannot deliver a standard to which 
argumentation can be held. 
Anti-philosophy and the Moral of Rhetoric  
Arjo Klamer has explained the dispute between methodologists and rhetoricians as 
a matter of different perspectives: 
 
Since this linguistic turn the books of conventional methodoloy are gathering dust 
on my shelves and I had to gather an entire new selection of books for my library.  
[.…].  We not only use different concepts, ask different questions, but we also read 
a different literature and relate to different texts.  [….].  The critics turn out not to 
have read Aristotle, Perelman, Toulmin, Foucault, Booth, Rorty and so many 
others who have written about rhetoric and discursive practices.  It’s no wonder, 
therefore, that we have such a hard time communicating (Klamer, 2001, p. 73). 
How does McCloskey compare rhetoric to philosophy?  McCloskey sees 
positivism as a reaction to German idealism.  Logical positivism was meant to end 
speculation about metaphysics.  But not talking about metaphysics does not make it 
disappear.  She sees rhetoric as a replacement for the current philosophy:   
 
We need a new philosophy, or anti-philosophy, to understand economic science as 
she actually works.  The form of anti-philosophy recommended here is the oldest 
one, ‘rhetoric’ (McCloskey, 1994, p. xiii). 
She has no need of a methodology:  “An economic methodology ‘based’ (that 
hopeful word) in philosophy […] is too thin to work (McCloskey, 1994, 86).”  
Moreover, the conception of economics within macro-economics is plural:  the 
neoclassical school, the Austrians, the Institutionalists, and the Marxist have 
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divergent starting points.  The starting points are decisive turns within economics 
and determine the way of looking. 
 
German idealism has now returned in a more mature version, as pragmatism or 
rhetoric.  Rhetoric has the advantage that it is interpretative and introspective about 
metaphors and stories.  Idealism in such a way is based on social discourse.  In the 
end, the philosophy of economics is about morality, an intention which a number 
of philosophers of science share with her.  McCloskey urges a Sprachethik in 
which the ethical side of a conversation is stressed: 
 
[…] speech morality, the ethics of conversation.  […] Don’t lie; pay attention; 
don’t sneer; cooperate; don’t shout; let other people talk; be open-minded; explain 
yourself when asked […] (McCloskey, 1994, p. 99). 
Modernist science does not fulfil conversational demand, also because morality is 
seen as mere preference (McCloskey, 1994).  The discipline of rhetoric, in the 
spirit of the Roman statesman and author Cato of ‘vir bonus, dicendi peritus’, ‘a 
good man, skilled in speaking’, seems a promising alternative to the philosophy of 
economics. 
4.3: Metaphors and Stories 
The Rhetorical Tetrad 
McCloskey’s interpretation of rhetoric combines the tools of classical rhetoric with 
those of literary criticism.  Literary criticism permits one to bridge the gap between 
literature and science:  “The scientific report is itself a [literary] genre, whose 
conventions have changed from time to time (1990, p. 30, my insertion).” Her 
literary approach is adapted to the specific nature of economic literature:  
“Economics may be like poetry in this or that important respect, but plainly it is not 
the same (McCloskey, 1994, p. 44).”  Central to rhetoric is the art of argument, i.e. 
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skilfulness in using reasons to show that something is true or correct (McCloskey, 
1990).  Rhetoric is used by all economists: 
 
Rhetoric is unavoidable.  An economist or historian cannot avoid writing 
rhetorically since any argument has a rhetoric, a style of argument, taking 
‘argument’ to mean ‘any designs on the reader’ (McCloskey, 1990, p. 56). 
She explains her approach of the rhetoric of economics by the rhetorical tetrad, 
consisting of four elements:  fact, logic, story and metaphor.  All these elements 
help in exploring economics (1994).  The key point of the tetrad is that economics 
must be based on more than fact and logic, on which current economics is centred, 
due to its modernist background:   
 
The choice to have high standards of logic, low standards of fact, and no explicit 
standards of metaphor and story is itself a rhetorical one.  It depends on the 
audience of economic scientists (McCloskey, 1990, p. 23). 
Thus, economists lack self-awareness about their use of metaphors and stories.  To 
the concept of storytelling a modernist would respond that a real scientist just finds 
the story, so science is about reality and not ‘made up’ like in fiction.  But by just 
telling the story like it is reality, the modernist economist avoids the responsibility 
to examine his perspective.  Denying the existence of a perspective means to deny 
that people, not the external world, make stories.  Economists deny the use of the 
metaphor in the model as well.  
 
A feature of the rhetorical tetrad is that each of its parts limits the possible excesses 
of the other parts.  Metaphors and stories are the two ways of answering the 
question ‘why?’.  Metaphors and stories in economics can criticize each other, and 
co-exist.  An allegory integrates metaphor and story.  Following the empiricist 
tradition, a model and a story are to be checked by the facts.  So facts constrain a 
model and a story.  Logic also has its role.  In the spirit of the rationalist tradition, 
models and stories are to be investigated by logic for their consistency.  Yet, a 
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narrow focus on logic and facts can lead to bad science, just like a narrow focus on 
story and metaphor. 
 
The metaphor is very relevant in economics because the economic models are to be 
seen as metaphors.  The choice of a metaphor in economics reflects a worldview of 
a school of economics and is a figure of thought, not merely a figure of language.  
McCloskey proposes as a definition for a metaphor that it brings together “two 
separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly 
appropriate to the one as a lens for seeing the other (Black, M., 1962, Models and 
Metaphors, p. 236 cited in McCloskey, 1990, p. 12).”  Another definition of a 
metaphor is:   
Changing a word from its literal meaning to one not properly applicable but 
analogous to it:  assertion of identity rather than, as with simile, likeness (Lanham, 
1991, p. 100). 
Besides using metaphors in the usual sense, the economist uses them in the form of 
the economic models:   
The market for apartments in New York, says the economist, is ‘just like’ a curve 
on a blackboard.  No one has so far seen a literal demand curve floating in the sky 
above Manhattan.  It’s a metaphor (McCloskey, 1990, p. 1). 
Metaphors in the form of models work best in economics at making standard 
predictions, for example how higher interest rates affect the housing prices.  A 
metaphor is not ‘true’ in the sense that it corresponds with the external world as in 
the correspondence theory of truth: it is merely useful for a purpose.  A problem 
arises when metaphors are taken literally.  Then metaphor becomes identity: 
instead of one of the possible perspectives the metaphor becomes the only 
perspective and absolute.   
 
Besides using metaphors, an economist tells stories: 
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Plainly and routinely, 90 percent of what economists do is such storytelling.  Yet 
even in the other 10 percent, in the part more obviously dominated by models and 
metaphors, the economist tells stories (McCloskey, 1990, p. 16). 
Indeed, economists explain their models in the more accessible form of a story or a 
narrative.  To find stories in economics is easy: 
 
The actions of an economistic folklore are few:  entry, exit, price setting, orders 
within a firm, purchase, sale, valuation, and a few more.  [.…] .  Economists say 
over and over again, ‘action X is just like action Y’[…] (McCloskey, 1990, p. 24). 
The story is a fiction, constrained by, but underdetermined by the facts.  Just like 
metaphors, stories are selective, because they focus on what is important.  
Storytelling as such is scientific.  Storytelling works best at understanding 
something that already happened (for example, explaining the economic depression 
of the 1930s), but is used for predictions as well.  Economists themselves do not 
always realise that they are telling stories.  Rhetorical criticism sensitizes us to the 
possibility that a writer, possibly unconsciously, tries to make us look in a 
particular way.  Stories can also be dangerous for the public which takes the 
economic stories literally. 
Metaphors and Stories in Investment Theory 
I now apply McCloskey’s rhetorical approach to investment theory to discover the 
main metaphors and stories in Markowitz’s theory, the CAPM, and some of the 
alternative investment theories and theories of uncertainty.  The main metaphor in 
Markowitz’s investment theory is the claim that investment management is 
mathematical statistics.  The application of mathematical statistics assumes 
calculability and distracts the attention from uncertainty.  The metaphor of 
mathematical statistics makes us see only through the perspective of calculability: 
it makes us think in terms of probability distributions, correlations, criteria for 
efficiency, and algorithms as the necessary elements.  The second metaphor in 
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Markowitz’s theory is the machine.  The machine metaphor, a well-known form in 
management theory and indeed in political theory and sociology generally, can be 
recognized in the language of, and aspiration to efficiency.  ‘Efficiency’ in 
Markowitz’s theory means that an investment portfolio has a maximum return 
given a level of risk.  The machine metaphor implies that risk and return can be 
optimized by precise calculations, which can and should determine the composition 
of the investment portfolio. 
 
Both the metaphors of mathematical statistics and the machine underplay the 
importance of the beliefs about risk and return.  Beliefs are viewed as merely input 
for the theory.  Moreover, the beliefs cannot be seen as a problem once the jump to 
mathematical statistics had been made.  The machine metaphor focusses on the 
process parts of reaching efficiency, such as the efficiency criteria and the 
algorithms, and beliefs are treated merely as inputs for the calculating machine. 
 
Markowitz’s metaphor of mathematical statistics in story form is that applying 
mathematical statistics is a sensible and sophisticated thing to do: statistics allows 
you to engineer your investment decisions like an actuary manages an insurance 
portfolio.  It is superior to a less sophisticated quantitative or qualitative approach.  
A second story is that the theory finds an efficient trade-off in risk and return by 
running its algorithms.  Before Markowitz there was no ‘efficient’ frontier of risk 
and return: investment portfolios are to be directed to the efficient frontier. 
 
The dominant metaphor in the CAPM is the equilibrium: the market of investments 
is in balance because of informational efficiency and rational expectations.  In 
equilibrium, risk and return have become predictable.  Equilibrium and 
predictability are exchangeable.  The second important metaphor is the 
informational efficiency.  It is again a machine metaphor, but now concerning the 
processing of information.  Because of informational efficiency the market of 
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investments is at any time in balance:  new information is immediately being 
processed into a new equilibrium. 
 
A dominant story that pervades modern investment theory is the idea that running 
risk should receive a reward.  Thus, stocks should earn a premium, aka known as 
the risk premium, above the risk-free rate, because investors are risk averse.  
Besides the rational constructivist point of view, historical evidence is used.  For 
example, Jeremy Siegel (1994) analyses that stocks earn a risk premium in the long 
run of a period of 20 years.  To repeat, the rationale of rising stock prices could, 
say, be that if the economy grows, profits of stocks as a subset of the economy 
could grow as well, and if the valuation of the stock remains constant, then prices 
of stocks should go up.  But things can go wrong as well, and therefore the past 
does not need to resemble the future. 
Besides informational efficiency in story form, the dominant story in the CAPM is 
that an optimal portfolio is no longer at the Markowitz efficient frontier of risk and 
return, but a combination of the risk free return and the market portfolio.  The 
market portfolio consists of all securities, which are correctly priced, so no 
advantage could be gained by choosing another portfolio.  Another important story 
is that diversifiable risk does not deserve a reward: only the exposure to the 
undiversifiable risk is rewarded. 
 
The metaphors and stories of current investment theory persuade because financial 
economists have been trained to accept the ideas of equilibrium and calculability, 
which belong to mainstream neoclassical economics.  But investment theory, 
especially the CAPM, is to be seen as an ideal type: informational efficiency in 
combination with rational expectations seems utopian. 
 
Let us now investigate the metaphors of the opponents of predictability in 
economics and investment theory.  Knight proposes the metaphor for economic 
phenomena to behave like an organism: the organic includes the aspect of change 
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of economic phenomena.  An organism adapts to new, unforeseen circumstances, 
while a mechanism adheres to strict rules.  Keynes illustrates the functioning of a 
financial market by the metaphor of a beauty contest. To win the contest, a 
participant has to predict which face the other contesters will choose.  The 
metaphor of the beauty contest stresses how human interacting works out, and 
opposes the valuation theory, in the sense that valuation is not fundamental but 
constructed in the beauty contest.  A related metaphor of Keynes summarizes how 
to act under uncertainty and formulates an efficient market theory without some 
mechanism of equilibrium: Keynes’s efficient market theory leads to the 
conclusion that financial markets are instable.  Von Mises stresses that causes are 
teleological instead of mechanical: teleological does not mean here ‘the striving 
towards a collective equilibrium’, like in the CAPM, but the striving of many 
individuals for their goals, which results in unpredictability.  McCloskey highlights 
that predicting in economics is magical.  Magic persuades people, because they 
believe the narrative of expertise.  Taleb uses the metaphor of the black swan, 
which is a rare, very influential, and unpredictable event.  The metaphor of the 
black swan stresses the fallibility of induction on which investment theory founds 
the probability beliefs of its models. 
 
Alternative investment theories have metaphors to their aid as well.  I will discuss a 
number of the metaphors.  The ideological criticism of investing equates investing 
to gambling.  By saying investing is gambling the dark side of investing is 
highlighted, including manipulation and fraud, which as we all know are part of 
investing.  The metaphor of Galbraith, Minsky, Kindleberger and Shiller is that 
financial markets are like bubbles which can burst.  A bubble is reinforced by 
lending and self-reflexive social mechanisms, but is not grounded in economic 
facts, so it bursts, sooner or later.  Mandelbrot proposes wild instead of mild 
randomness as the metaphor for financial markets, and therefore that investment 
theory needs an alternative statistical theory. 
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In the next Chapter, the metaphor of investing as culture is explored, and other 
metaphors could be interesting as well, such as that investing is a power relation 
analogous to the agency theory of Jensen & Meckling (1976), which will be treated 
in the next Chapter in one the cases of innovative investment practice. 
 
The metaphors of the uncertainty economics and alternative investment theory 
highlight other aspects of investing than the current investment theory does, and 
makes us see its weak spots. 
4.4: Virtues  
Because the theoretical reason of investment theory results in weak outcomes, the 
practical reason should dominate in decision making.  Practical reason is about 
introspection, values, and ethics.  McCloskey (2006) favours bourgeois virtues as a 
balanced system of ethics.  McCloskey investigates the role of virtues of our 
capitalist, bourgeois society in the tradition of Adam Smith (1790).  In Greece of 
the antiquity, Aristotle (1908) has laid the foundations of virtue ethics in 
Nicomachean Ethics.  The seven virtues that McCloskey distinguishes, consist of 
four pagan virtues: courage, temperance, justice, and prudence, and three Christian 
virtues: faith, hope, and love.  A virtue does not tell you what to do, but is about 
character and fits to all kinds of situations: 
 
A ‘virtue’ is a habit of the heart, a stable disposition, a settled state of character, a 
durable, educated characteristic of someone to exercise her will to be good 
(McCloskey, 2006, p. 64). 
Virtue ethics contrasts modernist ethics because virtue ethics is grounded in human 
nature and tradition, instead of in subjective utility or abstract reasoning (Audi, 
1995).  Subjective utility founds the ethics of economics.  In the virtue system of 
McCloskey, thinking in terms of utility is about the virtue of prudence, which is the 
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main virtue of neoclassical economics.  By prudence or phronesis she means 
practical wisdom, know-how, or common sense (2006, p. 253).   
 
But economics should be more than prudence, which also represents ethics in 
investment theory.  Not all virtues seem applicable to investing, for example faith 
and hope seem less relevant for such a secular activity.  Let us illustrate what other 
virtues can mean for using investment theory.  Investing is often done with other 
people’s money.  The virtue of temperance is about individual balance: temperance 
demands self-control and epistemological humbleness of the people who decide 
about investing or research on investment theory.  Temperance means that 
investment professionals and researchers should not gamble: with leverage it is 
easy to gamble in investing, but it takes merely a financial crisis to put investment 
strategies to a stress test, resulting in the destruction of wealth.  Justice is about 
social balance and demands, like the virtue of love, to care for the owners of the 
managed investments.  The clients often do not have the knowledge about 
investing that the investment professionals possess: that makes the clients 
vulnerable.  But it cannot be fair that the epistemological uncertainty of investing is 
transferred to the clients.  So, investment managers should communicate about the 
uncertainty, be humble, and take care as good as possible of the client’s money. 
 
Following McCloskey’s discourse analysis of economics, the new rhetoric for 
investment theory requires qualitative judgment based on intellectual honesty, 
insight in its rhetoric, and bourgeois ethics.  Because investing takes place under 
Knightian uncertainty, statistics are supportive rather than dominant in decision 
making.  And alternative investment as treated in Chapter 2 should be a part of the 
discussion as well.  So, investment theory should become more a moral science and 
less an engineering one: it is about judgment, combining virtues with historical and 
theoretical insights.  Of course, no fixed methodology should exist in the domain of 
the practical reason as well, so virtues are interesting possibilities beyond the one-
sided solutions of prudence-only or other monolithic modern ethical theories.  In 
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the next Chapter the culture of investing and innovative cases from practice will be 
central.  Culture is both a natural extension of rhetoric and uncertainty. 
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Chapter 5 
The Culture of Investing  
 
“When I hear the word culture I reach for my ethics (Tweet Deirdre McCloskey, 5 
September 2014).” 
5.1: Culture, Economics and Finance 
The Relevance of Culture 
Economics and finance ignore culture.  The education of economists leaves culture 
out, neither is culture an explicit part of the finance education; no wonder, because 
economics and finance are modelled after physics, which indeed does not need 
culture as a source of explanation.  In line with the modelling of economics after 
physics, the philosophical context of modernism has caused economics and finance 
to shun the human part of reality, such as values, ethics, and culture: 
By 'modernism' we mean the claim to practise science as we understood the term 
in secondary school.  Extract from life if you can what is historical, value-laden, 
judgmental, ethical, cultural, tacit, skilful, smooth, curved -'all things counter, 
original, spare, strange'; and what will be left is modernism.  It consists of the 
simpler parts of science and scholarship.  Modernism […]has urged us to leave 
strictly to the side the matters of moral force and human meaning (Klamer & 
McCloskey, 1992, p. 156). 
By relating culture to economics, Klamer poses a question in the Weberian 
tradition of distinguishing between procedural and substantive rationality (Klamer, 
2014, p. 29).  Economics is about procedural rationality, culture is about 
substantive rationality.  Both substantive rationality and culture centre at values, or, 
the answer to the question ‘What is important?’  Sociology, anthropology, and 
philosophy include the perspective of culture.  The inclusion of culture in 
economics could yield a richer economics as well.  For example in decision 
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making, economics and finance rely on the calculations of rational choice, though 
the notion of culture would beg for the alternative of phronesis, that is the practical 
wisdom to do the right thing: 
Economists embrace the idea [of means to an end, measured in utility] because it 
enables them the modelling of decisions in the form of mathematical equations.  
The modelling gives the idea the aura of ‘science’.  The idea of phronesis makes 
us realize that too much is involved in doing the right thing, that calculation is 
therefore nigh impossible, and modelling quite hopeless (Klamer, 2014, p. 27, my 
insertion). 
In addition to values, Klamer’s cultural approach of economics emphasizes 
conversation as a way to interpret culture.  The point of using conversation to 
understand investment theory can be illustrated by the role of talk in the stock 
market:    
The chatter in the stock market (that ideal of a marketplace) is another example of 
persuasion in the economy.  Portfolio managers talk full-time to decide on buying 
or selling.  Stockbrokers talk to clients and to each other.  Technical elves spend 
their days researching the thoughts the brokers ought to have.  Journalists spend 
their careers reporting the talk on Wall Street, elvish or human.  (McCloskey & 
Klamer, 1995, p. 194). 
McCloskey & Klamer stress the logic of talk instead of computation, because 
people make judgments and persuade each other whether a piece of information is 
knowledge (ibid., p. 191).  The importance of talk contrasts with a main theme in 
investment theory, that of informational efficiency by which financial markets 
reflect all available information.  But as discussed in Chapter 2, full immediate 
reflection of information is merely possible for obvious facts, because only then 
information can be processed mechanically without judgment. 
Klamer’s View of the Culture of Economics 
The fact that economics ignores culture, does of course not mean that economics 
has no culture.  In the current Chapter, I work along the lines of Klamer’s (2001, 
2003, 2006, 2007, 2014) approach of the investigation of the culture of economics, 
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which also suits with investment theory because it is a part of economics, aka 
financial economics.  A difference between Klamer’s and the current investigation 
is that Klamer investigates the culture of academics and I investigate the culture of 
the investment practice of institutional investors.  So, what is culture?  Culture 
constitutes the partly tacit social behaviour of a group, by Klamer described as: 
[…] culture denotes beliefs, customs, values, emotions, stories, and sentiments that 
every member of group (Balinese men, Italians, academic economists) have in 
common and, crucially, by which they distinguish themselves as a group (Klamer, 
2007, pp. 39-40). 
Klamer’s cultural approach fits in with the rhetorical approach applied in the 
dissertation, which has been Klamer’s point of departure as well (1988 & 1992 & 
1995 with McCloskey, 1994 with Leonard, 2001).  Within the cultural approach 
Klamer concentrates on values and conversations.  Values, or what is important, 
typify a culture and can be of a moral, social and cultural character ─though 
originally, value is an economic notion (Klamer, 2003, p. 195).  Value was a topic 
of debate in classical economics: is value about the exchange for labour as Marx 
thought, or about the subjective value for individuals like the marginalists 
proposed?  In an effort to combine both theories, Marshall proposed that value 
arises out of the interplay between supply and demand (ibid., p. 195).  In the 
language of economics values are called preferences, which are exogenous, given 
(ibid., p. 193).  Yet, the reduction of values to mere preferences in economics, and 
the translation of preferences into utilities is not what happens when important 
decisions are made in real life, because values matter in decision making: 
The consideration of values makes better sense of the process of choosing and 
acting, at least I will so propose (Klamer, 2003, p. 192). 
Besides values, Klamer uses the metaphor of conversation to understand the culture 
of economics: 
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This book [Speaking of Economics: How to Get in the Conversation] is the result 
of my finding out what it is that economists do, what makes the science of 
economics tick.  The main point: think of economics in terms of a conversation, or, 
better yet, a bunch of conversations (Klamer, 2007, pp. xiii-xiv, his italics and my 
insertion). 
Contrary to the academic ideal of truth, conversation as a metaphor reveals that 
truth is secondary (ibid., p. xiv).  Conversations are highly disciplined, and for that 
matter “Conversations constrain what we are able to say (ibid., p. 26).” A feature of 
a conversation as a metaphor of culture is that it has a core which is stable for a 
lengthy period.  Another feature of a conversation is that it discovers and develops.  
The conversation resembles Kuhn’s (1962) paradigm, though the metaphor of 
conversation offers a language-oriented perspective, instead of a science-oriented 
perspective.  The notion of conversation has been among others discussed by Rorty 
(1979) (Klamer, 2007, p. 18).  Although a conversation resembles rhetoric, Klamer 
prefers conversation because it relates to a community:  
[…] I prefer the metaphor of conversation.  Seeking conversational commonalities 
is not a persuasive process but rather an attempt to find the expressions for my 
ideas to be heard.  Conversation stresses the cooperative, the sharing of ideas, the 
identification with others (Klamer, 2007, p. 25). 
Besides oral conversation, conversation consists mainly of individuals dealing with 
texts, such as articles and books.  The past conversations are relevant to a better 
understanding of the current conversation and reveal options for a future 
conversation, as illustrated in Chapter 2 of the dissertation about the history of 
finance.   
Notions of Culture: Klamer and Hofstede Compared 
I will now compare Klamer’s view on culture with that of Hofstede (1997), who 
has compared organisational cultures between countries.  More in-depth, culture 
has according to Klamer three meanings, which I will quote at some length: 
1) Culture in the anthropological sense […] connotes the stories, history, 
expectations, artifacts, symbols, identities and values that a group of people 
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shares and with which they distinguish themselves from other people.  In this 
sense a family, company, city, region, ethnic group, nation, and continent can 
be said to have a distinct culture.  Having a culture implies having the 
possibility to share the meanings of life with others. [….].  
2) When the Germans write Kultur, they indicate the second meaning of culture: 
here culture connotes civilization usually expressed in the accumulated 
achievements of people in a certain region over a long period of time in the 
arts, the sciences, technology, politics, and social customs […].  [….]. 
3) In common parlor culture refers often to just the arts, sometimes including 
design, architecture and certain crafts […].  [….].(Klamer, 2014, pp. 7-8, his 
italics). 
Klamer’s first meaning of culture is relevant for the analysis of economics and 
investing, and overlaps with Hofstede’s notion of culture as a collective 
phenomenon:  
Culture is always a collective phenomenon […].  Culture consists of the unwritten 
rules of the social game.  It is the collective programming of the mind that 
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others 
(Hofstede et al, 2010/1997, p. 6, their italics). 
Hofstede describes national cultures by four categories: values, heroes, rituals, and 
symbols (Hofstede et al, 2010/1997, pp. 7-10).  Values form the centre of a culture, 
and symbols its outer layer.  Heroes are the role models of a culture.  In investment 
practice, successful investors are role models, such as Warren Buffet and George 
Soros.  In academic finance, heroes are for example Markowitz, Sharpe, Fama, and 
Merton.  It is interesting to note that the investment heroes Soros (1987, 2008) and 
Buffet oppose modern portfolio theory.  Rituals are social activities which a culture 
regards as essential, such as ceremonial meetings, and discourse, of which the 
dissertation provides an analysis.  Heroes, rituals, and symbols form the visible 
practices of a culture.  In Hofstede’s categorization, Klamer’s approach to the 
culture of economics focusses on values and the conversational part of rituals.   
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Culture and Uncertainty: Hofstede’s View 
Hofstede has investigated cultural differences between countries in the research 
project for IBM.  His explanatory model of culture has four dimensions (Hofstede 
et al, 2010/1997, p. 31): 
 
1. Power distance 
2. Collectivism versus individualism 
3. Femininity versus masculinity 
4. Uncertainty avoidance  
 
The way a culture handles uncertainty is a part in Hofstede’s explanatory model.  
He claims that countries differ in the way uncertainty is experienced and handled.  
Hofstede’s dimensions and findings are debated by for example McSweeney 
(2002), see also Magala (2004), but for the dissertation the criticisms on his model 
are out of scope.  But Hofstede’s notion of uncertainty is relevant: if uncertainty 
relates to culture, culture could explain why and how investors cope with the 
uncertainty of investments.  To Hofstede, uncertainty is a feeling of anxiety and a 
part of culture since the dawn of civilization.  Civilizations have invented 
numerous ways to cope with uncertainty: 
Every human society has developed ways to alleviate this anxiety.  These ways 
belong to the domains of technology, law, and religion (Hofstede et al, 2010/1997, 
p. 189). 
Technology has been directed against natural uncertainties, law against behavioural 
uncertainties, and religion against transcendental uncertainties.  In investment 
theory, the technology of statistics treats uncertainty of the future outcomes of 
financial markets as if returns are a piece of nature ‘out there’. 
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As a matter of culture, uncertainty avoidance begs for predictive ability by some 
method: 
Uncertainty avoidance can therefore be defined as the extent to which the 
members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations.  This 
feeling is, among other manifestations, expressed through nervous stress and in a 
need for predictability: a need for written and unwritten rules (Hofstede et al, 
2010/1997, p. 191, their italics). 
The psychology of uncertainty avoidance is that the method of handling 
uncertainty transforms uncertainty into a specified risk, which could imply two 
things: anxiety changes to a worry which is focused on the risk, or anxiety 
disappears (ibid., p. 197).  Using a predictive method such as stochastical 
prediction handles uncertainty by replacing the feeling of uncertainty with a 
rational, technical method.  Thus, risk per se is not the problem of uncertainty: the 
ambiguity of uncertainty is the reason of anxiety.  Ambiguity aversion is also a 
subject of behavioural finance.  Ambiguity aversion demonstrates why people 
prefer objective over subjective probabilities (Ellsberg, 1961).   
 
Culture and Uncertainty: Schön’s View 
Donald Schön (1970) regards uncertainty and the quest for certainty, the stable 
state, as a central notion in human life.  Culture creates stability and is a response 
to uncertainty.  He perceives the aim for a stable state in both the secular and the 
personal domain.  In the personal domain, humans tend to regard their identity as 
fixed when they say ‘I am Dutch’, ‘I have studied economics’, or ‘I am a banker’.  
The belief in the stable state provides for a need: 
Belief in the stable state is central, because it is a bulwark against the threat of 
uncertainty (Schön, 1970, p.1) 
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The belief in internal or external stability constructs stability.  According to Schön 
humans try to compensate uncertainty in one domain in stability in another, say, 
compensating the instability of being an artist with a structured way of life.  When 
big changes occur in society three destructive reactions can occur: regression, 
revolution, and apathy: 
There are a variety of responses to loss of the stable state. Some of the responses 
are anti-responses, versions of a refusal to recognise it, and they are destructive in 
character.  One of them takes the form of a return.  The idea is: let us return to the 
last stable state, to the way it used to be. [….].  There is a form of revolutionary 
response whose war-cry is total rejection of the past, but in such a fashion that the 
past is permitted to creep in by the back door […]. There is a third kind of 
response, which is mindlessness (ibid., p. 6). 
How about a constructive response to change?  A constructive response is to learn 
how to adapt as a way of managing the change.  My view on investing is that both 
the negative and constructive reactions to the economic and societal changes after 
the credit crisis of 2008, can be recognized in the behaviour of institutional 
investors: outright denial of the crisis, or trying to learn and improve behaviour.  
According to Schön, the solution to cope with uncertainty has to be both at the 
personal and the institutional level.   
5.2: Values, Decision Making and Phronesis  
I will now proceed by explaining how Klamer regards values and conversation as 
constitutive of decision making.  Values and conversation are no part of the 
decision making in economics.  The ethics of economics is reduced to the rational 
decision making with the help of calculations to optimize utility.  The reduction of 
ethics to rational, utilitarian decision making is a result of scepticism about ethics.  
Finance follows the mechanical approach of economics, witness Markowitz (1952, 
1959).  Because the epistemology of investment theory fails, decision making in 
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economics needs ethics.  It is not to say that economics has no ethics, the point is 
that its ethics are constrained to prudence only. 
In decision making, conversation is an alternative for calculation, calculation 
functions merely as the input for discussion.  It is from deliberation between people 
that most decisions are being made.  In the case that deliberation is too expensive, 
one sees that the decision is automated, for example for portfolio advice to private 
clients with an average wealth or less.  Why is deliberation necessary?  Could we 
not make a computer program in which we place all the inputs and calculate the 
outcome?  The dissertation has stressed that the knowledge about the future is 
partial because of external uncertainty.  Even if external certainty is a reasonably 
assumption, like in designing a bridge, the purpose, costs, design, aesthetics, etc. 
has to be deliberated as well.  Yet, even more talk is needed if external uncertainty 
is at a higher level.  We could say that internal uncertainty characterizes ethical 
deliberations, which needs to be explored by talking: “A reason to focus on the 
talking is the instability of the ethical categories (Klamer, 2009, p. 452).” The 
cause of instability is that values around which the decisions are made, must be 
interpreted in their situation.   
Knowing one’s culture means knowing one’s values, which enhances decision 
making by deliberating values which are appropriate for the situation at hand.  A 
value is not a means, but an end, a goal, in itself.  For short, a value answers the 
question ‘What is important?’.  As a source of values, Klamer (2014) proposes the 
oikos, the home.  He uses the oikos as a metaphor for the values that a person, an 
organization or the society strives for: oikos is more important than its translation 
into numerical entities in economics and in the market.  In Klamer’s words: “Doing 
the right thing is realizing our oikos, or whatever else we value (2014, p. 7).”  
Because values are part of a culture, culture is important in economics too.  Klamer 
proposes to use phronesis or practical wisdom as a way of decision making that 
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involves values.  Phronesis here has a broader meaning than utilitarian prudence in 
economics, as phronesis is about the goals of life:  
Practical wisdom, or knowledge of the proper ends of life, distinguished by 
Aristotle from theoretical knowledge and mere means-end reasoning, or craft, and 
itself a necessary and sufficient condition of virtue (Blackburn, 2008). 
In Aristotle's ethics it [phronesis] is the complete excellence of the practical 
intellect, the counterpart of sophia in the theoretical sphere, comprising a true 
conception of the good life and the deliberative excellence necessary to realize that 
conception in practice via choice […] (Taylor, C.C.W. in Honderich, 2005, their 
italics, my insertion). 
Klamer uses phronesis in the Aristotelean meaning.  The difference between the 
prudence of economics and the phronesis of Aristotle is that prudence of 
economics is reduced to self-interest, while Aristotle seeks the middle ground 
between self-interest and altruism. 
  
Besides making decisions, phronesis is about the practical wisdom to realize 
values.  Realizing values starts with being aware of the values.  Klamer’s approach 
reminds of Karl Weick’s (2001) ideas about sense making within organizations 
under uncertainty.  Weick illustrates that sense making is not like breaking the code 
in a game of Mastermind, but more like designing a map to make the world 
understandable from the perspective and the purpose of the maker (Weick, 2001, p. 
9).  Yet, decision making in neoclassical economics does resemble a game of 
mastermind, in which one solution is available by acting rationally.  Sense making 
as cartography allows, however, many solutions because it is based on imagination 
within a social context. 
 
How does Klamer’s notion of values relate to McCloskey’s approach of virtue 
ethics?  Klamer says that consciousness of the seven virtues for discovering and 
realizing values is “most helpful for doing the right thing (Klamer, 2014, p. 26).”  
Klamer and McCloskey obviously agree in their criticism on the monistic approach 
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of neoclassical economics, which reduces prudence to calculating utilities.  
According to Klamer, virtue ethics, as discussed in the Chapter 4, is a part of the 
deliberation about ethics and relates to values: 
 
One is that virtue is a value that someone has internalized and enacts.  The second 
is that virtuous action aims at the middle ground between two extremes, and the 
third is that judging virtuous behaviour requires situational knowledge (Klamer, 
2009, p.453). 
Where do McCloskey and Klamer differ?  Klamer seems to pursue a Socratic 
approach to value, an approach to discover what is important.  McCloskey’s 
account of virtue ethics (2006) proposes seven virtues which are essential for a 
fulfilling life. 
Klamer (2014) seemingly stresses the oikos, which may resembles the virtue of 
love the most, and phronesis, practical wisdom, while McCloskey seeks to balance 
the seven virtues.  Further, Klamer applies phronesis to the practice of decision 
making within families and organisations. 
   
Both McCloskey’s virtue approach and Klamer’s value approach can compensate 
the lack in epistemological strength of investment theory.  McCloskey’s approach 
tries to ensure a balanced approach by reminding us of all the seven virtues, 
Klamer’s approach is a way of sense making for individuals at home or in an 
organisation, and is embedded in the virtues that McCloskey proposes.  Both 
approaches stimulate conscious thinking about decision making.  For the practical 
purpose of making investment decisions, formulating values within a virtue ethics 
context is important, though the starting point is insight and honesty about the 
epistemological weakness of mainstream investment theory.  Merely reformulating 
the implicit dogma’s of investment theory as values would be a mistake, and 
strengthen the received view of investment theory. 
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5.3: Methodology of the Investigation of the Culture of 
Investing 
The analysis of culture helps to explain the behaviour of investors.  The central 
claim of the dissertation that predictability does not apply to investing, raises the 
questions why investors hold on to their practices of prediction, and what 
constitutes the practices of investors, seen through the perspective of culture.  In 
the following the methodology of the investigation of the culture of investing will 
substantiated. 
 
Culture of Dutch Professional Investors 
The current Chapter aims to describe the culture of investing by investigating the 
culture of the Dutch professional investors.  Though investing often becomes a part 
of the popular culture during a boom in the stock market, professional investors at 
Dutch institutions manage the largest part of the investments of private individuals 
in the Netherlands.  At the end of 2014, Dutch pension funds manage 1.209 billion 
euro, that is 88% of the total invested amount of 1.379 billion euros of Dutch 
private individuals and organizations (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2014).  Some 2.000 
investment professionals work at Dutch financial institutions as measured by the 
combined number of members of the Dutch Association for Investment 
Professionals and the CFA Society Netherlands (‘Vereniging voor 
Beleggingsanalisten’ and ‘CFA Society Netherlands’).  Investment professionals 
are specialized, they can be for example an Asset Liability Management specialist, 
a fund manager or an analyst for segments within equities, bonds, credits or private 
equity, a strategist, a risk manager, or a performance analyst.  In spite of the 
specializations of investment professionals, the Chapter aims to identify what the 
investors share in their culture, instead of investigating the differences between the 
specializations. 
 
In the practice of investment management, prediction and stochastical prediction 
are variations on a theme.  A stochastical prediction is a product of scientific 
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refinement, which is simplified into two dimensions in Markowitz’s portfolio 
theory and the CAPM, or into one dimension, such as a quantitative strategy that 
tries to benefit from an anomaly of the efficient market hypothesis.  A one 
dimensional prediction can also be grounded on less complicated statistics such as 
long term data, a theory of valuation, technical analysis, expectations of future 
economic growth, investment themes, or the central bank policy.   
Ethnography includes Personal Observations 
The method of ethnography is an appropriate way to perform an investigation into 
the culture of a community:   
Ethnography is the art and science of describing a group or culture. The 
description may be of a small tribal group in some exotic land or of a classroom in 
middle-class suburbia. The ethnographer writes about the routine, daily lives of 
people. The more predictable patterns of human thought and behavior are the 
focus of inquiry (Fetterman, 2015, p. 184). 
Ethnography is a form of qualitative research and implies that the researcher is a 
part of the community to be observed, and that the researcher conducts interviews 
and studies documents (Bryman & Bell, 2011/2003, p. 426).  For example, 
Hammersley & Atkinson (1983) take a similar view of ethnography.  In the 
investigation I adopt Klamer’s framework to focus on values and conversations.  
The ethnographic method is needed because the values of investors are hidden and 
have to interpreted, and the conversations of investors have to be witnessed to be 
typified.   
The ethnographic method grounds on the insider’s view, the personal experience, 
which makes sense since: “[…] climbing unknown mountains is safer with native 
guides […] (Magala, 2004, p. 8).”  My experience as an investment professional in 
the Netherlands will be a source of investigation.  In my professional life I have for 
the last 20 years been working in investment management as an investment 
advisor, analyst, and researcher.  I performed my research activities for a large part 
at the Dutch fund manager Robeco.  For the last 10 years, I have been working at 
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Dutch pension funds as an investment and risk manager.  In this role, I have 
become very familiar with the way Dutch investment professionals behave and 
argue.  Using my experience has at the same time the possible objection of a 
personal bias.  The investigation uses, however, a variety of sources, that is 
interviews, literature, and the material of the dissertation, which are assumed to 
balance the analysis. 
Interviews 
Besides participative observation, interviews are a source of ethnographic 
investigation.  I conducted a number of interviews with professional investors in 
the Netherlands which serve as background material for the investigation into 
culture.  In ethnographic research finding ‘key actors’ is essential to gain insight 
into the culture of a group: 
Some people are more articulate and culturally sensitive than others.  These 
individuals make excellent key actors or informants.  [….].  Key actors require 
careful selection.  They are rarely perfect representatives of the group.  However, 
they are usually members of the mainstream – otherwise, they would not have 
access to up-to-date cultural information.  Key actors may be cultural brokers, 
straddling two cultures.  This position may give them a special vantage point and 
objectivity about their culture (Fetterman, 2015, p. 187). 
 The interviewees chosen can be regarded as such key actors in the Dutch world of 
institutional investors.  They are experts on innovative approaches in investing, and 
try to cope with the problems of stochastical prediction or the culture of investing 
in general.  The choice for focussing the interviews on experts on innovative 
approaches has the advantage of gaining a contrasting expert view on investing and 
thereby on its culture.  At the same time, it is also relevant for the dissertation to 
find how the investment practice handles uncertainty in others ways than 
prescribed by investment theory and other traditional investment practices.   
Concerning the interviews, a qualitative, semi-structured approach has being taken.  
Its intention is to get ‘rich’ answers (Bryman & Bell, 2011/2003, p. 467).  Rich 
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answer are useful because values and culture are hidden.  To validate the 
interviews, the resulting text of the interview has been reviewed by the interviewee.  
In the following the interview questions are presented: 
1.  How would you describe your investment approach, and which 
elements play an important role in your approach?  
2.  What is the difference of your approach with the standard investment 
approach based on modern investment theory by Dutch institutional 
investors?  
3.  How did you come to your investment approach?  
4.  Which parts of the non-mainstream investment theory are neglected in 
investment practices?  
5.  How important is statistics for your approach, and what role do 
statistics play?  
6.  To what extent does your approach predicts returns or results of the 
investment process?  
7.  What are your experiences with your approach in the institutional 
practice?  
8.  How could the existing culture of investing be changed in your opinion?  
9.  To what values or virtues should investors pay more attention in their 
investment decisions in the future? 
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A particular study of internal documents could also have been a part of the 
ethnographic investigation.  I have not explicitly used the source of internal 
documents, because such documents are undisclosed.  Though, as an insider I am 
very familiar with such internal documents and as such, the documents function as 
background knowledge. 
Literature on the Culture of Investing 
The investigation into the culture of investing is, however, not necessarily 
restricted to the ethnographic method.  I will for example also refer to literature on 
investing to enrich the notion of the culture of investing.  The literature of De 
Goede (2005), Preda (2006), Galbraith (1954), and Shiller (2000) is well suited for 
the culture of investing.  The purpose of discussing their books is to typify the 
culture of investing, and discover the values and conversations of investors.  The 
works of De Goede (2005) and Preda (2006) investigate the inception of the 
current investment theory and its contrast with the earlier notion of investing as 
gambling.  De Goede en Preda were also treated in the Chapter 2 about the history 
of investment theory.  Galbraith (1954) wrote a telling book about the stock market 
crash of 1929 and its aftermath.  Shiller (2000) has investigated bubbles on 
financial markets and their (cultural) causes.  The other Chapters of the dissertation 
are, of course, a relevant source as well.  To my knowledge, there is no literature 
on the culture of Dutch professional investors at pension funds. 
 
Because I focus on the culture of Dutch professional investors at pension funds, I 
will not discuss the literature that discusses the culture of investment banking, that 
is the culture that is associated with the culture of ‘Wall Street’.  Though both 
Dutch professional investors at pension funds and investment bankers deal with 
financial markets, the culture of Wall Street is in my opinion not representative for 
Dutch professional investors: a pension funds and a commercial American or 
global investment bank differ in the type of environment.  The reader interested in 
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the culture of Wall Street is referred to Michael Lewis (1989, 2010), Gillian Tett 
(2009), and Karin Ho (2009). 
 
Pitfalls of an Investigation into Culture 
In a paragraph about the methodology of the investigation of the culture of a group, 
the notion of culture as such needs to be discussed as well.  In the following, the 
notion of culture will be discussed along the lines of McSweeney’s criticism (2002) 
of Hofstede’s (1997) cross-cultural approach.  Though McSweeney’s criticism is 
directed against Hofstede’s methodology of cross-cultural research, it can be 
helpful for the current investigation because his criticism has a number of 
generalizable elements.  McSweeney’s (2002) criticisms, complemented with 
views of Magala (2005) and Morgan (2006), and including my response, are 
summarized below: 
• Other factors than culture can explain actions (McSweeney, 2002, p. 109).  
Instead of culture, other explaining factors of the behaviour of investors 
could be the need to make a living, the commercial or bureaucratic ends of 
an organization, power relations, constitutional arrangements, or peer 
group pressure.  My Response: I consider culture as a metaphor, a 
constitutive perspective of looking at phenomena (Morgan, 1986).  Though 
Morgan focusses on the culture of organizations, instead of a professional 
group such as investors, his ideas are helpful in understanding culture as a 
means of investigation.  Morgan (2006/1986, pp. 140-147) identifies as 
strong points of the metaphor of culture that it focusses on symbols, 
identifies shared values and beliefs, and promotes the notion of social 
construction.  The danger of using the metaphor of culture might be that 
‘everything’ is explained by culture.  Yet, the point of using a metaphor is 
that it is appropriate, not that it could prevent other ways of seeing.  The 
limitations of the metaphor of culture will in the dissertation be balanced 
by the outcomes of the other approaches applied, such as the rhetoric and 
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the history of investment theory, the philosophy of statistics, the economics 
of uncertainty, and, the mainstream and alternative theories of investing.   
 
• Assuming one uniform culture would disregard the diversity within the 
culture (McSweeney, 2002, pp. 95-96).  My response: Dutch professional 
investors are a rather heterogeneous group, and the outcome of the 
investigation does not deny diversity within the culture.  The cultural 
picture of investing will, of course, always remain a generalization.  Yet, 
the point of the investigation is to deliver a persuasive picture of the 
dominant culture of investing.   
 
• Culture is an elusive subject to grasp (McSweeney, 2002, p. 108).  His 
advice is to be careful to take the outcomes of an investigation as being the 
culture.  My Response: a concept such as a culture can be interpreted in 
many ways; the interpretation of the concept of culture does not differ from 
that of concepts such as freedom, rationality or truth.  So, the culture does 
indeed not exist.  Klamer provides a clear approach to the culture of 
economics by focusing on values and conversations, which he finds 
relevant to economics: he does not seem to claim that values and 
conversations describe the entire culture and differs in that respect from 
Hofstede’s approach. 
 
• Beliefs are not stable, but depend on the situation: so culture interacts with 
the changes in the environment, it is therefore dynamic (Magala, 2005, p. 
9).  My Response: in the literature review the inception of the current 
culture of investing and the culture of investors at the time of the crash of 
1929 will be treated.  One can wonder whether the culture of professional 
investors could become instable easily after all the financial and other 
crises that it has survived; as I see it, the culture of investing and its destiny 
root in the continuance of our liberal, free market society.   
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5.4: Personal Observations 
In line with the tradition of participatory research in ethnography, I will use my 
observations about investment management to construct a picture of the culture of 
investing.  The picture has gradually formed as it took time to gain insight into the 
epistemological flaws of investment theory and practice.  In 1991, I obtained an 
MSc in finance (in Dutch: drs.), and in 1999, I finished the postgraduate VBA-
education, the Dutch CFA-equivalent for becoming an investment and financial 
analyst.  In my professional life I have for the last 20 years been working in 
investment management as an investment advisor, analyst, and researcher.  My 
research activities I performed for a large part at the Dutch fund manager Robeco.  
For the last 10 years, I have been working at Dutch pension funds as an investment 
and risk manager.   
 
My research interest in investment theory has been in the mathematical-statistical 
analysis of investment problems after I had written a Master thesis on alternative 
risk measures in Modern Portfolio Theory.  Besides my interest in finance, I am 
also attracted to arts.  In 2010, I completed a BA in Philosophy.  My dissertation 
combines my interest in finance and philosophy.  Besides having been a researcher 
with a mathematical-statistical bent and an interest in philosophy, I worked as an 
investment strategist and equity analyst, and have been advising clients on 
investing.  Working in the practice of investment management and having analysed 
investment theory for practice, has taught me about investment theory, investment 
management, and the culture of investing. 
  
My first experience in the practice of investing was as an investment advisor for 
private individuals at the ING Bank.  At that time in the second half of the 90s, 
share prices rose sharply: I was advising in the middle of a bull market.  To be an 
investment advisor, one had to be in command of the arguments for buying stocks 
in general (the positive returns in the past, the optimistic outlook) and for buying 
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specific stocks (what to buy and why), understand the investment instruments such 
as bonds and options, and importantly, follow the news and interpret the stock 
market.  Being an investment advisor was all about information, interpretation, talk 
and persuasion.  Besides the ideas about investing from the bank, the diversity of 
clients such as entrepreneurs, professors, and public accountants, taught me 
different pictures of investing.  The ideas about investing ranged from: 
 
• investing is mere speculation, the market is autonomous: the irrationality 
argument 
• the investment advisors knows better because they had time to study the 
market: the information argument,  
• investing was about timing, about being smarter than others: the timing 
argument, 
• investing was about a rational top-down allocation: the rational 
construction argument 
• a patient long-term approach to investing leads to the best results: the long 
term argument. 
 
In the 90s, after a long period of price increases, most investors did not believe that 
stock prices could fall deeply.  An older investment advisor warned me that 
investment advising was a cyclical business: he had experienced the bear market of 
the 70s with the oil crisis and the high inflation.  Despite knowing about the 
episode, I could not imagine a bear stock market in the future.  If the stock prices 
fell, it was an opportunity to buy, to buy on the dips.  Some investors were caught 
by the folly of the stock market.  I had lengthy discussions whether buying call 
options with a long horizon was a better idea than buying the underlying stocks.  
Indeed, on the premise of rising stock prices, leverage pays off.  Buying call 
options with a long horizon did, of course, not turn out to be a good idea in the 
longer run.  As an investment advisor, I have gained experience with the practice of 
selecting stocks for a portfolio.  My experience was that the strategies based on 
204 
 
value, growth, themes, sectors or whatever often turn out differently than expected 
beforehand, for example other shares performed better (such as IT stocks in those 
days), the portfolio contained the wrong stocks within the sectors, or the nature of a 
stock or whole sector changed.   
 
In 1997 I became an equity analyst.  I was convinced that being an analyst I could 
better predict stock prices, because I would get a better understanding of the 
companies involved.  After a number of analyses of stocks, however, it appeared to 
me that more knowledge about a company did not lead to superior ideas about the 
future performance of a stock.  The translation from analysis to advice was often 
done by rules of thumb, about for example price-earnings ratio compared to 
expected growth rates, which could be made without the analysis as well.  In order 
to work as an analyst, you have to believe in the idea that the work has value, or at 
least you must have fun in studying companies.   
 
So in 1999, I continued my career as an investment analyst at the Dutch fund 
manager Robeco.  As an investment analyst, I had the opportunity to explore the 
mathematical-statistical part of investment theory, and apply it to practice.  I have 
thought about questions such as: ‘How does time relate to risk in investing?’, ‘Are 
options useful in asset allocation?’, ‘How is risk perceived?’, ‘How to measure 
risk?’, ‘Does diversification pay off?’, ‘How to establish an expectation for future 
returns?’  I experienced that the mathematical-statistical approach delivers insight 
about the mechanisms it studies, which has value as a way of interpretation, 
understanding.  I have also learned that the investment industry upholds a number 
of myths that seem to be believed by most investment professionals.  I mention a 
number of them below: 
 
• A long investment horizon diminishes risk.  Yet, investment risks are not 
smaller but larger with a long horizon, unlike what is often thought.  As 
explained in Chapter 2, risks adds up on a longer horizon: the notion of 
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more risk opposes the belief of investors that getting results from investing 
is merely of matter of time.   
 
• The diversification of investments is the key to reducing risk.  But the 
effects of diversification within and across asset classes is a myth: in times 
of crisis, it will not work because the correlations between the asset classes 
converge to 1.  Moreover, the rationale behind the low correlation 
coefficients is often not based on economic rationale. 
 
• In the long term an investment portfolio will achieve its expected return.  If 
the expected risk and return could be estimated, then it is unlikely that the 
expected return on equity is achieved in the long term.  Expected returns 
are almost never met simply following the theory of statistics. Suppose we 
know that the expected return on equity is 10%, then the probability is 50% 
(at each horizon) that the return is 10% or more.  However, a yield of less 
than 10% also has a probability of 50%. 
 
In the beginning of the 2000s, the bubble in the stock market started to burst.  For 
the first time, I started to doubt that investing in stocks would always lead to a 
superior return above bonds.  Since the bursting of the internet bubble and the three 
bad years of 2001-2003, I finally lost the belief that stocks would always yield 
more than bonds.  The belief that stocks yield more than bonds, appeared to be an 
unconscious assumption of the investment world and its theory.  I had realized that 
the equity premium above risk-free bonds was uncertain, and possibly not even 
positive.  Obviously, personal experience changes beliefs. 
 
At that time it seemed to me that investing in a broadly diversified investment fund 
was a better idea than investing in a particular portfolio.  But I no longer believed 
in an active policy of the fund manager of the fund.  No doubt, fund managers 
themselves believe that they can outperform the market, of course, if you do not 
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believe that, you cannot be part of the culture of investing.  I remember that a fund 
manager was under pressure, because one of the flagship funds under his 
management, underperformed for a number of years.  The fund manager asked, in 
order to cope with the criticism in the weekly meeting of fund managers and 
research analysts: “Who does not believe in outperformance?”  Of the some 100 
people in the meeting room nobody raised his hand (me neither).  The fund 
manager thus concluded: ‘Fine, so that issue is settled.’ If we all believed in 
outperformance, than the flagship fund would be all right, if merely given some 
time.  It would have been possible to raise my hand in that meeting, but in the 
culture of investing at an active manager, that would have been unwise.  You have 
to believe in outperformance to be part of the culture of investing at a fund 
manager.   
 
I also have been an investment strategist at the fund manager, while continuing to 
do analytical work.  Maybe, the perspective of looking at the financial markets as a 
whole including the economy, and trying to say meaningful things about it, could 
improve my insight in the financial markets.  As an investment strategist, getting a 
clue about the direction of the economy was the key thing: it was all about the 
business cycle, recessions, and the central bank decisions about interest rates.  But 
also was being an strategist broad and eclectic, for example about Minsky’s model 
of boom and bust, societal trends, innovation, politics, and models composed of 
indicators about valuation, technical analysis, momentum and the like.  Yet, despite 
that it was interesting to study economic phenomena, it did again not take long for 
me to conclude that the development of the economy is not predictable, just like 
the financial markets.   
 
Since 2005, I work as an advisor to the board of a pension fund about investment 
and risk decisions.  I have, for example, participated in more than 100 meetings of 
investment committees in which professional investors and trustee participated.  In 
such meeting the investment policy is discussed, varying from Asset Liability 
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Management studies which support the long term asset allocation decisions to short 
term tactical decision making, with discussion about what the economy, the stock 
market or the interest rate would going to do.   My observation is that the culture of 
investing of pension funds in the Netherlands is not that different from the 
investment culture of a commercial fund manager.  The biggest difference is that 
commercial reasons can influence the behaviour of investors at a fund manager: it 
can push people to be more optimistic about investing.  Another observation is that 
the changing of the investment climate after the crisis of 2008 did not really change 
the culture of investing.   
 
To summarize my ideas about the beliefs of the institutional investment community 
in the Netherlands: 
 
1. Optimism that stocks will outperform bonds.  The optimism continues in a 
bear market 
2. More general: the economy and the financial market will return to an 
equilibrium 
3. It is possible to outperform a market index, but it takes expert knowledge 
4. It is possible to predict the market, but it takes expert knowledge 
 
Due to personal character traits, some professionals in the investment world will 
leverage the beliefs.  When asked individually, investment professionals will 
probably take interest in my views, but for reasons of culture, conformity, income, 
status and position they cannot express their doubts in public as it places them 
outside the community.   
5.5: Literature on the Culture of Investing  
The purpose of discussing literature is to typify the culture of investing, and 
discover the values and conversations of investors.  The works of De Goede (2005) 
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and Preda (2006) investigate the inception of the current investment theory.  
Galbraith (1954) wrote about the stock market crash of 1929 and its aftermath.  
Shiller (2000) has investigated bubbles on financial markets and their (cultural) 
causes.   
The perspective that financial markets resemble gambling is old, witnessed by the 
De la Vega’s (1688) eyewitness report of the Amsterdam Exchange in the 17th 
century.  Yet, nowadays investing is not perceived as gambling because it has a 
rationale, arguments to believe that it is worthwhile.  Finance is now seen as a 
respectable scientific and societal subject, instead of as gambling, and at times 
associated with fraud and manipulation.  The change of perception of finance from 
gambling to a rational activity took time and was forced by the emergence of the 
financial markets, of which the actors needed respectability (De Goede, 2005, p. 
48). 
An often heard argument in the conversation about investing is that idle money on 
a savings account should be replaced by investments, because the money should, 
instead of doing nothing, be activated in the financial market.  In the financial 
market, money can be put to work.  De Goede underpins that the distinction of 
finance and gambling is merely political, ideological, instead of based on the nature 
of financial markets: 
Like statistics, modern (financial) rationality is not wholly secular and 
disinterested, but is premised upon faith in a divine or cosmological order (De 
Goede, 2005, p. 114). 
She identifies a transcendental justification of investing, which is based on faith, on 
optimism that capital invested in the stock market always will accumulate.  
Interestingly enough, she also regards statistics as a transcendental faith. 
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Preda has described the process of the transformation of the notion of investing in 
detail.  In France in the 1860s investing in stocks is associated with gambling, but 
how could investing in stocks be legitimized (Preda, 2006, p. 151)?  The 
legitimization of investing in stocks is done by vernacular science.  The vernacular 
science of financial investments attempts to dispose the unethical connotation of 
investing by turning it into a rational and partly scientific object, in which 
information becomes the most important aspect (Preda, 2006, p. 150). 
Vernacular science uses among other things the analogy of financial markets with 
physics and engineering, and adapts the idea of rational behaviour as the guideline 
for stock holders.  Rational behaviour in the form of self-control and the study of 
information, is promoted as the key to successful investing.  A part of vernacular 
science results in the efficient market theory because it includes probabilistic and 
abstract reasoning.  The perspective that financial markets can be managed by a 
scientific approach is enforced since ‘modern’ finance emerged in the 1960s.   
Galbraith’s The Great Crash 1929: The Classic Study of that Disaster offers 
insight into the culture investing in the 20th century.  The magnitude of the stock 
market crash of 1929 compares with the consequences on the financial markets 
following the credit crisis of 2008.  In the opinion of Galbraith (1992/1954, p. 9), 
regulation nor ethics will end the boom and bust cycle, he advocates to keep the 
history of the cycle of boom and bust alive by retelling the story how investors 
came to believe in the illusion that the stock market is an utopia in which stock 
prices continue to rise: 
For protecting people from the cupidity of others and their own, history is highly 
utilitarian.  It sustains memory and memory serves the same purpose as the S.E.C. 
and, on the record, is far more effective (Galbraith, 1992/1954, p. 11). 
The metaphor that financial markets are bubbles, highlights the danger of the 
financial markets.  Socially constructed optimism regularly pervades the culture of 
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investing.  Some phenomenon causes, though not justifies, the optimism: “[…] 
speculation does not depend entirely on the capacity for self-delusion (ibid., p. 
33).” In a boom time, the culture of investing is a part of the popular culture.  A 
condition for a boom is that investors have trust: 
Such a feeling of trust is essential for a boom.  When people are cautious, 
questioning, misanthropic, suspicious, or mean, they are immune to speculative 
enthusiasms (Galbraith, 1992/1954, p. 188). 
Besides trust, a boom needs prosperity: ample resources have to be available to be 
invested (ibid., p. 188).   
The optimism of investors in a boom, makes being negative on the outlook of the 
stock market a taboo.  Galbraith experienced the taboo personally: he received 
various threats of physical violence after he testified in 1955 at a congressional 
hearing that the stock market crash of 1929 could repeat itself, at which the stock 
market reacted negatively (ibid., p. 17).  The threats received are an obvious 
reaction to breaking a taboo because the declining stock market threatened 
investors’s optimism.  The culture of investing combines personal interest and 
pressure of the group, and rejects critics: 
Clearly, given the nature of the euphoric mood and the vested interest therein, the 
critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, not to say applause.  
To summarize: The euphoric episode is protected and sustained by the will of 
those who are involved, in order to justify the circumstances that are making them 
rich. And it is equally protected by the will to ignore, exorcise or condemn those 
who express doubts (Galbraith, A Short History of Financial Euphoria, in The 
Essential Galbraith, 2001, p. 254). 
People just want to believe they can get rich.  And some investors do get rich, if 
they manage to sell their stocks before the market collapses. 
A part of the culture of investing is that its optimism cannot afford doubts.  
Therefore no forecaster is easily held accountable for his optimism.  An exception 
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was, as told in Chapter 2, Irving Fisher, who is even nowadays remembered for his 
unfortunate prediction in October 1929 before the crash that “stock prices have 
reached what looks like a permanent high plateau (Dimand, 2007, p. 45).”  As a 
matter of culture, the sayings of experts are part of the ritual of investing. 
Shiller (2000) is an opponent of the efficient market theory and elaborates on 
culture in Irrational Exuberance.  The public generally expects stocks to deliver a 
positive return in the long run, an expectation based on the views of experts and 
other people: 
It is still very much the conventional wisdom today that for investor whose 
horizons are years long, the stock market cannot disappoint.  People modify their 
sense of this conventional wisdom only slowly as they hear expert opinion from 
time to time, hear others say ‘they say that …,’ and hear others express approval or 
disapproval of these opinions (Shiller, 2001/2000, p. xiv). 
The optimism of investment experts that the market goes up in the long run, is 
based on background facts, which are not disputed (ibid., p. xv).  The interesting 
thing is that after a crash the optimism remains (ibid, p. xvi).  The remaining 
optimism is typically a cultural phenomenon of investing, a value that guides 
investors as they perform their cultural program. 
The media offers support for the optimism about the stock market, which is by 
closer inspection performed by a typical conversation in which the interviewer asks 
critical questions and is reassured by the interviewee (ibid, p. xv): 
Interviewers and investment professionals sometimes seem to play a sort of 
rhetorical game on television that plays out pretty predictable to be supportive of 
the market.  The interviewer asks dark questions about whether the market might 
conceivably do very badly, blunt questions posed as if to get an answer with the 
plain, unvarnished truth.  The interviewee answers in an assuring, confident, 
professional manner about the great longer-run outlook for the market, about the 
importance of not being unsettled by short-run fluctuations, and about the benefits 
of holding firm to a long-run investment strategy.  The interviewer establishes his 
or her news-media credibility as pressing hard for the truth, but given the typical 
choice of interviewee, the interview closes on a suitable upbeat note (Shiller, 
2001/2000, p. xv). 
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The point of the long citation is that, in my view, it could be a conversation 
between a client and an investment expert or advisor as well, and could be typical 
for the culture of investors.  The client could be less critical than the interviewer 
but nevertheless worried, and is being reassured.   
The media play a decisive role in the culture of investing.  Though they look like 
objective observers, they spread the ideas about the markets.  Media compete about 
the attention of the public and want to keep that attention (ibid, p. 72).  How can 
they do that?  The news has to be interesting and preferably be a continuing story.  
The stock market is a source of continuing information, just like sport.  Thus, the 
media need the stock market to capture the attention of the public, which cannot 
get enough of news about the stock market during the boom days and when 
financial disaster strikes.  Markets are, however, not moved by the news as you 
would expect markets to be.  Shiller explores the crash of 1987 as a case study and 
finds that no significant news could be discovered as the cause of the crash (Shiller, 
2001/2000, p. 88).  News is brought because the public wants explanations.  The 
media also help promote the optimism of the stock market, because that is the story 
that the public wants to hear. 
Another point of culture is that in the good times of the stock market a belief exists 
that a new era has come, which elevates growth forecasts to a higher level, and 
underpins rising stock market levels and valuations such as price to earnings (ibid., 
p xxii).   
5.6: Innovative Case 1 The Management of Investment Risk 
The culture of investing is heterogeneous, also because innovation takes place in 
investment practice.  The innovations of interest here is how practice constructively 
handles the uncertainty of investing.  The current paragraphs will treat the ideas 
and practices of three investment professionals in the institutional part of the Dutch 
financial sector dealing with mainly pension funds.  Each of the interviewees has 
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an innovative way of dealing with the problems of the epistemology of investment 
theory, i.e. the stochastical unpredictability of future returns and the culture which 
holds on to the practices of investing.  The interviews serve as background material 
for the investigation into culture. 
 
Introduction Theo Kocken 
Theo Kocken is Professor of Risk Management for Institutional Investors at the 
VU University Amsterdam.  After working as a risk manager at ING and 
Rabobank, he became in 2000 a founder and CEO of Cardano, a Dutch company 
which performs risk management services for the financial sector such as pension 
funds.  In 2007 an asset and risk management branch of Cardano in the United 
Kingdom was launched.  Currently Cardano employs some 150 people (Cardano, 
2015).  Cardano’s risk management approach aims to avoid excessive risk taking.  
What ‘excessive’ means, depends, of course, on the theory of risk that Cardano 
applies.  Besides servicing risk management for pension funds, the firm advises for 
example about the design of pension fund schemes and the distribution of risk 
between generations.  The text following is based on my interview with Kocken, 
conducted on 9 February 2015, and is completed with additional information from 
the literature and other sources. 
Risk Management  
When Kocken was 30 years old and head of market risk at ING, a large Dutch 
financial institution, he had experienced that financial markets in South America 
suddenly could collapse and that past statistics cannot predict such cases.  The 
experience made him reflect on the usefulness of Markowitz’s portfolio theory and 
of statistics for the risk management of financial markets.  A story that he has 
frequently told at seminars about risk management illustrates why Value at Risk-
models (VaR) are still being used despite their flaws.  A VaR-model is based on 
portfolio theory and measures the maximum absolute or relative risk within two or 
three standard deviations of the current value of an investment.  Financial 
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institutions worldwide practice the method of VaR.  As risk manager he calculated 
the VaR of a certain portfolio on a 99% confidence interval for a 10-day horizon, 
which was mandatory for the De Nederlandsche Bank (the Dutch central bank, for 
short DNB).  For ING, however, he conducted a stress test for the same portfolio 
with a significantly higher outcome than the VaR for DNB.  Yet, DNB did not use 
the higher level of possible loss as proposed by Kocken, not because they did not 
understand or disagreed to his interpretation of the risks, but because they had to 
conform to the supervisory rules.  The conversations with DNB about how to 
estimate risk were an eye-opener for him; intelligent professionals seem to have to 
neglect common sense because usual practices dominate.   
Kocken (1997) has formulated an alternative, innovative approach of risk 
management in his book about risk management for financial institutions.  The 
book treats, among other things, subjects such as value at risk and the risks of 
options.  Yet, one chapter of the book, that is chapter 7 about stress testing and the 
measurement of event risk, differs from the usual view about risk management 
centred on the VaR-approach.  The reason for including stress tests in his book is 
that VaR underestimates risk.  Kocken calls the phenomenon ‘the Value at Risk 
paradox’: the VaR-model does not function when it is needed most, that is in times 
of crisis when risks materializes (Kocken, 2010/1997).  The stock market crash of 
1987 demonstrated risks in the form of standard deviations of 10 times and more, 
which the VaR-model merely did expect to happen once in a period from the big 
bang until now (ibid., p. 213).  One of the reasons that VaR-models fail in times of 
a financial crisis is the assumption that returns are normally distributed.  Though 
VaR-modelers have tried to incorporate non-normality, in practice the VaR-models 
remain too optimistic.   
So, why do his stress test demonstrate a higher possible loss then the VaR-model?  
The higher loss originates from rare events, which are no part of past data on which 
the VaR-models are based.  For example, Brady Bonds (restructured bank loans of 
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mainly South American countries) can behave normally for twenty years, but then 
suddenly collapse by 80%.  The collapse of the Argentinian peso is another 
example in which past statistics are meaningless, because if the Argentinian peso is 
decoupled from the American dollar, past statistics based on a coupling of the two 
currencies are no longer representative.  Kocken thought a decrease of 50 to 60% 
possible in the cases mentioned.  Interestingly, professionals in the financial world 
have often reacted that stress testing is not scientific, because it is based on 
economic judgment, and not on statistics.  The received view of risk management 
practitioners expresses the ideas of modernistic science, which have been discussed 
at length in the current dissertation.  Kocken’s approach of stress testing 
(2010/2007, p. 223) involves a casuistic approach based among other things on 
macroeconomic and political research, and demands experienced and creative risk 
managers. 
Besides that the tail risks in financial markets are bigger than expected by the users 
of conventional investment theory, diversification does not function either in a 
crisis on financial markets.  Diversification does not function because correlations 
tend to move towards their maximum of 1 in a crisis, which means that no 
diversification benefit is left.  The accepted theory, however, is Markowitz’s theory 
of diversification, which has proven to be naïve if merely backed by past statistics 
instead of an economic rationale.  An example of diversification with an economic 
rationale is TCX (the currency exchange fund), which is supported by Cardano 
Development (a branch of Cardano).  The fund provides loans in local currency to 
entrepreneurs in countries in West Africa, East Africa, Central Asia, and South 
America.  The fund hedges the local currency risks by diversifying 50 currencies, 
which are statistically independent because the dynamics of the countries involved 
differ.  Such an economic rationale for diversification does not exist for stocks and 
bonds of the US and Europe, because in a crisis the markets of the US and Europa 
move in the same direction.  
216 
 
A Economic Explanation of the Failing of Portfolio Theory 
Concerning economics, Kocken (2012) advocates the theory of Hyman Minsky 
which is also of importance for risk management.  Minsky’s theory (1982) sketches 
the causes of economic instability that lead to a worldwide depression.  Minsky 
stresses that the economy and financial markets do not tend to an equilibrium as 
neo-classical economics and finance propose, but that the economy and financial 
markets are inherently instable:  
Minsky realised that our economy was anything but a system where external 
shocks from outside our assumedly stable economy are processed by the economy 
until equilibrium is re-established.  In fact, the world works exactly the other way 
round. Big unexpected external shocks may be troublesome, but they are not the 
reason behind real deep depressions.  The major destabilising moves are created 
internally, from within the economy.  A process that keeps repeating itself, hence 
the name endogenous instability.  It is those endogenously created moves that lead 
to depressions (Kocken, 2012, p. 7). 
The instability is created by superfluous lending which fuels optimism, and will 
eventually lead to an endogenous crisis.  See also Chapter 2 of the dissertation in 
which the theory of bubbles is explained.  The policy applied by the central banks 
to act on recessions by lowering the interest rate, postpones and thereby aggravates 
the crisis.   
Kocken relates the optimism of investors to the behavioural bias of the affect 
heuristic: 
This is partially due to overconfidence but is also supported by the ‘affect 
heuristic’, as researched by Paul Slovic: when people have a good feeling about 
the returns of the markets, their perception of the risks in the markets is lower.   
This is exactly what we saw during many crises in the past: the more risk 
accumulated (exploding stock and house prices etc.), the lower the volatility in the 
markets (Rosenberg & Kocken, 2013, p. 31). 
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A Behavioural Explanation of the Failing of Portfolio Theory 
Kocken has found behavioural finance illuminating as a source of explanation why 
professionals continue to use models based on portfolio theory; endogenous 
instability can be explained by behavioural finance as well.  In his inaugural lecture 
(2012) as a Professor of Risk Management for Institutional Investors at the VU 
University Amsterdam, he combined Minsky’s theory of economic instability 
(1982) with the insights of behavioral finance, which are directed at individual 
behaviour.   
A number of behavioural biases are central to explaining why investment and risk 
professionals carry on with the models of portfolio theory.  The first one is 
ambiguity aversion as described by Ellsberg (1961): people dislike uncertainty and 
prefer a presentation which is more elaborate (also see Chapter 3 of the 
dissertation, in which Ellsberg’s views are discussed).  Risk professionals arguably 
understand the criticism, but taking the criticism seriously would force risk 
professionals into ambiguity.  That is why risk professionals find it difficult to 
abandon models because models are their main support against uncertainty.   
The second behavioural bias is the so-called attribute substitution in which a 
problem is simplified by reducing the problem to a simpler problem, for example in 
representing the economy by a neo-classical equilibrium model or financial 
markets risk by a VaR-model: 
[…] our brain has the latent tendency to substitute complex problems with less 
complex problems.  And these less complex, though often mathematically rigorous 
problems are then resolved as a substitute solution for the complex problems.  
That is called attribute substitution (Kocken, 2012, p. 18). 
The third bias relevant to risk management is overconfidence, which paradoxically 
has the tendency to rise if the level of uncertainty is higher.  Overconfidence could 
also explain the inability to learn from financial crisis (Kocken, 2014, p. 19).  
Despite the economic depression in the 1930s, economics has embraced the 
Cartesian mathematical approach in the 1950s which does not include the 
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phenomena of depression and its causes.  Yet, the point is that mathematics does 
not support predicting in economics and finance.  Models for the calculation of 
option prices do not predict: a low implied volatility as distilled by an option 
valuation model does not mean that the volatility of the underlying asset will 
remain low.  Though, mathematics is useful for the valuation of options on 
financial markets or embedded options in pension schemes, because uncertainty 
can be articulated by the mathematics of option theory.  A further treatment here of 
embedded options would be out of scope, an example of an investigation of 
embedded options and its redistributive effects on pension funds can be found in 
Kocken (2006).   
The fourth relevant bias is the confirmation bias: the confirmation bias is the 
tendency to filter information towards a confirmation of our point of view.  It helps 
to explain why people do not always seem to learn from new information: they 
ignore the new information because it does not match earlier adopted ideas.  
How to Invest 
The assumptions of the models of Markowitz and Sharpe that probability 
distributions and correlations are known and therefore predict, are flawed.  The 
consequence is that investors following portfolio theory will become disappointed, 
because portfolio theory embeds optimistic assumptions.  Thus, investing in a more 
robust way has to be done in another way: 
And if we concede we don’t know the distributions exactly, then we should steer 
in a very different way to lead to more robust solutions (Rosenberg & Kocken, 
2013, p. 29). 
Assuming a pension fund has a clear ambition for the realization of the pensions, 
for example about the aspiration level of the indexation, then, making investment 
portfolios robust, starts with investigating what negative consequences are 
unacceptable.  In practice, the question for pension funds what level of the funding 
ratio, or level of indexation, is unacceptable, appears difficult to answer.  But, if a 
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pension fund does not answer the question what level of funding ratio is 
unacceptable, chances are that the fund has taken insufficient risk measures to 
prevent happening that the funding ratio ends up below such a disaster level.  Once 
a disaster level has been formulated, the arrangement of the investment portfolio 
has to prevent that the disaster level will be met.  To the purpose of risk 
management, 5 stress scenarios are projected on the portfolios.  The projection is 
both top-down and bottom-up.  The bottom-up projection is relevant because the 
actual implemented portfolios of the investment managers may react differently to 
the stress scenarios than the top-down portfolio strategy had assumed.  The purpose 
of the stress scenarios is to assure that the pension fund can survive the worst of the 
five scenarios.   
The Use of Options 
What is the role of derivatives in the strategy of Cardano?  Derivates can be 
applied for managing the interest and inflation risk of pension funds, but also for 
investments in stocks.  Pension funds in the Netherlands have usually a large 
amount of stocks in their portfolio.  Because of peer group pressure in the form of 
reputation risk, Dutch pension funds may find it hard to significantly lower the 
amount invested in stocks.  The investment approach favoured by Cardano, is 
performed by the Cardano UK branch: Cardano UK composes a portfolio with 
many small bets, with a small amount of stocks, and aims at a modest investment 
performance.  If an investment approach with small bets is not possible, buying put 
options offers another possibility to reduce risk.  Such downside protection with 
put options to protect a minimum value of stocks has a cost, but offers real risk 
reduction which fundamentally differs from the assumed risk reduction in portfolio 
theory.   
The cost of buying put options can reduced by combining put options with writing 
call options on the stocks involved.  A written call option means that the writer, 
that is the pension fund, receives a premium in exchange for the future delivery of 
the stocks or its financial equivalent at a certain price level.  By writing call options 
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the return of the stocks is maximized.  Combining put options with written call 
options, aka a collar, provides risk reduction if stocks have to be held in the 
investment portfolio (Van Capelleveen, Kat & Kocken, 2004).   
An example of a case in which Cardano was involved was the protection of the 
funding ratio of the Pension Fund of the Rabobank (Walschots & Capelleveen, 
2008).  The Rabobank Pension Fund acquired a hybrid protection, combining the 
coverage of interest rate risk (which stems from the long term obligations of the 
pension fund to pay pensions to the participants) and equity risk.  In technical 
terms, the pension fund engaged in an equity linked swaption collars, which 
combine a collar on both the interest rate and stocks.  It would be out of scope to 
explain the technical details of the approach, for that see Walschots and Van 
Capelleveen (2008).  The construction was applied in 2007, and proved to be 
valuable in 2008 at the time of the credit crisis.  The case of the Rabobank Pension 
Fund is rather unique, it takes courage and knowledge to execute such a protection 
strategy. 
What Should Be Done about the Current State of Finance? 
Having explained the problems with finance, a key question is how the theory and 
practice of finance can be changed.  Kocken notes that Taleb, a well-known critic 
of prediction in investing, is widely read and admired in the investment world, but 
that his ideas are not put to practice.  Why not?  Apparently, investment 
professionals are not cynical or critical enough, and are not able to think out-of-the-
box.   
An important step in changing finance is that investment and risk professionals 
must realize that their field and its praxis is flawed.  But current training ensures a 
continuation of the faith in current finance.  Therefore, Kocken has launched a 
MSc in Risk Management for Financial Institutions at the VU University 
Amsterdam.  The MSc differs from the usual quantitative approach of risk 
management and is intended for experienced professionals who have started to 
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question the quantitative approach.  The MSc in Risk Management has a 
multidisciplinary approach in which, besides assessing the regular risk models, 
consists of subjects such as psychology, philosophy, history of financial markets, 
decision making, and group dynamics.   
Besides his educational effort, Kocken engages in reaching a wider audience for 
the failing of economics and finance.  Therefore, he made the documentary Boom 
Bust Boom with Terry Jones, who was part of Monty Python, about human 
behaviour which is absent in the neoclassical economic models.  In an article about 
the documentary in Ad Valvas, he explains to the students of the Amsterdam 
University VU that “economists live in a fantasy world (Schilp, 2015, p. 1, my 
translation).”  Including human behaviour in economics as Kocken proposes, 
means to acknowledge that people imitate each other when they make decisions, 
which creates bubbles and instability.  The documentary is aimed at economists, 
policy makers and the public.  Kocken is now supporting student organizations that 
demand a more pluralist education (Rethinking Economics, Post-Crash Economics 
Society, Young Scholars Initiative of the Institute for New Economic Thinking).  
Their joint aim is to build a website for the public (its launch is targeted in the first 
quarter of 2016), explaining the economic news in laymen terms, but also offering 
different views on the underlying causes instead of one single view of ‘this is how 
it works’. 
Entrepreneurship in the financial services could change practice as well.  The risk 
management services of Cardano have been a success: Cardano provides services 
to pension funds of which the assets amount to 150 billion euro (Cardano, 2015), 
but in terms of market share, Cardano is not dominant.   
Another solution concerns the development of ideas employed in economics and 
finance.  Kocken suggests that economics and finance should engage more in 
investigating the complexity of the economy and financial markets with a bottom-
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up approach.  A bottom-up approach replaces the equilibrium analogy of physics 
by the evolution of biology, like adopted by the Santa Fe Institute.  
5.7: Innovative Case 2 Shell’s Scenarios-approach 
Introduction Peter Heijmans 
Peter Heijmans is Head of Strategy at Shell Asset Management Company 
(SAMCo).  SAMCo has some 60 billion euros of assets under management for 
defined benefit pension funds of Shell worldwide such as for the Netherlands, 
Great Britain, the United States, Austria, and Germany.  Shell, or more formally 
Royal Dutch Shell plc, is worldwide active in energy and petrochemicals, and 
employs 90.000 people in 70 countries.  Heijmans is trained as a macroeconomist 
and worked for 4.5 years at the Shell Strategy & Planning department, in the 
Scenarios team, and prior to that as an economist in the US and for the Dutch 
government.  The Strategy & Scenarios team makes scenarios about the business 
environment of Shell and is concerned with subjects such as the oil prices, the 
energy demand, the global energy system, and the global economy.   
Since August 2013 Heijmans is head of investment strategy at SAMCo.  As the 
head of strategy, Heijmans can use his experience with scenarios for the investment 
management of the pension funds of Shell.  The text following is based on my 
interview with Heijmans, completed with additional information from articles and 
other sources.  I conducted the interview with Peter Heijmans on 20 February 
2015.   
Scenarios instead of Statistics 
Shell is a pioneer in scenario-thinking and has been working with scenarios since 
the 1970s.  The attraction of scenarios is that they stress discontinuity, instead of 
the usual mechanistic claim of continuity provided by forecasting (Wilkinson & 
Kupers, 2013).  The company works with scenarios because scenarios instead of 
statistics enable to cope with uncertainty, indeed: 
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Any form of mechanical extrapolation/modelling/probability analysis is ‘an 
enemy to thinking’.   
Probabilities assume the presumption of predictive accuracy.  Scenarios are most 
powerful when they stimulate flexible and innovative thinking (Heijmans, 2014, p. 
10, his emphasis). 
For Shell the scenario-approach prohibits the usual behaviour of people when 
confronted with uncertainty: people usually dislike uncertainty and therefore ignore 
uncertainty (Shell, 2008, p. 9).  Scenarios consider the worrying parts of 
uncertainty, are story-like, and prepare new conversations: 
Decision makers can use scenarios to think about the uncertain aspects of the 
future that most worry them—or to discover the aspects about which they should 
be concerned—and to explore the ways in which these might unfold.  [….]. 
Scenarios are based on intuition, but crafted as analytical structures.  They are 
written as stories that make potential futures seem vivid and compelling.  [….]. 
Scenarios are intended to form a basis for strategic conversation—they are a 
method for considering potential implications of and possible responses to 
different events (Shell, 2008, p. 8). 
Shell has been working with scenario’s because the route from discovery to 
exploration of and distribution of energy cover long horizons, and investment in 
projects are capital intensive and irreversible (Heijmans, 2014, p. 5).   Depending 
on the subject the horizon of a scenario can stretch to 20 years for global themes 
such as mobility and cities, and more than 50 years for issues such as energy 
systems (ibid., p. 13).  With such characteristics, the traditional way of forecasting 
nudges people into a direction that seems appropriate because of our education, 
training, and current dominant ideas (ibid., p. 7).  Yet, experience shows that the 
future probably differs from such extrapolations, moreover such a focus tends to 
hinder other ways of seeing.  A detailed description of the current and past 
scenarios of Shell (see www.shell.com /scenarios) would be out of scope for the 
dissertation. 
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Investing in General 
How does Heijmans look at the role of investing for pension funds?  Investing is 
not a purpose in itself, but should be aimed at achieving the ability of SAMCo’s 
clients to fulfill their nominal liabilities and the ambition to grant indexation.  
SAMCo’s clients have a long term investment horizon.  Return is a reward to risk, 
which needs to be taken, but in a careful and sustainable way.  Diversification 
improves the trade-off between risk and return.  Active asset management can add 
value.  
Most pension funds of Shell have determined journey-plans for de-risking, mostly 
defined in terms of the funding ratio.  De-risking in this context is defined as 
reducing the investment and balance sheet risk of the pension funds, with the 
objective of reducing the likelihood of a drop in the funding ratio in the future, and 
hence reducing the likelihood of the need for increased sponsor contributions.  The 
goal is to reach a certain funding ratio threshold, at which the surplus of the fund is 
large enough to pay pension benefits including indexation for inflation.  Once in 
‘happy land’ the investments can be de-risked, because risk taking is not necessary 
anymore to reach the goal.   
Scenario Thinking Applied to Investing 
Working with scenarios differs from working with models because scenarios are 
meant to explore and models are meant to analyze.  Models for investing are based 
on historical data.  But in the future, discontinuities will appear and that makes the 
stochastic future different than assumed by the model.  The credit crisis of 2008 
illustrates the effect of discontinuity for the Dutch pension fund of Shell: the Asset 
Liability Management study (ALM-study) for the pension fund, conducted just 
before the crisis in 2008, resulted in a risk of less than 0,1% that the funding ratio 
could halve.  Yet it did happen: the funding ratio of the pension fund declined from 
180% to 80% (Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds, 2015, p. 69).  So experience 
demonstrates that it is dangerous to found the investment policy on ALM.   
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Though, an ALM-study has other qualities as it allows to identify the interests and 
risks for the various stakeholders, such as the sponsor and the participants, of the 
pension fund.  For example, if the pension fund lowers the weight of stocks in the 
portfolio, then the probability that the sponsor has to pay additional premium 
declines, but at the same time a higher level of premium is necessary because the 
expected return of the portfolio diminishes because of the lower weight of stocks.  
And as a result, the average indexation, that is the compensation for inflation, for 
the participants will probably decline, but also become less risky.  Thus, ALM 
allows to compare various investment and other pension fund policies in a 
stochastical way.  One should however be careful to take ALM-results as absolute 
results: the results compare relatively.  Heijmans does not take the outcome of the 
ALM-study literally that the average funding ratios eventually always will rise, 
because the rise stems from the fixed equity risk premium which is normally as an 
input for ALM.  So, judgment of senior investment professionals is needed to 
interpret the results, and to consider other scenarios as well.   
The scenario approach of Shell has had a first try-out for the investment 
management of the pension funds of Shell.  The subject of the workshop for 
investment management with the Shell Scenario team was the outlook for inflation, 
which at the same time determines the interest rate, often the biggest risk for the 
funding ratio of a pension fund, because the pension obligations are sensitive to 
changes in the interest rate.   
How to Make Scenarios 
Shell has a lot of experience with making scenarios.  How does making a scenario 
work in practice?  A multidisciplinary expertise is essential to overcome the 
problem of having an incomplete view of reality (Heijmans, 2014, p. 9).  For the 
workshop a certain type of people are needed.  For example, if only people who are 
accustomed to ALM studies participate then the workshop does not result in 
interesting scenarios because the traditional answers will probably result.  To make 
a workshop a success, a diversity of backgrounds is needed, because different kinds 
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of thinking are needed, for example the thinking of political scientists or 
philosophers when the outlook for inflation is discussed.  So external people from 
outside of SAMCo are being sought, preferably from other countries. To work with 
scenarios, senior people are needed and the participants have to be prepared, 
because people often feel comfortable with their acquired views.   
Some 10 to 15 people take part in a workshop.  A workshop in which the scenarios 
are built is based on conversation (ibid., p. 9).  The workshop may appear a 
somewhat chaotic process.  Various experts will present their view to an audience 
of Shell employees.  Then discussion follows and the facilitator of the workshop 
collects and categorizes statements.  During the workshop relationships between 
the statements are laid.  Heijmans explains that a workshop on the same topic other 
could yield other, not necessarily better or worse results as well, the results possess 
an element of serendipity.  Though what results from the process is out-of-the-box, 
non-traditional, and from different perspectives than the traditional model-based 
approach.  
The scenario team prepares the workshop by identifying the important trends, for 
example for inflation demographic trends are an input.  In the identification of 
trends, the so-called critical uncertainties, the most important uncertainties about 
say regulations, politics, or oil prices have to be discovered.  In the workshop the 
experts are asked to present their view on how the critical uncertainties could 
develop.  One caveat would be to merely present the extreme scenarios.  But to 
stress extreme scenarios does not work because it leads to confusion instead of 
results from the workshop.  
To illustrate the outcomes of the recent scenario exploration for the businesses of 
Shell, the scenarios ‘Mountains’, in which government policies dominate, and 
‘Oceans’, in which the markets dominate, are presented here: 
Mountains 
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The first scenario, labelled “mountains”, sees a strong role for government and the 
introduction of firm and far-reaching policy measures.  These help to develop 
more compact cities and transform the global transport network.  New policies 
unlock plentiful natural gas resources – making it the largest global energy source 
by the 2030s – and accelerate carbon capture and storage technology, supporting a 
cleaner energy system. 
Oceans 
The second scenario, which we call “oceans”, describes a more prosperous and 
volatile world.  Energy demand surges, due to strong economic growth.  Power is 
more widely distributed and governments take longer to agree major decisions. 
Market forces rather than policies shape the energy system: oil and coal remain 
part of the energy mix but renewable energy also grows.  By the 2070s solar 
becomes the world’s largest energy source (Shell, 2014). 
 
5.8: Innovative Case 3 Investment Beliefs  
Introduction Alfred Slager  
Alfred Slager is Professor of Pension Fund Management at the TIAS School for 
Business and Society in the Netherlands.  He has been working in investment 
management as a portfolio manager at Fortis Investments, policy advisor at 
PGGM, the Dutch Pension Fund for the Care and Welfare sector, and as the Chief 
Investment Officer of the Pension Fund of Stork.  Currently he is a trustee of the 
board for SPH, the pension fund of general practitioners in the Netherlands.  The 
text following is based on my interview with Slager, and is completed with 
additional information from the literature.  I conducted the interview with Slager 
on 17 March 2015. 
What are Investment Beliefs? 
Slager has pioneered, together with Kees Koedijk (2007, 2011) the field of 
investment beliefs.  The board of a pension fund or an investment manager has 
implicitly or explicitly beliefs, in other words ideas or convictions about investing.  
Investment beliefs consist of three parts: beliefs about the capital markets, the 
organization of the investments, and the society (Slager & Koedijk, 2007, p. 77).  
The reason that investors should examine their investment beliefs is because 
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finance lacks the epistemologically ‘certainty’ of physics, and, though data on 
financial markets are available in great quantities, models of financial markets 
mostly lack predictive power (ibid., p. 78).  The lack of an effective epistemology 
makes investment beliefs dominant for the investment policy executed in practice.  
Investment beliefs are, however, often tacit, and need to be clear to improve the 
performance of investing: 
Investment beliefs improve stakeholder governance by reducing possible conflicts 
of interest, and charge the innovative adaptability of an organization by setting 
guidelines for best practice.  Managers need to formulate their own investment 
beliefs: a clear view on how they perceive the way capital markets work, and how 
their organizations can add value and strive for excellence (Slager & Koedijk, 
2007, p. 77).  
Another reason for the importance of articulating investment beliefs, is that 
changing beliefs is easier if the beliefs are known. This knowledge is instrumental 
for effective reflection on the results, and the (potential) need to adapt in changing 
financial markets.  Beliefs have to be measured if possible: ex-ante as evidence to 
support a belief, and ex-post to sustain to a belief or to change it.   
The approach to formulate investment beliefs originated from the practice of 
investment management.  Slager has experienced that applying investment theory 
is not self-evident in practice, for example the optimization procedure for risk and 
return as proposed by Markowitz (1952, 1959) is not an effective tool because the 
data input can lead to non-sensical portfolios.  Another example is that the results 
of active management, the pursuit to outperform a benchmark, are doubtful.  In 
general, investment theory needs interpretation to be put to use fruitfully in 
practice.  The interpretation of investment theory is also a part of the investment 
beliefs.   
Dutch pension funds have shown interest in working with investments beliefs.  
Slager has advised some 30 Dutch pension funds in articulating their investment 
beliefs, some more in-depth than others.  For a thorough review, boards of pension 
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funds need to invest time to discuss their investment beliefs, because, again, the 
beliefs often are implicit.  Of the 30 pension funds, two-thirds ended up in 
successfully describing their investment beliefs, the other third did not fully pursue 
the process of investigating their beliefs. 
Beliefs about Capital Markets  
The beliefs about capital markets can be clustered in four themes: risk premiums, 
diversification, market inefficiencies and the investment horizon (Koedijk & 
Slager, 2011).  I will not treat the themes in depth here because the themes have 
been treated at length in the dissertation.  The existence of a risk premium of stocks 
and other investments is a basic belief for investors.  According to Slager, not to 
believe in the risk premium would be to disbelief the future success of capitalism, 
which has achieved economic growth by achieving a higher return than risk free 
investments by taking risk.  Market efficiencies are beliefs about beating the 
market index, a subject which has been treated in the dissertation in Chapter 2.  
Koedijk & Slager (2011, p. 79) advise boards of pension funds to be careful about 
active investment strategies because there no clear proof that such strategies deliver 
persistent excess returns after costs.  Koedijk & Slager (2011, p. 102) stress that 
diversification may not work in a time of crisis on the financial markets, and advise 
to look at the economic ratio of new asset categories if they are meant for 
diversification.  The subject of diversification has been treated in the dissertation in 
Chapter 2.  The fourth aspect of the investment horizon is about the flawed notion 
that a longer horizon diminishes investment risk.  The investment horizon and its 
pitfalls have also been a subject of Chapter 2 of the dissertation in the appendix.  
Koedijk and Slager apply an evidence-based approach here; it is not their 
individual investment opinion that guides these proposals, but rather the state of 
empirical research, seen through the lens of a decision maker of a pension fund. 
Beliefs about the Organization of Investments  
The organizational beliefs about investments matter for governance.  Concerning 
the investment beliefs about governance, the principal-agent problem in investment 
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management often is overlooked.  The agents, the asset managers, have other 
interests other than the principal, the board of the pension fund, and ultimately the 
participants.  The asset managers pursue their ideas as investors.  The principal, the 
board of the pension fund generally lack detailed or expert insight into investment 
management, also because it takes a number of years to become aware and to 
understand what investing is about, and by then board members may have left or 
changed roles.  Key is that the governance investment beliefs are formulated 
according to the interests of the participants.  Slager & Koedijk (2007) refer for the 
theory of governmental beliefs to the agency theory of Jensen & Meckling (1976).  
Awareness of agency problems should lead to minimizing agency costs, which 
consist of the monitoring costs of the principal, the bonding cost that the agent 
makes to demonstrate that the agent works in the interest of the principal, and the 
residual loss, the cost that remains because of the imperfection of the monitoring of 
the principal.  
The societal beliefs concern values such as the environment and human rights 
which are to be considered by Dutch pension funds in their investment policy.  An 
oversight of the practices of responsible investing in the Netherlands can be found 
in Koedijk & Slager (2011, pp. 190-204).   
What Should Be Done about the Current State of Finance? 
A key question is how the theory and practice of finance can be changed.  Besides 
engaging agency theory in practice as discussed, the practical side of behavioral 
finance can be put to use in investment practice.  Slager refers to Gigerenzer (1999 
with Todd, 2000) as an author on behavioural finance who has practical relevance 
(see also Chapter 2 of the dissertation in which the ideas of Gigerenzer are treated). 
Another theme which is underexposed in finance and economics is that economics 
is also political economics.  Economics is not merely a technical subject, but also 
deals with values such as fairness and the distribution of wealth.  Analogous to 
economics, finance is not seen as a political subject, but nevertheless has ethical 
231 
 
value aspects: money is not neutral and influences people as it potentially can make 
them greedy, negatively affecting the alignment between principal and agent.  This 
phenomenon is generally attributed to the financial sector at large.  However, this 
occurs at all levels; within boards, between boards and their executive offices, as 
well as between the pension fund and asset manager. Here too, the formulation of 
beliefs (and the organizational embedding) provides a self-disciplining mechanism 
to potentially counter these effects.  The depoliticization of finance has been a 
subject in the dissertation in the current Chapter.   
Despite that Slager would like to see that more attention to ethics would change 
behaviour of the organizations and professionals involved in investing, he does not 
expect that ethics is the solution to improve the current state of finance.  However, 
he posits that the sector should not be afraid to make fiduciary and ethical norms 
more explicit than is the case today.  Rather, the focus in the Netherlands is on 
making the pension contract explicit, but this does not induce change.  As an 
example he refers to the effects of the ERISA laws of the United States.  ERISA is 
the abbreviation of ‘Employee Retirement Income Security Act’ of 1974) and is 
meant to protect participants of pension scheme by setting standards of, and 
disclosure for, conduct of pension funds in the United States.  ERISA forces for 
example a constant urge to investors to explain why investments are made in the 
interest of the participants, and sharpens trustee’s minds on what really matters in 
the principal-agent dilemma’s that they might face.  
To change the practice of finance, Slager does not strongly believe that changing 
the finance education would change the practice.  First, it would be difficult to 
fundamentally change the finance education because the received view of finance 
dominates strongly and would basically require a whole new generation of tutors, 
textbooks and method of teaching.  Second, there is the alluring career perspective 
to consider.  Students of finance simply find active management more appealing 
than passive investment as advocated by the theory of efficient markets.  Ending on 
a more positive note, placing more focus on the institutional and ethical context of 
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investment discussion will help change the mindset, yet slowly.  Also a form of 
belief, in Slager’s view. 
5.9: Values, Conversations, their Justification, and Innovation 
The Values of Investors 
Klamer regards values as an important aspect of culture.  The values of a culture 
are not evident and therefore have to be interpreted.  Emerging from my personal 
observations, the interviews, the literature, and the dissertation, in my view, the 
prime shared values of investors are wealth, optimism, and rationalism.   
 
Wealth 
The investment of capital in the financial markets aims to earn money for future 
income or consumption, or to preserve capital.  An intriguing point about the 
culture of investing is that wealth, money, cannot actually be an end, because 
money is always instrumental to achieve something else (Klamer, 2014, p. 9).  
Values are about what is important in life, the ‘things’ we strive for.  Klamer uses 
the oikos, the home, as an example of a value which will probably be important to 
most of us.  So, we have to understand the values of the people for whom is 
invested.  Indeed, institutional investors must be interested in the values of their 
clients, also because investing is an instrument with uncertain outcomes.  
Accepting the uncertain outcomes of investing as an instrument is a leap of faith. 
 
Optimism 
The public expects stocks to deliver a positive return above bonds in the long run.  
The optimism in the culture of investing roots in our liberal, free-market society.  
The free-market system has realized a remarkable high economic growth 
(McCloskey, 2010).  Economic growth and profits are related: in general higher 
economic growth means higher profits.  And, higher profits mean in general higher 
prices of stocks.  In Chapter 4, I have argumented that the transfer mechanism of 
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economic growth (not a sure thing either) to stock prices is more complicated and 
uncertain than explained here.   
The level of optimism about the stock market varies.  In a boom time the optimism 
is at its highest level and shared by professional investors and the investing public 
alike: investing then becomes a part of the popular culture.  The optimism of 
investors in a boom, makes being negative on the outlook of the stock market a 
taboo, because people are too eager to become rich.  Probably therefore, no 
forecaster is easily held accountable for his optimism.  I cannot recall investors in 
the Netherlands who lost their job after the credit crisis of 2008, because they were 
accused of too much optimism.  An exception of a person held accountable was, as 
told in Chapter 2, Irving Fisher, who is even nowadays remembered for his 
unfortunate optimistic prediction in October 1929 before the crash.  As a matter of 
culture, the optimistic sayings of experts are part of the ritual of investing.  In times 
of bust, professional investors will maintain their optimism.  Professional investors 
who doubt on the optimism will have a hard time functioning in the culture of 
investing and probably will pursue another career.  So, self-selection of 
professional investors ensures a continuing optimism.   
My observation has been that the optimism about investing is both present in 
commercial and non-commercial institutions.  A commercial setting can however 
stimulate investors to be more optimistic because doubt does not persuade clients.  
Also will personal character traits encourage some professional investors, though 
not the majority, to leverage their beliefs.   
 
Rationalism 
Handling uncertainty, a feeling of anxiety, has since long been a universal part of 
culture (Hofstede et al, 2007).   Using a predictive method handles uncertainty by 
replacing a feeling of uncertainty with a rationalistic method.  Since the 1860s, 
vernacular science has modelled investing after engineering, and has promoted 
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rational behaviour as the role model for investors (Preda, 2006).  Rational 
behaviour consists of self-control and the study of information.  Vernacular science 
results in the efficient market theory and the use of the statistical approach as 
explained at length in Chapter 2.  The analysis of the rhetoric of investment theory 
has also demonstrated that modernism is form of rationalism that has heavily 
influenced current investment theory and practice.  Predictionism is a form of 
modernism and expresses itself in investment theory in the form of teleological 
equilibrium thinking, valuation theory, and stochastical predictability. 
The Conversations of Investors 
Besides values, Klamer has proposed to investigate conversations as an utterance 
of culture.  In my view, the archetypical conversations of investors, again emerging 
from my personal observations, the interviews, the literature, and the dissertation, 
are about ‘The market and the economy’, ‘Talk by the model’, ‘Money must be put 
to work’ and ‘Doubt and reassurance’.  The archetypical conversations can, of 
course, be combined. 
The Market and the Economy  
As an investor you have to be informed about the news, so the media, views of 
brokers, and the development on the markets are important.  Investors talk a lot 
about developments on the markets and the economy, and interpret the 
development in order to be able to make decisions.  Though the media look like 
objective observers, they spread the ideas about the markets.  Brokers do 
effectively the same thing as media. 
Talk by the Model 
As often in complex phenomena, a rationalisation is needed to get in control.  It is 
the same for financial markets.  For example quantitative models based on 
investment theory supply information, input, to the conversations and decisions of 
investors.  The models make a conversation possible about risk and return of 
investments, or the selection of stocks.  Models also legitimise investment 
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decisions, for example: ‘If we enlarge our stake in stocks with 10% our risk return 
profile will benefit’.  
Money Must Be Put to Work 
An argument heard often argument in the conversations about investing is that 
money on a savings account should be replaced by investments, because money 
should, instead of doing nothing, be activated in the financial market.  De Goede 
(2005) also discusses this theme.  The same kind of discussions take for example 
place about bonds versus stocks or other securities.  The discussions about putting 
money to work tend to be about taking more risk, and are often based on optimism. 
Doubt and Reassurance 
A discourse such as about investing has to be repeated frequently.  The cycle of 
doubt and reassurance fits in the discourse as Shiller (2000) has demonstrated by 
his analysis of interviewers of the media and investment professionals.  The 
interviewer asks critical questions about the financial markets, and the investment 
professionals reassures the interviewer. The interview ends with a supportive view 
of the market.  The same kind of conversations about the markets, specific 
investments, or investment strategies take place between a client and an investment 
expert or advisor.  Obviously, the conversation of doubt and reassurance is needed 
because of the uncertainty of investing.     
The Justification of the Culture of Investing 
How to relate Klamer’s investigation of the culture of economics to that of the 
culture of investing?  The culture of economics is about getting attention.  Instead 
of on attention, the culture of investing concentrates on wealth.  Conceptually, the 
legitimization of a conversation can consist of three parts: a transcendental 
justification (religion or truth), a social justification (the meaning for society), and 
a personal justification (such as the need to make a living) (Klamer, 2007, pp. 47-
48).  Getting attention in economics is a social justification.  To consider truth as 
the only effective contribution, would reflect the philosophical realist position: for 
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short, the realist position expects a theory to conform to the external world, and so 
to be true in the notion of truth as correspondence to the external world.  But 
effective contributions can also be established if they are meaningful or interesting, 
for example because a contribution aids to understanding.  A contribution can also 
be pragmatic, for example by giving guidelines for what to do.  Yet, in the end, the 
contribution of a conversation has to be effective.  The conversation must be able to 
sensibly answer the ‘So what?’ question.   
For investing, the ‘So what?’ question is whether the investments lead to more 
wealth.  McCloskey puts the forecasting abilities of investor to the test by asking 
the ‘So what?’ question in the form of the American question: “If You’re So Smart 
Why Ain’t You Rich? (1990).”  The answer to the question is one of common 
sense: investors earn a living by ‘selling’ their predictions, but cannot really 
predict.  The social justification of investing is to make money by investing to 
provide future income or wealth to the owners.  The personal justification for 
investors is that they make a living out of making money for their clients, and 
probably that they like or need their job.  Investing has a transcendental 
justification as well, investing is nowadays a matter of unquestioned faith (De 
Goede, 2005).  Like economics, finance is depoliticized and viewed as a technical 
subject, not a moral subject.   
 
What about truth as a justification for investing?  Investors need theories to help 
them act, but are the theories really true, or are they to be viewed as practical 
guides?  In Chapter 4 the scientific context of modernism was treated.  Modernism 
has moulded investment theory into a stochastical predictive framework.  
Modernism is a part of the background culture of investment theory and is a 
possible explanation for the depoliticization of finance.  The denial of the 
normative aspect in modernist science intents to keep science confined to truth.  In 
finance, a statistical formulation leads to the idea that the applied theory of 
statistics is meaningful.  But an improper theory of statistics fools one into the 
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feeling of certainty, and does not explain nor predict financial markets.  Of course, 
efficient markets are an interesting notion of modern finance, just like 
diversification and value: theories have a worth for themselves, but does that make 
them a good guide for practice?  In practice, the ideas of finance together with 
other ideas serve as a practical guide, like engineering serves to build a bridge.  But 
investing is not like engineering, because the analogy of economics as mechanical 
physics does not hold (Knight, 1921). 
 
Evaluation of Innovative Practices 
An interesting outcome of investigating practice is that practice combines various 
theoretical and practical viewpoints as a matter of phronesis, as foreseen by 
Klamer.  Kocken uses his insight gained as a risk manager that VaR-models based 
on portfolio theory do not function, to implement stress testing as the alternative.  
Stress testing is not based on statistics.  Furthermore, he combines the insight of 
Minsky’s instability hypothesis, a non-mainstream macro-economic theory, as an 
argument for better risk management by stress testing.  To understand why risk and 
investment professionals stick to the current investment theory, he applies insights 
from behavioural finance.  He also advocates the bottom-up approach of 
evolutionary finance.  Concerning investment theory, he advocates the use of 
option theory.  Options make sure that downside risk is covered.  
Slager combines insights from the practice of investing with management and 
agency theory.  He asks a Socratic question when he asks investors what beliefs 
they have about investing, and takes uncertainty as a starting point.  Next, he 
emphasizes that organizational aspects are important in investing, that management 
matters.  He also underpins the agency problem for pension funds, which in 
essence reflects the metaphor of investing as power relations between the 
participants, the board of the pension fund, and the investment managers. 
The Shell scenarios approach applied to investing by Heijmans, is of a non-
stochastical character.  Mechanical statistical forecasting has not been effective in 
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the past for the business of Shell and is regarded as an enemy to thinking.  In 
essence, the scenario approach is about the social construction of a potential future, 
founded on uncertainty, conversation, and practical wisdom.  The scenario 
approach has emerged from management practice, the management of uncertainty. 
Kocken and Heijmans share the conviction that scenario thinking is a better 
alternative for investing than applying statistical models.  But both acknowledge 
that statistical models have a specific benefit as well.  In my words, statistical 
models for investing reveal how stakeholders of a pension fund or parties in an 
option contract divide risk and return: in essence, the models try to quantify 
statistically the equity, the fairness of the distribution of risk and return between 
parties involved.  The quantification serves to make the fairness between 
stakeholders or parties visible, and is not meant, or should be understood, as a 
specific prediction.  Yet, the model is useful, because it provides an insight which 
would otherwise not have been available.  
Many ideas and practices exist to change the theory and practice of finance.  
Besides entrepreneurship in the financial services, changing education is important 
to Kocken. Therefore he has launched a MSc in Risk Management with a 
multidisciplinary approach.  He also tries to reach a wider audience for the failing 
of economics and finance with the documentary Boom Bust Boom.  Furthermore he 
supports student organizations that demand more pluralist education in economics.  
Concerning science, he suggests that economics and finance should investigate the 
complexity of economic and financial markets phenomena with a bottom-up 
approach.  Slager suggest that, besides agency theory, the practical side of 
behavioral finance can be put to use in investment practice by the ideas of 
Gigerenzer.  Further he suggest that finance is to be regarded as a political subject, 
because money is not neutral.  Slager expects that laws could change the behaviour 
of investors.  As an example he refers to the effects of the ERISA laws of the 
United States.   
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In the dissertation, other ideas to change finance have had attention as well: the 
alternative investment theory with the statistical theory of Mandelbrot, bubble 
theory, evolutionary finance, political finance, the analysis of rhetoric, the analysis 
of culture, ethics in the form of virtue and value ethics, and financial history.  A 
more heterogeneous culture of academic finance and investment practice could 
accommodate the ideas mentioned: the alternatives for modern investment theory 
are plenty.  How to make the culture of finance more heterogeneous?  That starts 
with awareness of the current problems, the introduction of multiform metaphors 
for investment theory, and handling the ambiguity of theory uncertainty, that is 
having competing theories of finance, by presenting, explaining and elaborating the 
alternatives.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions  
Mainstream investment theory assumes stochastical prediction.  Stochastical 
prediction is a special apodictic form of prediction, which makes the characteristics 
of a group of outcomes predictable, like the outcomes of throwing a dice.  In the 
dissertation the central question was: What grounds the use of stochastical 
predictability in investment theory? The question has no simple answer because the 
assumption is implicit in investment theory and backed by statistical theories, of 
which the assumptions are implicit as well.  To get a complete answer to the 
question of the foundations of stochastical predictability in investment theory, the 
dissertation used the form of a rhetorical analysis, enriched by uncertainty 
economics, philosophy of statistics,  history, culture, innovative practices, and 
literature on alternative investment theories.  The purpose of the dissertation is that 
it should result in a refutation of stochastical predictability in investment theory. 
 
We will now look at the answers to the subquestions of the dissertation: 
 
1. What is the rhetoric of investment theory?   
The analysis of the rhetoric of investment theory in the dissertation is grounded on 
the approach of the rhetoric of economics by McCloskey.  Therefore, the rhetoric 
of investment theory is, among other things, about the discourse and metaphors 
(constitutional ideas) of investment theory.  The history of investment theory 
provides a good starting point for a discussion of its discourse.  Since the 1960s, 
finance and neoclassical economics belong together, which the name financial 
economics demonstrates.  Yet, the notion that investment theory is a young science 
and merely has existed since the 1960s is flawed.  Finance as relevant for 
investment theory has existed since the 13th century and is grounded on actuarial 
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science and probability theory.   The legitimization in the 1860s of investing in 
stocks, which until the 19th century were associated with gambling, is done by 
vernacular science which results in efficient market theories, because it included 
probabilistic and abstract reasoning.   
 
Another part of the discourse of investment theory stems from McCloskey’s 
analysis of the rhetoric of economics.  After all, investment theory belongs to 
economics since the 1960s.  McCloskey’s discourse analysis considers economics 
as a product of the modernistic scientific culture of logical positivism, which has 
led to a dogmatic emphasis on prediction, mathematics, and statistical significance 
testing.   
To complete the discourse of investment theory with other findings in the 
dissertation, investment theory is characterized by stochastical equilibrium 
theories.  Markowitz’s portfolio theory uses the theory of valuation which assumes 
that the price of a security will tend to its intrinsic, equilibrium, value.  In the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, the continuation of Markowitz’s portfolio theory, 
informational efficiency ensures an equilibrium of risk and return.   
 
The main metaphor in Markowitz’s investment theory is the claim that investment 
management is mathematical statistics, in which investment returns are a 
probability distribution.  The application of mathematical statistics assumes 
calculability and distracts the attention from uncertainty.  The second metaphor in 
Markowitz’s theory is the machine, which can be recognized in the language of, 
and aspiration to efficiency.  The machine metaphor focusses on the process parts 
of reaching efficiency, such as the efficiency criteria and the algorithms, and 
beliefs are treated merely as inputs for the calculating machine. 
The dominant metaphor in the CAPM is the equilibrium: the market of investments 
is in balance because of informational efficiency and rational expectations.  In 
equilibrium, risk and return have become predictable.  Equilibrium and 
predictability are exchangeable.  The second important metaphor is the 
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informational efficiency.  It is again a machine metaphor, but now concerning the 
processing of information.  Because of informational efficiency the market of 
investments is at any time in balance:  new information is immediately being 
processed into a new equilibrium. 
 
2. What philosophy of statistics is applied in investment theory?   
The arguments for assuming stochastical predictability are founded on a theory of 
statistics.  The various theories of statistics have implicit assumptions about the 
structure of reality, in other words, the theories of statistics have different 
philosophies of probability.  Markowitz proposes to use subjective, personal 
probabilities for decision making with his portfolio theory.  Markowitz’s theory is 
grounded on Savage’s personal probability theory in which the reliability of the 
probability beliefs is irrelevant.  The theory of objective probabilities, aka the 
frequency theory, founds the CAPM.  The ergodic assumption as used in the 
rational expectation hypothesis in the CAPM assumes that objective probability 
information is available from past data.   
 
3. What are the arguments for uncertainty as the opposite of predictability?   
Non-mainstream economics assumes unpredictability instead of predictability and 
has heavily debated predictability and statistics.  Their arguments against 
predictability and statistics are an important source for making the case against 
predictability.  Knight calls stochastical predictability ‘risk’: a situation under risk 
results in certainty when a ‘whole’ group of cases is available.  He calls a situation 
without stochastical predictability ‘uncertain’.  Economic and investing phenomena 
float in between risk and irreducible uncertainty, and are called ‘uncertain’.  
Uncertainty means that the probabilities are unmeasurable.  Keynes relates 
financial markets explicitly to uncertainty, and invents an investment theory upon 
rational expectations under uncertainty.  Furthermore, he introduces the role of 
animal spirits in economic phenomena, which contrast rationality.  Von Mises’s 
argument for uncertainty is first that intent human action features teleological 
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causality, which cannot be predicted, and second that natural sciences do not 
predict the world as a whole either, so why claim predictability for economics?  
McCloskey refutes uncertainty by the absence of profitable predictability: if 
forecasting is easy, economists would get rich by exploiting their knowledge.  
Taleb’s argument for uncertainty is that black swans determine risk and returns of 
investments; but one cannot predict black swans.   
I have also presented a thought experiment about the assumption of stochastical 
predictability in investment theory.  The experiment puts the statistical outcomes of 
modern investment theory to the test of risk-free arbitrage, that is the other 
dominant branch of investment theory, which implies, in contrast to modern 
portfolio theory, certainty of outcomes.  The thought experiment uses the paradigm 
of risk-free arbitrage of finance to illustrate that the paradigm of predictability of 
finance is flawed. 
 
4. Do alternative investment theories offer a better explanation, modelling, 
prediction or handling method?   
Modern investment theory has interesting rivals, which have in common that they 
do not pretend to predict financial markets.  The alternative theories aim at 
explanation or modelling of financial markets.  The ideological criticism of modern 
finance, political finance, uses elements of behavioural and bubble criticisms, and 
combines them with the criticism on free markets in general.  Mandelbrot’s fractal 
finance provides within the rational mathematical tradition an alternative statistical 
theory, which models seemingly predictive patterns in financial markets, wild 
volatility, and bubbles.  The bubble theory explains how bubbles in (financial) 
markets arise.  Behavioural finance is insightful and helps to reflect on decision 
making, and explains behaviour of market participants.  The bottom-up approach 
of evolutionary finance yields an interesting alternative to the top-down approach 
of modern investment theory.  Concerning the depth of the rival theories of 
finance, they all have substantial backing and empirical proofs which can compete 
scientifically with modern investment theory.  
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5. Can virtue and value ethics compensate the assumed epistemological 
deficiencies of investment theory in decision making?   
If the epistemology of mainstream and alternative investment theories is not suited 
for predicting, practical reason in the form of virtue or value ethics can become 
relevant, also because the ethics in economics and investment theory is reduced to 
merely the rationality of prudence.  Both McCloskey’s virtue approach and 
Klamer’s value approach can compensate the lack in epistemological strength of 
modern investment theory.  McCloskey’s approach tries to ensure a balanced 
approach by reminding us of all the seven virtues, Klamer’s approach is a way of 
sense making for individuals at home or in an organisation, and is embedded in the 
virtues that McCloskey proposes.   
 
6. What explanations offers an investigation of the culture of investing for the use 
of investment theory?   
As an extension of rhetoric, the perspective of Klamer’s approach of the culture of 
economics is relevant and applicable to investing, because culture is extension of 
rhetoric and relates to uncertainty.  Uncertainty, a feeling of anxiety, is handled by 
culture in numerous ways.  In Klamer’s approach of culture, values and 
conversations are central.  In my view, the prime shared values of Dutch 
institutional investors are:  
 
• Wealth: the investment of capital in the financial markets aims to earn 
money for future income or consumption, or to preserve capital.  A 
problem here is that money is never an end, but a means.  
 
• Optimism: the optimistic sayings of investment experts are part of the 
ritual of investing.  Even in times of bust, professional investors will 
maintain their optimism.   
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• Rationalism: Using a predictive method handles uncertainty by replacing a 
feeling of uncertainty with a rationalistic method.  Rational behaviour 
further consists of self-control and the study of information.   
In my view, the archetypical conversations of investors are about ‘The market and 
the economy’, ‘Talk by the model’, ‘Money must be put to work’ and ‘Doubt and 
reassurance’.   
Purpose of the dissertation 
The purpose of the dissertation was to investigate  stochastical predictability in 
investment theory.  The investigation of stochastical predictability is relevant for 
science, but also for investors, the financial sector, policymakers, bankers, and the 
society at large, because treating unpredictability as predictability can and did harm 
the economy and people’s wealth.  The proof of unpredictability lies outside the 
paradigm of statistics, because statistics assumes that the substrate that produces 
probability outcomes is stable.  The inference to the best explanation that 
investment returns are unpredictable, based on the extensive reflection in the 
dissertation, seems more persuasive than the arguments of investment theory that 
personal or objective probability beliefs predict.   
 
The new proposed rhetoric, discourse, for investment theory is that investing takes 
place under Knightian uncertainty, which makes statistics supportive rather than 
dominant in decision making.  So, investment theory should become more a moral 
science and less an engineering one: it is about judgments, combining virtue and 
value ethics with historical and theoretical insights, also from alternative 
investment theories, aka heterodox finance, which can enrich mainstream 
investment theory and guide practice.  An interesting outcome of the investigation 
of a number of innovative investment cases in practice is that innovative practice 
combines various theoretical and practical viewpoints as a matter of practical 
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wisdom, to mention a few: stress testing, the use of option theory to reduce risk, 
management theory, agency theory, or a scenarios approach. 
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Summary 
Uncertainty is a feeling of anxiety and a part of culture since the dawn of 
civilization.  Civilizations have invented numerous ways to cope with uncertainty.  
Technology has been directed against natural uncertainties, law against behavioural 
uncertainties, and religion against transcendental uncertainties.  In investment 
theory, the technology of mathematical statistics treats uncertainty of the future 
outcomes of financial markets by the metaphor of the machine, as if investments 
can be engineered to a maximum efficiency of risk and return, and financial 
markets process information in a machine-like efficient way.  Yet, the competing 
economic theory of uncertainty stresses for example the metaphor of the organism, 
which highlights change instead of stability. 
The rhetoric as the discourse of investment theory uncovers that the theory of 
statistics is a blind spot in the current conversation about investment theory and 
practice.  Probability and prediction in investment theory look like a tying sale, 
since investment theory is founded on stochastical predictability.  The proof of 
unpredictability lies outside the paradigm of statistics, because statistics assumes 
that the substrate, that produces probability outcomes, is stable.  The inference to 
the best explanation that investment returns are unpredictable, seems more 
persuasive than the arguments of investment theory that personal or objective 
probability beliefs predict.   
 
The theory of objective probabilities founds the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) but does not stochastically predict, and neither do Markowitz’s subjective 
probabilities for his portfolio theory.  The ergodic assumption as used in the 
rational expectation hypothesis assumes that objective probability information is 
available from past data.  The assumption which accommodates stochastical 
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changes, is needed to make financial economics a predictive science.  But past data 
cannot predict the future stochastically because unexpected changes occur. 
 
For example Keynes’s theory of uncertain expectations contrasts the contemporary 
investment theory of the CAPM, and seems more relevant.  His alternative 
investment theory implies that rational expectations do not lead to predictability, 
but to instability.  To my opinion the efficient market hypothesis did not go far 
enough be merely denying predictability in active management, but should have 
led to the logical conclusion that return and risk of financial markets are 
unpredictable either.   
 
Statistical models for investing have a function, despite that they cannot predict: 
they reveal how stakeholders of a pension fund or parties in an option contract 
divide risk and return: in essence, the models try to quantify statistically the equity, 
the fairness of the distribution of risk and return between parties involved.  The 
quantification serves to make the fairness between stakeholders or parties visible, 
and is not meant, or should be understood, as a specific prediction.  The statistical 
model is useful, because it provides an insight which would otherwise not have 
been available.  
 
In the dissertation, a lot of ideas to change finance have had attention: the 
alternative statistical theory of Mandelbrot, bubble theory, political finance, the 
analysis of rhetoric, the analysis of culture, innovative practices, ethics in the form 
of virtue and value ethics, and the history of finance.  A more heterogeneous 
culture of academic finance and investment practice could accommodate the ideas 
mentioned: the alternatives for modern investment theory are plenty.  How to make 
the culture of finance more heterogeneous?  That starts with awareness of the 
current problems, the introduction of multiform metaphors for investment theory, 
and handling the ambiguity of theory uncertainty, by presenting explaining and 
elaborating the alternatives.   
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Samenvatting 
Onzekerheid is een gevoel van ongerichte angst en een onderdeel van cultuur sinds 
het begin van de beschaving.  Beschavingen hebben tal van manieren bedacht om  
onzekerheid te bestrijden.  Zo is technologie gericht tegen onzekerheden uit de 
natuur, zijn wetten ontwikkeld tegen onzekerheden in het gedrag van mensen, en is 
religie ontstaan als antwoord op transcendentale onzekerheden.  In de 
beleggingstheorie, behandelt wiskundige statistiek onzekerheid over de 
toekomstige rendementen op de financiële markten met behulp van de machine 
metafoor, alsof het risico en rendement van beleggingen tot een efficiënt niveau 
kunnen worden geconstrueerd, en financiële markten informatie machinaal op een 
efficiënte manier verwerken.  De concurrerende economische theorie die 
onzekerheid juist centraal stelt, gaat bijvoorbeeld uit van de metafoor van het 
organisme, die verandering in plaats van stabiliteit benadrukt. 
 
De theorie van de statistiek vormt een blinde vlek in de huidige conversatie over de 
beleggingstheorie en praktijk.  Waarschijnlijkheidstheorie en voorspelbaarheid van 
beleggingsrendementen lijken wel een koppelverkoop, omdat beleggingstheorie is 
gebaseerd op stochastische voorspelbaarheid.  Het bewijs van onvoorspelbaarheid 
ligt echter buiten het paradigma van de statistiek, want de statistiek veronderstelt 
dat de ondergrond die uitkomsten produceert, stabiel is.  De meest plausibele 
verklaring lijkt echter dat beleggingsrendementen onvoorspelbaar zijn.  De 
argumenten voor onvoorspelbaarheid lijken overtuigender dan de argumenten van 
de beleggingstheorie voor voorspelbaarheid, die mede zijn gebaseerd op de 
statistische theorieën. 
 
De statistische theorie van objectieve waarschijnlijkheid fundeert het 
marktevenwichtsmodel op van de financiële markten, het Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM).  De ergodische veronderstelling, zoals gebruikt in de hypothese 
van rationele verwachtingen gaat ervan uit dat objectieve waarschijnlijkheden 
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afleidbaar zijn uit historische gegevens.  Deze veronderstelling is nodig om van 
financiële economie een voorspellende wetenschap te maken.  Maar gegevens uit 
het verleden voorspellen niet op een stochastische manier, omdat in de toekomst 
onverwachte veranderingen optreden. 
 
Keynes’ theorie over onzekere verwachtingen staat in contrast tot het CAPM en 
lijkt relevanter.  Zijn alternatieve beleggingstheorie impliceert dat rationele 
verwachtingen niet leiden tot voorspelbaarheid, maar tot instabiliteit.  Naar mijn 
mening is de efficiënte markt hypothese in het CAPM niet ver genoeg 
doorgetrokken: wel ontkent het CAPM de mogelijkheid van extra rendement door 
actief beheer op de financiële markten, maar het CAPM gaat desalniettemin uit van 
de voorspelbaarheid van risico en rendement van financiële markten.   
 
Statistische modellen voor beleggen hebben als functie dat ze in kaart brengen hoe 
belanghebbenden bij bijvoorbeeld een pensioenfonds, of partijen in een 
optiecontract, risico en rendement verdelen: in essentie proberen dit type modellen 
met statistiek de rechtvaardigheid van de verdeling van risico en rendement tussen 
de betrokken partijen te kwantificeren.  Deze kwantificering is echter geen 
voorspelling.  
  
In het proefschrift hebben diverse ideeën om de beleggingstheorie en de praktijk te 
veranderen aandacht gekregen: de alternatieve statistische theorie van Mandelbrot, 
zeepbeltheorie, politieke finance, de analyse van de retoriek, de analyse van de 
cultuur, innovatieve praktijken, ethiek in de vorm van deugd- en waarde-ethiek, en 
de geschiedenis van finance.  De alternatieve beleggingstheorieën verdienen meer 
aandacht in de universitaire wereld.  En, hoe kan cultuur van beleggers de 
alternatieve beleggingstheorieën adopteren?  Dat begint met een groter bewustzijn 
van de problemen van de huidige beleggingstheorie, de omarming van een 
pluriforme benadering van beleggingstheorie, en het verder uitwerken van de 
alternatieve beleggingstheorieën en deugd- en waarde ethiek, in theorie en praktijk.  
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